United Nations S/PV.3513

Security Council

Fiftieth Year

Provisional

3513th Meeting

Thursday, 6 April 1995, 5.10 p.m.

New York

President:	Mr. Kovanda	(Czech Republic)
Members:	Argentina	Mr. Cárdenas
	Botswana	Mr. Legwaila
	China	Mr. Li Zhaoxing
	France	Mr. Mérimée
	Germany	Mr. Graf zu Rantzau
	Honduras	Mr. Martinez Blanco
	Indonesia	Mr. Wibisono
	Italy	Mr. Fulci
	Nigeria	Mr. Gambari
	Oman	Mr. Al-Sameen
	Russian Federation	Mr. Lavrov
	Rwanda	Mr. Bakuramutsa
	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	Sir David Hannay
	United States of America	Mr. Gnehm

Agenda

The situation in Somalia

Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Somalia submitted in pursuance of paragraph 13 of Security Council resolution 954 (1994) (S/1995/231)

95-85260 (E)

This record contains the original text of speeches delivered in English and interpretations of speeches delivered in the other languages. The final text will be printed in the *Official Records of the Security Council*. Corrections should be submitted to original speeches only. They should be incorporated in a copy of the record and be sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned, *within one week of the date of publication*, to the Chief of the Verbatim Reporting Section, room C-178.

The meeting was called to order at 5.10 p.m.

Tribute to the memory of the victims of genocide in Rwanda

The President: On the occasion of the first anniversary of the tragedy that befell Rwanda and shocked the world, I should like, on behalf of the members of the Council, to convey our deepest sympathy and condolences to the survivors of the Rwanda genocide. It is the hope of the members of the Council that, with the help of the international community, Rwanda and its people will attain lasting peace and stability.

I invite the members of the Council to stand and observe a minute of silence in memory of those who lost their lives during the genocide.

The members of the Security Council observed a minute of silence.

Expression of thanks to the retiring President

The President: As this is the first meeting of the Security Council for the month of April, I should like to take this opportunity to pay tribute, on behalf of the Council, to His Excellency Mr. Li Zhaoxing, Permanent Representative of China to the United Nations, for his service as President of the Security Council for the month of March. I am sure that I speak for all members of the Security Council in expressing deep appreciation to Ambassador Li for the great diplomatic skill and unfailing courtesy with which he conducted the Council's business last month.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

The situation in Somalia

Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Somalia submitted in pursuance of paragraph 13 of Security Council resolution 954 (1994) (S/1995/231)

The President: The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. The Security Council is meeting in accordance with the understanding reached during its prior consultations.

Members of the Council have before them the report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Somalia submitted in pursuance of paragraph 13 of Security Council resolution 954 (1994), document S/1995/231.

Following consultations among members of the Security Council, I have been authorized to make the following statement on behalf of the Council.

"The Security Council has considered carefully the report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Somalia dated 28 March 1995 (S/1995/231) and notes the successful conclusion of the withdrawal of UNOSOM II forces from Somalia. It expresses its appreciation to those Governments and agencies that have provided the personnel, humanitarian assistance and other support to the peace-keeping operation in Somalia, including those Governments which participated in the multinational operation for UNOSOM's withdrawal. It pays tribute in particular to all personnel who sacrificed their lives in this service.

"The Security Council underlines that the timely intervention of UNOSOM II and the humanitarian assistance given to Somalia helped to save many lives and much property, mitigate general suffering and contributed to the search for peace in Somalia. The Council notes that, over the past three years, the United Nations and the international community have made significant efforts to restore peace and stability and facilitate the re-emergence of a civil society. However, the continuing lack of progress in the peace process and in national reconciliation, in particular the lack of sufficient cooperation from the Somali parties over security issues, undermined the United Nations objectives in Somalia and prevented the continuation of UNOSOM II mandate beyond 31 March 1995.

"The Security Council believes that the Somalia operation provides important lessons for the theory and practice of peace-making, peace-keeping and peace-building.

"The Security Council remains convinced that only a genuinely representative and broad-based approach to reconciliation will bring about a lasting political settlement and allow for the re-emergence of a civil society in Somalia. The Council reaffirms, based on its experience in UNOSOM II, that the people of Somalia bear the ultimate responsibility for achieving national reconciliation and restoring peace to Somalia. The international community can

only facilitate, encourage and assist the process, but not try to impose any particular solution on it. The Council, therefore, calls upon the Somali parties to pursue national reconciliation, rehabilitation and reconstruction in the interest of peace, security and development.

"The Security Council notes the recent agreements reached between the factions in Mogadishu, especially on the control of sea and airport facilities. It expresses the hope that this encouraging development is indicative of a new spirit of cooperation among the factions and that it will lead to further progress in the search for a lasting peace in Somalia.

"The Security Council supports the view of the Secretary-General that Somalia should not be abandoned by the United Nations, which will continue to assist the Somali people to achieve a political settlement and to provide humanitarian and other support services provided that the Somalis themselves demonstrate a disposition to peaceful resolution of the conflict and to cooperation with the international community. It welcomes the Secretary-General's intention to continue a small political mission, should the Somali parties so wish, to assist them in coming together in national reconciliation and looks forward to the report which the Secretary-General has indicated he will forward on this matter. The Council urges close cooperation between the United Nations and regional organizations, in particular the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the League of Arab States, the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), as well as the Governments of neighbouring countries in these efforts. The Council considers it essential that the Somali parties clearly express their acceptance of such assistance and their willingness to cooperate with the United Nations.

"The Security Council recognizes that humanitarian assistance in Somalia is an important element in the effort to restore peace and security in the country. It is therefore important to sustain United Nations humanitarian activities in Somalia and to encourage non-governmental organizations to do likewise. However, their ability to do so will depend on the degree of cooperation and security offered by the Somali parties. The Council welcomes the willingness expressed by the international humanitarian agencies and NGOs to continue to provide rehabilitation and reconstruction assistance in areas where security is guaranteed by the Somalis. The Council stresses that the creation of a long-lasting, stable and secure environment throughout the country is vital for the resumption of large-scale activity in these fields.

"The Security Council reaffirms the obligations of States to implement fully the embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Somalia imposed by paragraph 5 of resolution 733 (1992), and calls on States, especially neighbouring States, to refrain from actions capable of exacerbating the conflict in Somalia.

"The Security Council requests the Secretary-General to continue to monitor the situation in Somalia and to keep it informed about further developments. The Council will remain seized of the matter."

This statement will be issued as a document of the Security Council under the symbol S/PRST/1995/15.

The Security Council has thus concluded the present stage of its consideration of the item on its agenda. The Security Council will remain seized of the matter.

The meeting rose at 5.20 p.m.

United Nations S/PV.3514

Security Council

Fiftieth Year

Provisional

3514th Meeting

Tuesday, 11 April 1995, 12.50 p.m.

New York

President:	Mr. Kovanda	(Czech Republic)
Members:	Argentina	Mr. Cárdenas
	Botswana	Mr. Legwaila
	China	Mr. Li Zhaoxing
	France	Mr. Mérimée
	Germany	Mr. Henze
	Honduras	Mr. Martínez Blanco
	Indonesia	Mr. Wisnumurti
	Italy	Mr. Fulci
	Nigeria	Mr. Gambari
	Oman	Mr. Al-Khussaiby
	Russian Federation	Mr. Lavrov
	Rwanda	Mr. Bakuramutsa
	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	Sir David Hannay
	United States of America	Mr. Gnehm

Agenda

The proposal by China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America on security assurances

Letter dated 6 April 1995 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/1995/271)

95-85266 (E)

This record contains the original text of speeches delivered in English and interpretations of speeches delivered in the other languages. The final text will be printed in the *Official Records of the Security Council*. Corrections should be submitted to original speeches only. They should be incorporated in a copy of the record and be sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned, *within one week of the date of publication*, to the Chief of the Verbatim Reporting Section, room C-178.

The meeting was called to order at 1 p.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

The proposal by China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America on security assurances

Letter dated 6 April 1995 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/1995/271)

The President: I should like to inform the Council that I have received letters from the representatives of Algeria, Egypt, Hungary, India, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Malaysia, Pakistan, Romania and Ukraine in which they request to be invited to participate in the discussion of the item on the Council's agenda. In conformity with the usual practice, I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite those representatives to participate in the discussion without the right to vote, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure.

There being no objection, it is so decided.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Lamamra (Algeria), Mr. Elaraby (Egypt), Mr. Molnár (Hungary), Mr. Shah (India), Mr. Kharrazi (Islamic Republic of Iran), Mr. Razali (Malaysia), Mr. Kamal (Pakistan), Mr. Gorita (Romania) and Mr. Zlenko (Ukraine) took the places reserved for them at the side of the Council Chamber.

The President: The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda.

In view of the lateness of the hour, I intend, with the concurrence of the members of the Council, to suspend the meeting at 1.30 and resume it at 3.15.

The Security Council is meeting in accordance with the understanding reached in its prior consultations.

Members of the Council have before them document S/1995/271, which contains the text of a letter dated 6 April 1995 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council.

Members of the Council will shortly have before them document S/1995/275, which contains the text of a draft resolution submitted by China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America.

I should also like to draw the attention of the members of the Council to the following other documents: S/1995/261, letter dated 6 April 1995 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General; S/1995/262, letter dated 6 April 1995 from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General; S/1995/263, letter dated 6 April 1995 from the Chargé d'affaires *ad interim* of the Permanent Mission of the United States of America to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General; S/1995/264, letter dated 6 April 1995 from the Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General; and S/1995/265, letter dated 6 April 1995 from the Permanent Representative of China to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General.

The first speaker is the representative of Ukraine. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

Mr. Zlenko (Ukraine): Mr. President, first of all let me congratulate you on the occasion of your assumption of the presidency of the Security Council for the month of April. I should like to express my gratitude to your predecessor, the Permanent Representative of China to the United Nations, Ambassador Li Zhaoxing, for his skilful and fruitful guidance of the work of the Council last month.

From our point of view, it is deeply symbolic that the delegation of Ukraine should have the opportunity to be the first to make a statement at the meeting of the Security Council devoted to the issue of the provision to the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) of security assurances.

As is well known, Ukraine acceded to the NPT after thorough and sometimes heated discussions in the Parliament and in the country as a whole of all aspects of

our participation in the Treaty and, above all, of the consequences of accession to the NPT for the security of Ukraine. The agreement upon the quadripartite document on the provision to Ukraine of guarantees of its national security on the part of the United States of America, Great Britain and Russia and the unilateral statements on the matter by France and China were the principal factors and that had a key role in the Ukrainian Parliament's decision in favour.

We believe that the Memorandum on Security Assurances in Connection with Ukraine's Accession to the NPT, which was signed in Budapest on 5 December 1994, can form the basis for elaborating a universal, legally binding document on assurances. It is clear, nevertheless, that some provisions of this Memorandum, reflecting as they do the unique situation in Ukraine, cannot serve as a precedent in all cases. We consider the draft resolution as a first step towards eliminating the contradictions that exist between the nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon Member States of the NPT on the problem of assurances.

At the same time, we welcome the confirmation by the nuclear-weapon States members of the Security Council of their commitments to place on the Security Council's agenda, as a matter of urgency, the question of assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against the non-nuclear-weapon States members of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to draft and adopt decisions aimed at supporting victims of such actions with all the necessary assistance.

We appreciate the fact that the draft resolution takes into account the concern felt by the majority of non-nuclear-weapon States over the possible catastrophic consequences of the use of nuclear weapons against them, which would entail huge loss of life alongside the material and financial losses. This concern is taken into account in the provision that has been determined to the effect that the Security Council will recommend proper procedures concerning compensation to victims of aggression in accordance with the norms of international law. We should also like to draw Council's attention to the fact that these procedures should be extended to third countries that suffer as a result of actions by an aggressor.

Let me express some specific considerations regarding the substance of the issue under discussion.

We pay tribute to the realism demonstrated by the nuclear-weapon States, which have promulgated negative security assurances to the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT in their unilateral statements. Nevertheless, in our view, it would be better if these assurances could be given in the form of a joint declaration. This would, on the one hand, unify the scope of the assurances given; on the other, it could strengthen the psychological and political authority, as well as the efficiency, of such assurances. It is obvious that differences in the substance of the nuclear sections of the military doctrines of the permanent members of the Security Council, to our regret, blocked agreement on such a format of the document.

We believe that the significance of the negative assurances given now by the nuclear States could be substantially strengthened if they were supported by the tools to monitor their implementation.

Given the fact that only five States are officially recognized now as nuclear Powers, one can assume that the nuclear security assurances are ultimately directed at the nuclear nations, to deter each other. It is therefore logical to come to the conclusion that additional security assurances for the non-nuclear States would be the nuclear States' mutual commitment not to use nuclear weapons first. This, in turn, would lay a solid foundation for the multi-objective system of measures to strengthen trust between other nations. There can also be added the renunciation of the unanimity principle when dealing with issues in the Security Council on the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

The reaffirmation by the nuclear States of their commitment to a nuclear-weapon-free world would be a key stabilizing element of such a system. An exceptionally positive role in this regard could be played by the commitment of the nuclear States to pursue the speediest possible conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty, as well as the drafting and signing of an agreement on the prohibition of the production and accumulation of fissile materials for military purposes. In this framework, the international community should also rely on the immediate ratification by the States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty of agreements resulting from SALT II, as well as subsequent urgent steps towards nuclear disarmament and other nuclear States' joining in this process as soon as possible.

We hope that the Security Council's adoption of this draft resolution on security assurances to the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons will play a positive role

in achieving a decision on the indefinite extension of the Treaty at its 1995 Review and Extension Conference.

The President: I thank the representative of Ukraine for his kind words addressed to me.

The next speaker is the representative of Hungary. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

Mr. Molnár (Hungary): It gives me great pleasure to be at this table today and to see you, Sir, presiding over the Security Council. Let me offer you my congratulations and wish you continued success for the remainder of your term in office. Allow me also to thank you and the other members of the Council for the opportunity to present Hungary's views concerning the important issue on the agenda.

I do not intend this morning to set out the full range of Hungary's views on the main issue, the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, on which the international community has been focusing its attention for some time. Our Foreign Minister will do that soon — in fact, exactly a week from today — in the general debate of the Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Instead, I wish to make but a few comments on a major step taken by five States — the five permanent members of the Security Council — as well as on the draft resolution which they have submitted and which the Council is expected to adopt today.

This statement is not the first a Hungarian delegate has made before the Security Council on the same subject. Twenty-seven years ago, when for the first time my country held a non-permanent seat in the Council, the Hungarian Permanent Representative stated:

> "The provisions of the draft resolution do constitute an important step in applying the Charter to the realm of nuclear weapons that could not have been foreseen at the time the Charter was drafted. By adopting the draft resolution before us the Council will contribute to a large extent to the meaningful implementation of Charter provisions to maintain peace and security all over the world. It provides for immediate action on the part of the Security Council and, above all, its nuclear-weapon-State permanent members. The draft resolution puts a potential nuclear aggressor in a position where he must be aware that his actions will be resisted effectively and immediately." (*S/PV.1431, para. 39*)

Nobody would deny that the world has dramatically changed in the 27 years since the meeting of the Security Council was convened to act on that draft resolution. For example, the draft before the Council today has been placed before it not by three, but by all five permanent members, and the difference goes far beyond mere numeric quantifications. Hungary therefore welcomes this draft resolution as a most significant step forward in providing security assurances to all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty by all the five nuclear-weapon-States which are also Parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

This step is not only a step forward; it is also a step of great historic significance. For the first time, the permanent five, acting in a most welcome manifestation of unity, are offering positive assurances in a Security Council draft resolution, and, also for the first time, they have elaborated measures, including the restoration of international peace and security, which the Council would take in the catastrophic event of nuclear aggression.

Nuclear aggression is, most unfortunately, not yet a forgone option. It is still a possibility — maybe a remote possibility, but still a contingency. Contrary to all reasonable expectations and all the major historic changes of recent years, a non-nuclear-weapon State may still find itself the subject of aggression, or the threat of aggression, involving nuclear weapons.

That is why Hungary, a small non-nuclear-weapon country, appreciative of meaningful action, attaches great importance to the security assurances thus given. We feel that the draft resolution will provide us, as it does all other non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT, with genuine guarantees. In addition, the draft resolution, by virtue of expressing a unity of intent by the five nuclear-weapon States, introduces a powerful element of deterrence against nuclear aggression or blackmail.

Before concluding this statement, I also wish to pay tribute to the declaration made in Geneva on 6 April before the Conference on Disarmament by France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States concerning the provisions of Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. We find it reassuring that those four permanent members of the Security Council clearly indicate that the draft resolution which is soon to be adopted is not the end of the road.

We are, therefore, ready to record the forthcoming resolution as a positive development and thus a most significant milestone in the effort to address in a serious and action-oriented manner the important issue of averting the dangers of a nuclear conflict.

The President: I thank the representative of Hungary for his kind words addressed to me.

The next speaker is the representative of India. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement now.

Mr. Shah (India): Mr. President, I should like to begin by congratulating you on your assumption of the presidency of the Security Council for the month of April. Your acknowledged diplomatic skills and experience are particularly reassuring as we consider today a matter of fundamental importance to all nation-States.

While maintenance of peace and security is the primary responsibility of the Security Council in the United Nations, preservation of national security is the primary responsibility of all governments of States Members of the United Nations. For those of us who are committed to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, a debate on the question of security assurances against nuclear weapon attack is a welcome development, even though my delegation is sceptical about the motivation which has prompted this debate today.

Today's debate takes us back to June 1968, when the Security Council adopted resolution 255. The nuclear-weapon Powers were then canvassing for signatures to the proposed Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Today, in a repeat of history, they are canvassing for votes for indefinite extension of the NPT. It is particularly disheartening that in this post-cold-war age, which provides the ideal opportunity for achieving complete and genuine nuclear disarmament, all that the most powerful countries in the world can think of are half measures aimed at preserving the balance of terror on the one hand and power by nuclear weaponry on the other.

May I recall that, when resolution 255 was passed by the Security Council in 1968, India was a member and abstained in the voting on the resolution. At the 1433rd meeting of the Security Council, India's permanent representative had said,

> "I should like to emphasize that any security assurances that might be offered by nuclear-weapon States could not and should not be regarded as a *quid pro quo* for the signature of a non-proliferation treaty." *(S/PV.1433, para. 107)*

He added,

> "The basis for any action by the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security is the Charter of the United Nations. Any linking of security assurances to the signature of a non-proliferation treaty would be contrary to its provisions, because the Charter does not discriminate between those who might adhere to a particular treaty and those who might not do so." *(ibid., para. 108)*

He further clarified that, while the permanent members of the Security Council have a special obligation and responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, they are:

> "... precluded from adopting a discriminatory approach in situations involving the security of States, including that arising from the threat or the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States." *(ibid.)*

In the debate 27 years ago, many countries supported the logic of this approach. Ambassador Bérard of France stated, in this room:

> "My Government reiterates that the real problem is that of the elimination of atomic weapons; the nations of the world will not receive the guarantees of security to which they are entitled until the nuclear powers agree to embark upon the road towards nuclear disarmament and until they reach that goal." *(S/PV.1430, para. 51)*

Ambassador Kuznetsov of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics stated:

> "The fact is, the nuclear weapons will still not disappear with the conclusion of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation; the possibility of an outbreak of nuclear war in the world will remain even against non-nuclear-weapon States." *(ibid., para. 10)*

I recall these categorical views of the important nuclear-weapon States so that this body can dispassionately judge the utility of the kind of security assurances that have now been offered.

Twenty-seven years later, I must reiterate that what my distinguished predecessor stated then is equally true today. In my delegation's view, it is the clear responsibility of the nuclear-weapon States that are also permanent members of the Council to go to the assistance of any State that is threatened with or is the victim of nuclear attack, and not merely those that might be signatories to the NPT.

At the forty-ninth session of the General Assembly, the international community decided to seek an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice on whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons is permissible under international law in any circumstances. This was an initiative taken primarily by the non-aligned countries, which do not possess nuclear weapons. India supports this initiative, and maintains that use of nuclear weapons would cause such indiscriminate suffering and destruction that it is contrary to the rules of international law and the Charter of the United Nations.

It is said that those who ignore the lessons of history are condemned to re-live them. Twenty-five years after the NPT came into force, there are today many more nuclear weapons placed in more countries than in 1970. Unless the international community acts, and acts quickly, to commit itself to the elimination of nuclear weapons, 25 years hence there will be more nuclear weapons, in more countries, than there are today, despite the extended NPT. What we should be debating today is not an interim measure to preserve the balance of terror as a sop to the security concerns of a category of non-nuclear-weapon countries, but a universal treaty commitment for time-bound destruction and elimination of nuclear weapons; that is, if the nuclear-weapon Powers are serious about indefinite security for all.

Despite General Assembly resolution 49/73, adopted overwhelmingly, the Conference on Disarmament's Ad Hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons has not been re-established during the current session of the Conference on Disarmament. While that must clearly be our priority, it is unfortunate that we are today discussing a draft resolution, to be passed by the Council, which is discriminatory, is riddled with ifs and buts and falls short of the requirement for a binding international legal commitment.

It bears repetition to say that the only security against the threat or use of nuclear weapons is a binding international legal convention on the elimination of nuclear weapons. Half measures, such as the draft resolution presented by the permanent five, which attempt to offer security assurances to a certain category of countries are no substitute for permanent security and, in fact, may give a wrong message. One would hope that by offering a draft resolution of this kind, the nuclear-weapon States are not telling the non-members of the NPT that they, the nuclear-weapon States, are free to use nuclear weapons against them, because this would have implications which are too frightening to contemplate.

Let me reiterate that India is firmly committed to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. India will not subscribe to the NPT so long as it is a discriminatory Treaty whose objective is not to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons so much as to prevent proliferation of nuclear-weapon countries. India will continue to pursue, both in the United Nations and outside, its unrelenting efforts to work towards non-proliferation and the elimination of nuclear weapons, even if yet another discriminatory and non-universal resolution emerges from the Security Council at the end of this debate.

The President: I thank the representative of India for his kind words addressed to me.

The meeting was suspended at 1.30 p.m. and resumed at 3.40 p.m.

The President: The President wishes to state that when he calls for the resumption of the meeting at 3.15 p.m., he means 3.15 and not 3.40. The President wishes to express his gratitude to those members of the Security Council who were here on time.

The next speaker is the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran. I invite him to take a seat at the Council table and to make his statement.

Mr. Kharrazi (Islamic Republic of Iran): Mr. President, at the outset, I should like to congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency of the Security Council for the month of April. I am confident that you will guide the proceedings of the Council during the current month effectively. I should also like to express our appreciation to the Permanent Representative of China for the excellent manner in which he conducted the deliberations of the Council during the month of March.

The Security Council is meeting today to discuss a subject of paramount importance to the security of the entire international community. The continued

production, stockpiling and testing of nuclear weapons by nuclear Powers endanger the security of non-nuclear-weapon States, which believe that the only effective security assurance against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons lies in the total elimination of such weapons. It is regrettable to note that not only have the nuclear-weapon States refused to undertake a programme of action for nuclear disarmament within a time-bound framework, with a target date, but they have also chosen not to finalize a comprehensive test-ban treaty. It is the considered view of the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) that, pending the achievement of universal nuclear disarmament, effective measures should be taken to ensure the security of these States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

The non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT believe that nuclear-weapon States should extend the negative security assurances granted to the States Members of the Tlatelolco Treaty to all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT. These assurances must be in the form of a negotiated, legally binding international instrument, with, *inter alia*, the addition of a protocol embodying legally binding nuclear security assurances to be annexed to the NPT. The Group of non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT in the Conference on Disarmament, including my delegation, have presented a draft protocol on the issue, which is an important step towards strengthening the Treaty. Anything short of that would not allay the concerns of non-nuclear-weapon States regarding the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

Bearing in mind that any act of aggression involving the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons constitutes a threat to international peace and security, it is incumbent upon the Security Council to take immediate measures under the provisions of Chapter VII of the Charter in the event of aggression with nuclear weapons or the threat of such aggression against a non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the NPT. These measures should include action on the part of the Members of the United Nations, particularly the nuclear-weapon States, individually or collectively, to suppress aggression. In other words, besides providing technical, medical, scientific or humanitarian assistance to the victims of an act of aggression with nuclear weapons, the Security Council should be prepared to use all necessary means in defence of the victims in accordance with the United Nations Charter. The draft resolution before the Council, while inviting Member States to act in the case of the use of nuclear weapons in the form of positive security assurances, lacks a clear reference to the core of the problem — that is, the negative security assurances. Regrettably, following the demise of the cold war, some permanent members of the Security Council continue to refrain from committing themselves not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT. Moreover, this draft does not go beyond the very limited scope of resolution 255 (1968) of 19 June 1968, except as regards the wording concerning technical assistance to the victim of a nuclear accident similar to the Chernobyl incident, not a victim of a threat or use of nuclear weapons.

The current draft before the Council clearly lacks the following essential principles: first, a prior determination that threat or attack by nuclear weapons constitutes a threat to international peace and security; secondly, a trigger mechanism to ensure a Security Council response to threats or attacks by nuclear weapons.

The non-nuclear-weapon States have renounced the nuclear option in return for the fulfilment of the commitment on the part of the nuclear-weapon States, including the provision of negative security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States through an international legally binding instrument. The nuclear-weapon States should uphold their commitments so that the NPT and the non-proliferation regime can be strengthened.

Undoubtedly, the present endeavour will help create an atmosphere conducive to the total elimination of nuclear weapons. As an original signatory of the NPT and as a Party that has fully complied with all its obligations under NPT and IAEA safeguards, the Islamic Republic of Iran is committed to acting in tandem with other peace-loving countries in this regard.

The President: I thank the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran for his kind words addressed to me.

The next speaker is the representative of Romania. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

Mr. Gorita (Romania): Allow me first to congratulate you warmly, Sir, on your assumption of the high responsibility of the presidency of the Security Council for the month of April. Your well-known diplomatic skills give us full confidence for the success of the Council's work this month.

I should also like to express our appreciation for the way in which the Permanent Representative of China conducted the work of the Council last month.

The draft resolution on security assurances to be adopted today by the Security Council is an important political initiative of particular relevance to the Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Indeed, progress in the direction of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons will facilitate the further strengthening of the non-proliferation regime, paving the way for an indefinite extension of the NPT and thus contributing to international peace and security.

It is a matter of satisfaction that the search for a solution to the problem of security assurances, which were basically negotiated in the Conference on Disarmament, did not set the United Nations, with its considerably enhanced role and credibility in maintaining international peace and security to one side. During the course of the negotiations and consultations in the Conference on Disarmament and other forums, Romania came out in favour of the idea of the Security Council's confirming, on a broader basis, the commitments originally undertaken by three nuclear-weapon States in Security Council resolution 255 (1968).

The new geopolitical realities prevailing in Central and Eastern Europe, especially in terms of what could now be called the absence of a "nuclear umbrella", make us, like other Central and Eastern European nations, particularly sensitive to the idea of enlarged and consolidated security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States. That is why we particularly appreciated and encouraged last year's initiative by the United States and other nuclear Powers to review their policies on providing security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States for the purpose of reaching a coordinated and common position on this important topic.

The draft resolution presented today to the Council for adoption addresses concerns in the security assurances area in terms of both negative and positive assurances for the NPT's non-nuclear-weapon member States. It is an effort towards a comprehensive and effective approach to a very complex issue that deserves appropriate acknowledgement and appreciation.

We consider that the Security Council draft resolution, together with the declarations by the five nuclear-weapon States circulated as official documents of the Council, bear significant political weight. Such collective security assurances, offered for the first time by all five nuclear-weapon States permanent members of the Security Council, are an important step in the right direction that cannot be underestimated. By adopting the draft resolution before it, the Security Council will offer additional incentives for universal adherence to and compliance with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and for a decision in favour of an indefinite and unconditional extension of the NPT.

Allow me to express our appreciation to the nuclear-weapon States members of the Security Council for their initiative. We hope that the draft resolution on security assurances will be adopted by the Council unanimously.

The President: I thank the representative of Romania for his kind words addressed to me.

The next speaker is the representative of Egypt. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

Mr. Elaraby (Egypt): Allow me at the outset to congratulate you, Sir, on your assumption of office. The delegation of Egypt is confident that your able leadership will benefit the Security Council in its deliberations on this important issue.

I should also like to pay tribute to your predecessor, Ambassador Li Zhaoxing, the Permanent Representative of China, for his commendable contributions during the month of March.

The Permanent Representative of Indonesia will be speaking shortly on behalf of the non-aligned States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). We have seen his text and my delegation shares his views.

This meeting of the Security Council is of the utmost importance. What is really at stake is the ability of the Council to discharge its primary responsibility in the maintenance of international peace and security. The Charter, in its Article 26, specifically confers upon the Security Council the crucially important task of formulating plans for the establishment of a system for the regulation of armaments. The elaboration and adoption of credible security assurances would fall squarely within the ambit of the mandate assigned to the Council.

When the General Assembly was debating the adoption of the NPT in 1968, Egypt's Permanent Representative stated in unequivocal terms that the non-nuclear Powers that signed the Treaty without a firm guarantee from the major nuclear Powers would be undermining and even jeopardizing their very existence as sovereign States.

It is relevant to recall that the Charter was conceived and concluded before the advent of the nuclear era; hence, the perils of the nuclear age were unforeseen and perhaps unimagined by the authors of the Charter. This explains the absence of measures commensurate with the qualitatively higher threats posed by nuclear weapons to international peace and security. The advent of the atomic bomb fundamentally altered the nature of the world in which the United Nations would have to function, modified the attitude that had been expressed in the Charter towards disarmament, and firmly established the elimination of nuclear weapons as the primary concern of all endeavours pertaining to the survival of life on our planet.

In this context, it was imperative politically and even psychologically to assign the highest priority to attaining general and complete disarmament. It was also for the purpose of preserving peace and security in the world that efforts were directed at limiting the possibilities of nuclear confrontation. Only the five permanent members of the Security Council were exempted from the ban on obtaining nuclear weapons. In return, non-nuclear-weapon States were to be offered guarantees that nuclear weapons would not be used against them.

It is indeed regrettable that, 25 years after the entry into force of the NPT, it has not yet acquired universality. General and complete disarmament remains a faraway and even an elusive objective. Moreover, the NPT relies for its implementation on the strict application of comprehensive International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards, which are themselves inadequate and need to be strengthened, updated and improved. Consequently, the nuclear-weapon States have a definite obligation to demonstrate to non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT that their security will not in any way be endangered by the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, and to extend genuine protection and assistance in the event that this security is threatened.

A brief survey of the genesis of the concept of security assurances is in order. When negotiations began on elaborating a treaty to curtail the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the mid-1960s, many States held the view that a clause on both negative and positive security assurances must form an integral part of any such treaty. Indeed, the Egyptian delegation has consistently strived, throughout the years, to ensure that non-nuclear-weapon States would be adequately protected. As far back as October 1967, during the negotiations for the elaboration of the NPT, Egypt submitted, at the 18-nation Disarmament Committee, a draft article to be incorporated in the proposed text of the NPT. Notwithstanding the initiative by Egypt and many other non-nuclear-weapon States, the efforts to incorporate a security assurance in the text of the NPT were unsuccessful. The NPT was finally adopted by the General Assembly in May 1968 without a clause on security assurances. One month later, Security Council resolution 255 (1968) was adopted in conjunction with unilateral declarations by three nuclear-weapon States. However, resolution 255 was from the very outset defective and disappointing. It was widely considered inadequate, since it did not extend genuine security to non-nuclear-weapon States, nor did it and the accompanying declarations add anything new to what had already been provided for in the Charter.

In point of fact, resolution 255 failed to demonstrate any effective element of deterrence to a would-be aggressor or to provide protection to a victim of aggression. Nor did it indicate the scope and nature of assistance to be provided to any non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the NPT that fell victim to a nuclear attack or threat of such an attack. The unilateral declarations issued at that time by the three nuclear-weapons States were, in essence, statements of intent with no binding assurances to provide for their application or to prevent their withdrawal. They stated that nuclear aggression would create a qualitatively new situation but, in effect, did not provide any corresponding, qualitatively new procedures, over and above the provisions of the Charter itself, for dealing with such a grave threat.

In light of these shortcomings, non-nuclear-weapon States continued to strive for more effective, more comprehensive and more binding assurances for their security. To this end, Egypt became the first to submit proposals, to the Fourth Review Conference of the NPT and the Conference on Disarmament in 1990, to update the substance of resolution 255 by expanding the nature and scope of application of security assurances, and by ensuring that they are enunciated in an international instrument, of a legally binding nature, that would ensure a response by the Security Council to any attack or threat of attack against a non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the NPT. Egypt's record confirms that its position on

security assurances has throughout been both consistent and persistent.

Today, as the Security Council ponders the adoption of a new resolution which aims to provide security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States, and as we are about to embark, next week, on the process of reviewing the NPT and securing its preservation in the most suitable manner, we must also remind ourselves that any system of security assurances must be measured — and measured carefully — on the basis of its effectiveness and its credibility. This is the spirit in which my delegation approaches the question of security assurances.

Security assurances, to be worthy of the name, must be designed and structured in such a manner as to cover the exigencies of our contemporary world and at the same time anticipate the developments of the future. They must meet the security needs of the world not only for today but also for tomorrow. Until the NPT becomes universal, the danger of proliferation will steadily increase with the passage of time. With this premise in mind, my delegation, in its consideration of the proposed resolution, is guided by four basic principles: credibility, deterrence, protection and assistance. I shall address each of these elements.

Firstly, credibility. Any resolution must capture and accurately reflect the magnitude of the nuclear threat which, as I said earlier, was unforeseen and unimagined by the authors of the Charter. Any distinction between a nuclear threat and a conventional threat must be amplified in no uncertain terms.

Under paragraph 4 of Article 2 of the Charter,

> "All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State ..."

Accordingly, whenever a State threatens another with conventional weapons, the Security Council is duty-bound to take effective collective measures for the removal of the threat and the suppression of the aggression, as stipulated in paragraph 1 of Article 1 of the Charter. This Charter injunction, as we all know, addresses conventional weapons, be they cannons, bullets or missiles, or even bows, arrows and spears.

The Council's response must draw a clear distinction between the nuclear and the conventional threats. Failure to distinguish can only undermine the credibility of the whole edifice. Experience has shown that it is no easy matter to repress a conventional armed attack. A conventional attack, however, has a limited scope; it does not entail the total destruction and massive annihilation that a nuclear one does. When a conventional attack occurs, one can swallow a response confined to "bringing the matter to the attention of the Council" and to "seeking Council action to provide necessary assistance". But a threat or use of nuclear weapons to wage war should unleash the collective security system, set out in Chapter VII of the Charter, in order to repel the aggression.

Moreover, attention must be drawn to a most grave factor, namely, the fact that the Council's response to a nuclear threat is subject to the regular voting procedure provided for under the Charter, specifically in the provisions of paragraph 3 of its Article 27, which pertains to the concurring votes of the five permanent members. The magnitude of the unprecedented and unparalleled devastation nuclear weapons can cause necessitates a degree of automaticity if credibility is to be conferred. Therefore, it should be clearly spelled out that a nuclear threat shall be deterred and that the victims shall be protected, assisted and defended in a clearly defined manner commensurate with gravity of the nuclear threat.

The rationale and philosophy of the draft resolution under consideration are based on the assumption that the potential nuclear threat is not expected to come from any of the permanent five, which have solemnly offered not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States.

The draft resolution therefore is directed toward a threat emanating from a non-NPT party or perhaps an NPT party which violates its NPT obligations and develops nuclear weapons. This fact poses a legitimate question: why is this important draft resolution "vetoable"? It is our considered view that this particular draft resolution should undoubtedly be beyond the scope of application of the veto in order to ensure its credibility.

The second element is deterrence. If the resolution is to have any deterrent effect on a would-be aggressor, it must contain an explicit reference to the fact that aggression with nuclear weapons, or the threat of such aggression, against a non-nuclear-weapon State party to the NPT constitutes a threat to international peace and security, and shall automatically trigger an immediate

response by the Security Council in conformity with Article 39 of the Charter and in a manner consistent with the substance and the spirit of the relevant Articles of Chapter VII. The effectiveness of the deterrent hinges on spelling out the precise dimensions of the response of the Council.

The third element is protection. The element of genuine protection must also be clearly enunciated in the form of a mechanism for enforcement of the security assurances which would indicate the mandatory action to be adopted by the Council to redress a situation where a non-nuclear-weapon State was the object of a nuclear attack or threat of an attack. It is axiomatic that the magnitude in the degree of devastation and destruction by nuclear weapons necessitates a proportionate elevation of the Security Council's response. It has to be abundantly clear that the territorial integrity and the political independence of any non-nuclear-weapon State, as well as the survival of its population, will be guaranteed as a matter of right and not as a recognition of an interest — whether or not we term it legitimate — to receive security assurances.

The fourth and last element is assistance. It is imperative to clarify and specify the scope and nature of assistance and compensation to be provided to any non-nuclear-weapon State party to the NPT that is a victim or object of a threat of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used. In this context, it should be recognized that assistance must be comprehensive and reparation mandatory. The draft resolution has expanded the technical assistance aspects. It remains silent, however, on the political remedial assistance needed to defend the victim.

However, in our view, the draft resolution before us contains three positive elements: It is endorsed by all the permanent members of the Council. It addresses the element of technical assistance in a more comprehensive manner than resolution 255 (1968), albeit in voluntary language. Operative paragraphs 5 and 6 invite Member States of the United Nations to provide assistance to any State that is victim of an act of aggression by nuclear weapons and recognize the right of any such victim to compensation from the aggressor. These are definitely positive elements and represent a welcome improvement on resolution 255 (1968).

We are not, however, persuaded that the formula in the joint draft resolution before us offers the non-nuclear-weapon States all that can now be devised, or even all that is due, to deter the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. In all candour, the draft falls short of the general expectations.

In this context it is appropriate to point out that at the 1991 session of the Ad Hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure the Non-Nuclear States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, Egypt submitted a paper on security assurances which sought to update and enhance resolution 255 (1968) and called for the initiation of a process of collective or individual consultations on security assurances. That was five years ago. Unfortunately, current efforts by the five members of the Security Council to update resolution 255 (1968) have completely bypassed any dialogue with the non-nuclear-weapon States, which are the prime beneficiaries and the constituency for security assurances, and have thereby resulted in a draft resolution which addresses only one of the foregoing elements, namely assistance — as if the Security Council's role in this matter is not to anticipate a nuclear threat but, rather, to expect a nuclear accident similar to the one in Chernobyl.

In the light of what I have said, it is evident that the draft resolution now before the Council lacks the following essential principles: first, a prior determination that the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons constitutes a threat to international peace and security; secondly, a trigger mechanism to ensure Security Council response to threats or attacks by nuclear weapons; thirdly, a commitment by the Security Council, as stated in the Charter:

> "to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace".

I have expressed Egypt's position on the substance of the draft resolution. Allow me now to touch very briefly on the time factor.

It is obvious that the timing of the submission of the draft resolution has a certain significance. The rush of the sponsors to secure its adoption one week before the start of the NPT Review and Extension Conference no doubt aims at tilting the balance towards their most preferred outcome for the Conference.

Thus, the Security Council is scheduled to vote today on a most important draft resolution with a direct bearing on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all

non-nuclear-weapon States, without allowing adequate time for broad consultations between all the concerned parties.

In point of fact, due to the far-reaching consequences of the draft resolution, its adoption should have been preceded by wide-ranging consultations and even a reasonable period of sober reflection.

However, one cannot help but wonder whether the adoption of such a draft resolution by the Security Council would suffice to dispel the wide scepticism about its credibility, which will have detrimental repercussions on the future success of the Treaty as a whole. This is not to suggest that the Security Council is not the right forum to enunciate such assurances. On the contrary, it is perhaps the course dictated by the Charter. However, it is self-evident that the crux of the security assurances is, and will remain, not who issues the assurances but what their contents are.

In conclusion, my delegation appreciates the efforts exerted by the sponsors to improve the text of the draft resolution. We must stress, however, that the draft resolution before us should not represent the end of the road, but rather the beginning. We noted with appreciation the statement of the Permanent Representative of France in the Conference on Disarmament on 6 April 1995 that the draft resolution

> "constitutes a first in many respects, and ... reflects our intention to meet the expectations of the international community globally, collectively and specifically." *(S/1995/264, annex, p. 3)*

In our view, the only global, collective and specific assurance against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is their total elimination. My delegation therefore does not subscribe to the view that the draft resolution provides the non-nuclear-weapon States with the required and long-awaited credible security assurances to which they are entitled as a result of their renunciation of the nuclear option.

In point of fact, the adoption of this draft will not in any way strengthen the NPT regime. As it stands today, the draft is, regrettably, insufficient in both form and substance.

The President: I thank the representative of Egypt for the kind words he addressed to me.

The next speaker is the representative of Algeria. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

Mr. Lamamra (Algeria) *(interpretation from French):* It is a great pleasure for me to express to you, Sir, the Algerian delegation's and my own warmest congratulations on your assumption of the presidency of the Security Council. I am delighted that the important deliberations today are being led by a distinguished diplomat who is quite naturally attentive to all the dimensions of the question under consideration.

I would also like to express to your predecessor, the Permanent Representative of China, our deep appreciation for the manner in which he conducted the Council's proceedings last month.

Lastly, I should like to express the Algerian delegation's support for the statement that will be made by the Permanent Representative of Indonesia on behalf of the non-aligned countries parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. We have taken note of the contents of that statement with satisfaction.

The Charter of the United Nations affirmed forcefully, among its cardinal principles, the commitment of the States Members of the Organization to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force. The Charter also stipulated, as the primary purpose of the United Nations, the maintenance of international peace and security through

> "effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace".

These references, drawn from the key legal instrument that establishes the order of contemporary international relations, are particularly relevant when the threat or use of force and acts of aggression may involve nuclear weapons whose destructive capacity threatens the very existence of the human race. These references are also relevant in explaining the nature and the scope of the security assurances which, on the initiative of the permanent members of the Security Council, in their capacity of nuclear-weapon Powers, it is envisaged are to be granted to the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

The current debate is undoubtedly timely, and we are grateful to those who initiated it for having seen the need for the Security Council resolutely to heed the aspirations of the peoples of the United Nations and to try to make its contribution to dealing with the global challenges that affect mankind's future because of the threats they pose to international peace and security. This debate is all the more timely since it is taking place after the international community has fully entered into a qualitatively new stage born of the disappearance of the bipolar and conflictual structure of the world, and on the eve of the Review and Extension Conference of States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

The question of security assurances for the non-nuclear-weapon States is part of the overall problem of the maintenance of international peace and security in relation to nuclear disarmament. That is why this question has always been at the very heart of the concerns and proposals of the Movement of Non-aligned Countries, whose member States have consistently affirmed the need for negative security assurances, enshrined in a binding international legal instrument, while rightly emphasizing that the true assurance against the threat or use of nuclear weapons is the complete elimination of this type of weapon. From this standpoint, the initiative of the five nuclear-weapon Powers, which is moving in a promising direction as regards positive guarantees, contains — because of the deliberately modest status given to the initiative proposed to the Council and because of its scope, which is limited to an updating of resolution 255 (1968) of 19 June 1968, which Algeria was not able to support when the Council adopted it — shortcomings which have significantly reduced its historic role at a time which is conducive to conceptual and operational breakthroughs in this field.

Many of the additions and improvements that the non-aligned countries suggested to the sponsors of the draft resolution under consideration were inspired by the twofold legitimate hope of making this exercise a successful example of partnership in identifying the needs and designing the appropriate responses, and of ensuring that the text to be adopted will constitute a solid base of effective and irrevocable commitments undertaken in solidarity by the nuclear-weapon States, with the full adherence of the States that are the beneficiaries of those commitments. It is in particular a question of placing the draft resolution firmly in the framework of Chapter VII of the Charter and of drawing the legal implications from this, with a view to establishing a system of positive security assurances organized around the three principles of deterrence, assistance and compensation, which would be set under way by the automatic and unconditional action of the Security Council.

Since it does not reflect factors which are unassailably true, since it does not incorporate elements which determine the very effectiveness of the assurances envisaged, this draft resolution objectively falls far short of the coherence required by this undertaking and of the expectations of the international community in this respect. In this context, the Security Council's awakening to a pressing issue that is part of the adaptation of international relations to the circumstances of the next century will not, unfortunately, bring about the healthy break with the restrictive and weak approaches to controlling the course of history which have too often been characteristic of the political management of the atomic age.

Just as history proves that every weapon invented by man has come to be used, it is very widely held that the mere existence of nuclear weapons is a factor for insecurity. While the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons has undeniably played a stabilizing role in respect of horizontal proliferation, vertical proliferation — which has developed in its shadow and which devours colossal sums of money — is fuelled by doctrines of deterrence and other balance-of-terror theories, all of them based on a logic of confrontation. The post-cold-war period should be able to free political will of past inhibition and sluggishness, to encourage a profound renewal of strategic thinking, establishing the obsolescence of the military uses of the atom, giving a decisive impetus to nuclear disarmament in the foreseeable future to achieve the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, and ensuring the promotion of a new concept of human security based on economic prosperity and social well-being. That would be the best way to keep the Charter promise to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war and to protect those generations from the madness that made mankind strive to acquire the means to guarantee its own destruction.

The President: I thank the representative of Algeria for the kind words he addressed to me.

The next speaker is the representative of Pakistan. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

Mr. Kamal (Pakistan): I would like to congratulate you, Sir, on your assumption of the office of President of the Security Council and to thank you and the other

members of the Council for giving me the opportunity to speak on the subject of negative security assurances.

The issue of negative security assurances has been addressed by the General Assembly over the last several years. The General Assembly has consistently maintained that there is an urgent need to reach an early agreement on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Such arrangements would best be in the form of an international convention of a legally binding character. The Conference on Disarmament agrees, in principle, to the idea of an international convention, but has not been able to agree on the nature of a common formula which could be included in such a convention.

The General Assembly has therefore appealed

> "to all States, especially the nuclear-weapon States, to work actively towards an early agreement on a common approach and, in particular, on a common formula that could be included in an international instrument of a legally binding character". (*General Assembly resolution 49/73, para. 3*)

Considering the widespread support for the conclusion of an international convention, the General Assembly recommended that

> "the Conference on Disarmament should actively continue intensive negotiations with a view to reaching early agreement and concluding effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons". (*ibid., para. 5*)

During the last General Assembly session those recommendations were reiterated in resolution 49/73, which was adopted by a vote of 168 in favour, none against and only three abstentions.

The Heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Movement, during their Tenth Summit Conference, held in Jakarta in 1992, also emphasized the significance of a multilateral and legally binding convention to adequately address the security concerns of non-nuclear-weapon States. The non-aligned Foreign Ministers reaffirmed that position in May 1994 in Cairo. They stated that

> "security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons could contribute positively to addressing some of the dangers inherent in the presence of nuclear weapons"

and

> "called on the Conference on Disarmament to reach an urgent agreement on an internationally binding convention". (*S/1994/894, annex, para. 54*)

Only unconditional guarantees of a legally binding character can effectively address the security concerns of non-nuclear-weapon States. Negative security assurances which are conditional could be subjected to varying interpretations and to selective implementation. Linking security assurances to certain criteria would militate against the objective of providing assurances on a universal basis. Also, relying on a subjective decision-making process for extending security assurances could result in arbitrary and selective application of those assurances. Security assurances should become operational whenever there is any use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. It also needs to be ensured that the provisions of security assurances are in full conformity with the United Nations Charter — especially Article 51 — which provides that the Security Council shall act, without discrimination, whenever international peace and security is threatened.

Pakistan believes that the Conference on Disarmament, as the sole multilateral negotiating body on disarmament matters, provides the most appropriate forum for the consideration of the issue of security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States. Such consideration should result in the conclusion of an international instrument that provides unconditional security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States. For this it is essential that the Conference on Disarmament should establish an ad hoc committee on negative security assurances, and that this ad hoc committee should be provided with a negotiating mandate for the conclusion of an international instrument of a legally binding character as early as possible.

Pakistan has consistently advocated that all non-nuclear-weapon States be provided with credible and effective security assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. We will continue to cooperate in achieving this objective.

The President: I thank the representative of Pakistan for the kind words he addressed to me.

The next speaker is the representative of Malaysia. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

Mr. Razali (Malaysia): The Malaysian delegation would like to recall with appreciation China's presidency of the Security Council in March. We also express our confidence, Sir, in your presidency this month.

The Malaysian delegation requested to participate in the debate today to share our views on this very important issue. Let me state it bluntly: we believe, over the long run, in a time-bound period, in the total and complete elimination of nuclear weapons as the only definitive assurance we can live with. Until this can be achieved, any assurance, whether positive or negative, whether given jointly or severally, will merely constitute an interim measure.

Malaysia and other members of the Non-Aligned Movement have consistently called for assurances in the context of a legally binding international instrument from the nuclear-weapon States, pending the attainment of the objective contained in Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Regrettably, there have been no results.

It should be recalled that disagreement over this issue was one of the reasons for the failure of the two NPT Review Conferences, in 1980 and 1990, to adopt Final Declarations. This is ironic given the fact that the nuclear-weapon States have agreed to such a binding instrument in the protocol to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which established the nuclear-weapon-free zone in South America.

Now that the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the NPT is just a week ahead, the nuclear-weapon States seem to have realized that they have to do something about this long-standing obligation. Their solution has been to submit a draft resolution on positive security assurances and to make individual declarations on negative security assurances. This initiative can best be described as too little too late, an effort whose motives are patently clear. The draft resolution deals exclusively with positive security assurances and says nothing regarding negative security assurances beyond taking note of the fact that all five nuclear-weapon States have given such assurances, either individually — as in the case of China — or collectively — as in the case of the United States, the United Kingdom, France and Russia.

The positive security assurances envisaged in the draft resolution do not break new ground. The draft includes elements which are already covered by the Charter and in resolution 255 (1968). The only new element in the draft that is different from resolution 255 (1968) concerns the elaboration of the types of assistance that the Security Council might offer if a non-nuclear-weapon State is the victim of nuclear aggression. This does not offer us any comfort, as the language used is weak and, in the event of a nuclear attack, no assistance would be able to undo the irreversible death and destruction.

The draft resolution before the Council should have included language committing the nuclear-weapon States to take action, in the event of a threat of the use of nuclear weapons, to suppress that threat. The relevant paragraphs which should address this issue are weak and so vague that they can be interpreted in several different ways. My delegation has worked with the Caucus of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) to introduce amendments to the draft to address this concern, but the proposals of the NAM Caucus were not accepted.

My delegation would like to remind the Council that obligations such as coming to the assistance of non-nuclear-weapon States in the event of aggression are already stipulated by Articles 39, 41 and 42 of the Charter, regardless of the types of weapons used. Aggression is aggression, and to discriminate against States non-Parties to the Treaty in giving assistance on the basis of the type of weapons used is against the fundamental provisions of the Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security.

My delegation also cannot support the inclusion of operative paragraph 9 of the draft resolution. This paragraph sidesteps the question of the legality of the use of nuclear weapons because it justifies the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons in cases of "self-defence". Given the fact that all the nuclear-weapon States are also permanent members of the Security Council, and that the Council has the power to determine whether or not a threat is an act of aggression or of self-defence, the assurance contained in the draft is at best questionable, if not hollow political expedience. In essence, in no way can Council substitute that assurance for an obligation assumed under a treaty, especially a Council where many political factors and imperatives are brought to bear.

The NAM Caucus, on behalf of non-nuclear-weapon States, had tried to propose language that addressed our

concerns on this matter. We note with appreciation that some of those proposals have been accommodated in the draft. However, our concerns to the effect that the draft resolution should affirm the belief that the only sure assurance against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is the elimination of nuclear weapons and that, pending that objective, such assurances should take the form of a legally binding instrument, were rejected. Accordingly, the draft resolution in its present form does not satisfy our call regarding security assurances. Nevertheless, we welcome the transfer of a preambular paragraph of the penultimate draft to the operative part as its paragraph 8 and the acknowledgement in the new last operative paragraph that the issue raised in the draft resolution remains a continuing concern of the Security Council.

My delegation had studied the individual statements made by each of the nuclear-weapon States and contained in documents S/1995/261, 262, 263, 264 and 265. Of the five, only the declaration by China contains the position that the non-nuclear-weapon States had envisaged, which is straightforward and contains no conditions. The declarations by all the other four nuclear-weapon States contain specific conditions. They also say nothing on the question of the threat of use of nuclear weapons. More importantly, they fail to address the question of nuclear disarmament, which is closely linked to the question of assurances.

That the five declarations vary in terms of structure and content and remain devoid of legal force does not provide any measure of comfort at all. They amplify the need for an internationally negotiated, legally binding instrument whereby all the nuclear-weapon States would be obligated to apply the same provisions and meet the same conditions. My delegation must conclude that the five declarations do not provide a high degree of confidence.

My delegation is committed to the need to implement fully all the provisions of the NPT. This is particularly important, since the Treaty cannot be improved upon. Any amendment to the NPT, as reflected in paragraph 2 of its article VIII requires, among other things, the concurrence of all five nuclear-weapon States. In other words, the nuclear-weapon States already have a veto. Strict adherence to the letter of the Treaty, therefore, is the only guarantee that we will be able to prevent proliferation and move decisively towards nuclear disarmament.

Having said this, my delegation would like to state here that we are equally concerned about proliferation and unregulated access to nuclear materials. We are still hopeful that, despite the clear discrimination in the NPT, improvements can somehow be made which could influence the small group of countries that are not party to it.

Finally, the draft resolution is at best a first step towards the institution of a legally binding instrument. The adoption of this draft by the Council cannot absolve the nuclear-weapon States from their obligation to negotiate complete nuclear disarmament, in addition to fulfilling the commitments elaborated above.

The President: I thank the representative of Malaysia for the kind words he addressed to me.

The President: It is my understanding that the Council is ready to proceed to the vote on the draft resolution before it. Unless I hear any objection, I shall put the draft resolution to the vote.

There being no objection, it is so decided.

I shall first call on those members of the Council who wish to make statements before the voting.

Mr. Wisnumurti (Indonesia): Allow me to begin by expressing my delegation's congratulations to you, Sir, upon your assumption of the presidency of the Council for this month. We are convinced that your diplomatic skill will guide the Council effectively.

My delegation would also like to express its sincere appreciation to Ambassador Li Zhaoxing, the Permanent Representative of China, for the excellent manner and wisdom with which he presided over the work of the Council.

It is a distinct honour and privilege for me to deliver this statement on behalf of the States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) that are members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries. We have noted with appreciation the endeavours made by the nuclear-weapon States to meet the legitimate security concerns of the vast majority of non-nuclear-weapon States by submitting the draft resolution as well as by issuing separate statements.

We believe that those statements contain some elements that deserve our careful consideration, especially on the eve of the convening of the NPT Review and Extension Conference. The non-aligned

countries continue to believe that Security Council resolution 255 (1968) and the assurances of 1978 fall short of providing adequate security assurances and therefore need to be supplemented. Nor do the unilateral pledges contained in the statements of 6 April 1995 by themselves create the necessary confidence that nuclear weapons will not be used: such declarations leave ample room for subjective interpretations. There is also the danger that, in certain circumstances, especially after the initiation of hostilities, such assurances may be unilaterally withdrawn. They therefore do not meet the security needs of non-nuclear-weapon States since they were not multilaterally negotiated, are unverifiable and conflict with each other. Above all, they do not offer legitimate, reasonable and binding assurances to meet the valid concerns of non-nuclear-weapon States.

To the non-aligned countries, nuclear issues are of world-wide significance because of the global reach of nuclear weapons. It is a truism that there is no protection against the use of nuclear weapons, which can be triggered by technical malfunction, political misjudgment or by miscalculation. The consequences of their use cannot remain limited, and there is no way to contain them within predetermined national or even regional boundaries. In addition to the human cost, the ecology of the world would be severely affected and its infrastructures shattered.

We are therefore encouraged that there are signs of a positive change in the approaches adopted by the nuclear-weapon States on this crucial issue at this crucial juncture. In this context, we welcome the individual declarations made by them last week as well as the draft resolution submitted by them now before us. These endeavours, in our view, reflect concerted and serious efforts by the nuclear-weapon States to assuage the concerns of the non-nuclear-weapon States to ensure their security. However, they do not meet the long-standing demand of the non-aligned countries for legally binding commitments to enhance their security. Such a demand is fully consistent with the Final Document adopted by the General Assembly at its first special session devoted to Disarmament, held in 1978, as well as with the resolutions adopted by the Assembly since 1979 which have emphasized the urgency of seeking an agreement for a binding international instrument to assure non-nuclear nations against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. This issue was also accorded priority in all four NPT Review Conferences.

The declarations of last week made by the nuclear-weapon States contain inherent weaknesses and deficiencies, as they are unilateral and non-binding. Because security can never be assured on the basis of hortatory declarations, and because of the threat that continues to be posed by the very presence of vast nuclear arsenals, the non-aligned countries regard security guarantees in a binding international convention without any loopholes as the legitimate right of all non-nuclear nations. In the context of an unacceptable balance of obligations and responsibilities as between the nuclear and non-nuclear countries, the NPT parties that have renounced the manufacture and acquisition of nuclear weapons have a legitimate right to unconditional and legally binding assurances. For without such iron-clad guarantees, the non-aligned countries would remain under the threat of nuclear weapons, or suffer their actual use, and they are therefore committed to a common formulation incorporated into a legal instrument.

Hence, it is deeply regrettable to note the lack of tangible progress in the Conference on Disarmament despite concerted efforts by the Group of 21 since 1979. It was the expectation of the non-aligned countries Parties to the NPT that the improved international political atmosphere and achievements in the field of disarmament, as well as greater military openness and transparency, had provided a qualitatively new environment for a fresh appraisal of this question. Yet, despite widespread support for an international convention for security guarantees, a consensus on a common formula or approach has continued to elude us due to the maintenance of established positions and the reiteration of existing unilateral assurances.

It is in this context that Parties to the NPT that are members of the Non-Aligned Movement have considered the draft resolution now before us. We have noted with appreciation that it contains some of the proposals advanced by the Non-Aligned Movement caucus. It rightly reiterates the importance of the NPT to the global community and calls upon the States parties to comply fully with their obligations, in particular with Article VI. It recognizes the legitimacy of the demand of the non-nuclear-weapon States for security assurances, and calls for appropriate measures to safeguard their security. And it contemplates the initiation of measures to counter aggression involving the use of nuclear weapons and seeks to render necessary assistance to victims of such aggression.

We regret, however, that the draft has failed to acknowledge the right of the non-nuclear-weapon States to unconditional security assurances in an international convention. Furthermore, it remains to be asked how a

veto-bound Council could conceivably stem aggression committed by a nuclear-weapon State and take appropriate measures against that State. Another lacuna in the draft resolution is the failure to include the Non-Aligned Movement's proposal that aggression with nuclear weapons or the threat of such aggression against a non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the NPT constitutes a threat to international peace and security and necessitates immediate measures on the part of the Council, in conformity with Article 39 of the Charter and consistent with the substance and spirit of the relevant Articles of Chapter VII. This failure has rendered actions and measures envisaged in the draft insignificant.

It is against this backdrop that the non-aligned countries Parties to the NPT have doubts concerning the purported significance of security assurances in the form of a resolution by the Security Council, however solemnly proclaimed and well-intentioned. Such assurances, to be credible, must be reinforced by a firm commitment to non-use of nuclear weapons and renunciation of such strategic doctrines; this would offer an immediate and more satisfactory solution to the universal quest for security. We therefore believe that more far-reaching action will be needed to ensure the security of all nations. None the less, we recognize that the draft resolution constitutes an initial step towards a legally binding international instrument which should be broader in scope and multilaterally negotiated. It will only be useful if the nuclear-weapon States pursue this objective and ensure its ultimate consummation. Its successful outcome could further strengthen the non-proliferation regime and also constitute an important step in the broader process of nuclear disarmament.

Mr. Fulci (Italy): Since this is the first time that I have spoken in the Council under your presidency, Sir, allow me first to congratulate you warmly on your assumption of such an important duty, which we are sure you will be able to discharge with your usual, well-known efficiency and effectiveness, and also with your good sense of humour.

I think this is also an excellent occasion for me to express once again my delegation's heartfelt thanks to our distinguished and very good friend, Ambassador Li Zhaoxing of China, for the exemplary way he presided during last month over the work and activities of the Council, and also the way in which he represented us in Haiti on 31 March.

After a long and difficult negotiation, the five nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) have agreed on a document on security assurances, which is now before the Security Council. The Italian delegation is pleased to note that, for the first time in history, the five nuclear-weapon countries are acting jointly on this issue, and are giving a positive response to the aspirations and requests of a great many non-nuclear-weapon States.

Italy very much hopes that the process that bore these first positive fruits, on the eve of the Review and Extension Conference of the NPT, can continue and expand in the future. We are convinced that a further strengthening of the security assurances will contribute positively to international peace and security, to the benefit especially of all the countries that have signed, and are fully complying with, the NPT.

May I also underline the political implications of the fact that, for the very first time, positive and negative security assurances are both contained in the same document, moving in the direction of the expectations and requests of numerous members of the international community.

Even if the specific unilateral commitments of the five have not been harmonized — which would have been preferable, of course — we have duly noted the national declarations on security assurances made public in recent days. We deem it significant that they were announced concurrently and simultaneously.

The draft resolution before us contains new, progressive elements on the type of assistance to be provided in cases of the use, or threat of use, of nuclear weapons. We welcome this development.

The draft resolution also adds to the progress made in Geneva, with regard to both the comprehensive banning of nuclear testing and the prohibition of the production of fissile material for military purposes.

My Government believes that this initiative will help create the premises needed to make a decision on extending, indefinitely and unconditionally, the NPT at the upcoming New York Conference. Moreover, this new step moves in the same direction as the achievements of recent years in the field of nuclear disarmament, of which START I and START II are the main, but not the only, examples.

The President: I thank the representative of Italy for his particularly kind words addressed to me.

Mr. Cárdenas (Argentina) (*interpretation from Spanish*): My delegation wishes to express the following views in connection with the important draft resolution on security assurances on which the Council is about to vote.

The progress achieved on disarmament and non-proliferation since 19 June 1968, when this body adopted resolution 255 (1968), has been both significant and decisive.

Today we are considering a new draft resolution on security assurances. It constitutes a commitment to establishing effective measures and arrangements to guarantee the non-nuclear-weapon States that are parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) against the use, or threat of use, of nuclear weapons by those possessing them.

This new draft resolution — along with the recent unilateral declarations made by nuclear-weapon States, which are closely, directly and perhaps even causally linked to the draft resolution — will contribute to the consolidation and strengthening of hope in the international community, and will even generate newer and greater hopes, as we go through an effective process of nuclear disarmament. Moreover, the nuclear-weapon States will be making a firm commitment to providing broader security assurances, both positive and negative: they will have committed themselves, on the one hand, to taking certain specific actions and, on the other hand, to refraining from other actions.

It should be stressed that this draft resolution will be in keeping with what was initially established in this regard in Protocol II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco. However, in our opinion, that Protocol is more in line with the needs of non-nuclear-weapon States.

The draft resolution is linked to an understandable historical aspiration on the part of the non-nuclear-weapon States signatories of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Through the draft resolution, those countries will receive new security assurances from those possessing nuclear weapons.

Unlike what happened with regard to resolution 255 (1968), with the adoption of the draft resolution under our consideration, the five permanent members of the Security Council will have offered — for the first time, as we have already stated — a set of positive and negative assurances to those signatories of the Non-Proliferation Treaty that do not possess nuclear weapons.

This draft resolution, the significant advances being made in the Conference on Disarmament and the unilateral declarations of security assurances that I have mentioned can be considered milestones — very important ones, in our view — marking paths begun in 1968.

My delegation welcomes the opportunity to reaffirm the Security Council's important role of jurisdiction and assistance in respect of this issue.

The adoption of the draft resolution before us will also encourage hopes for a forthcoming indefinite and unconditional extension of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which is one of the main pillars of peaceful coexistence in our times. With such an extension, nuclear disarmament can become a reality of the twenty-first century, and the cause of peace will thus be strengthened. We therefore welcome this action.

Mr. Gambari (Nigeria): My delegation would like to congratulate you warmly, Sir, on your assumption of the office of President of the Security Council for the month of April. We are convinced that under your leadership the Council is in excellent hands. We would also like to thank Ambassador Li Zhaoxing of China and members of his delegation for their skilful guidance of the work of the Council during the month of March.

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which came into force in 1970, represents a responsible mix of rights and obligations on the part of Member States parties to the Treaty. To a large extent, it is an unequal Treaty, which, however, has continuing implications for the maintenance of international peace and security.

As a product of the cold war, the Non-Proliferation Treaty seeks to prevent both the horizontal and vertical spread of nuclear weapons. It seeks to pursue nuclear disarmament and the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons. In doing so, it embodies the hope that the benefits of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes will be made accessible and available to States parties, particularly the developing countries among them, as a positive contribution to their socio-economic development. The cold war is now over, and no time is more propitious than the present to pursue the non-proliferation objectives of the NPT, particularly as

provided for in Article VI of the Treaty. The continuation of the Treaty must reside in the full and effective implementation of both the spirit and the letter of that Article.

With the creation of a differentiated form of membership, the NPT was bound to be discriminatory. However, it has continued to attract increased membership — and with good reason, in our opinion — with the result that the goal of universal adherence to the Treaty is now a viable and feasible proposition. This is just as well.

We cannot but reiterate, however, that the Non-Proliferation Treaty has served the international community well. We must therefore seek to strengthen it.

In return for a renunciation of the development and acquisition of nuclear weapons, the non-nuclear weapon States expected, *inter alia*, credible assurances from the nuclear-weapon States that they would not use, or threaten to use, nuclear weapons against them. To all intents and purposes, this is legitimate.

It was this concern of the non-nuclear weapon States and their insistence on the need to be provided with such security guarantees that induced the adoption of resolution 255 (1968). That resolution recognized, *inter alia*, that aggression with nuclear weapons, or the threat of such aggression, against a non-nuclear-weapon State would create a situation in which the Security Council and, above all, its nuclear-weapon-States members, would have to act immediately in accordance with their obligations under the United Nations Charter.

Resolution 255 (1968) was considered *ab initio* unsatisfactory. Only three of the nuclear-weapon States gave some form of positive security assurances. It did not commit the nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty to any specific form of action in defence of a non-nuclear-weapon State which is a victim of nuclear attack or aggression involving the use of nuclear weapons.

The present draft resolution, which builds on resolution 255 (1968), enjoys the support of the five nuclear-weapon States. We commend in particular the unconditional security assurance given by China in its own national declaration contained in document S/1995/265 of 6 April 1995. This is a positive development. Be that as it may, it is the firm and principled view of my delegation that what is desirable, in the circumstance of the inequities in the NPT and the disparities in the implementation of the various provisions of the Treaty by the two sides to the bargain, is that negative security assurances should be provided to non-nuclear-weapon States in a legally binding instrument. Such an instrument, which should be negotiated multilaterally, must have as its starting point the obligation of "no use, no first use" of nuclear weapons by the nuclear-weapon States against a non-nuclear-weapon State party to the Treaty — the kind of obligation contained in the Chinese national statement to which I referred earlier.

In other words, there must be a clear commitment by all the nuclear-weapon States — not some of them — not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty. Since the non-nuclear-weapon States accepted the Treaty provisions not to develop or to acquire nuclear weapons, they should in return be assured in Treaty form that they will not be victims of use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The insistence on such a *quid pro quo* is both legitimate and fair, and therefore cannot be side-stepped much longer.

Although we have in the spirit of consensus agreed to go along with the adoption of the present draft resolution, which had been put forward in anticipation of the NPT Review and Extension Conference, we do so without enthusiasm. Therefore, we must place on record our disappointment that the present draft resolution fails to prescribe clearly defined and specific action to be taken in the case of aggression with nuclear weapons, the specific obligations of nuclear-weapon States, the specific form of assistance to be provided by the Council as a duty, rather than as a request from a victim State, and the action to be taken by the Council should the aggressor be a nuclear-weapon State which is also a permanent member of the Security Council. The draft resolution also fails to commit all members of the Council to the necessity of adopting in the immediate future negative security assurances in a legally binding instrument.

The assurances in the present draft resolution, as drafted, need to be further clarified if they are to inspire the necessary confidence which non-nuclear-weapon States can live with, and if they are not to be a mere set of measures whose efficacy could be undermined by varying interpretations of Member States. There must also be a set of assurances which Member States would be unable to withdraw from fulfilling, especially during hostilities, on account of what may be claimed as national interests. My delegation looks forward to a set of guarantees that would not be vulnerable to the use of the

veto by the permanent members of the Security Council. Nigeria has always believed, and continues to believe, that the best assurances against nuclear annihilation is the complete elimination of these weapons.

The President: I thank the representative of Nigeria for his kind words addressed to me.

Mr. Martínez Blanco (Honduras) *(interpretation from Spanish)*: On behalf of my delegation, may I congratulate you, Sir, on your assumption of the presidency of the Security Council for this month. We are convinced that under your leadership the work of the Council will be successful.

I also wish to express our appreciation to your predecessor, the Permanent Representative of China, Ambassador Li Zhaoxing for having conducted the work of the Security Council in March with skill and effectiveness.

My delegation would like first of all to say that it agrees with the comments made by the Permanent Representative of Indonesia on behalf of States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) that belong to the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries.

Avoiding nuclear war and preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons have been, and should remain, priorities of the international community in the maintenance of international peace and security. None the less, achieving these objectives is now more difficult than in the recent past because political and economic circumstances following the cold war have opened up different paths to proliferation for those States with the financial and technical capacity to design, acquire or produce nuclear weapons. Their acquisition by such States, and their possible acquisition by groups within States, and then the use or threat of use of these weapons, is a danger to international peace and security. It is therefore today more necessary than ever before to make every effort and commitment against nuclear proliferation. All peace-loving States must commit themselves to these efforts.

My delegation considers that in the attainment of these objectives, as well as in international cooperation for the peaceful uses of nuclear technology, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is of undeniable importance, and that therefore there should be universal adherence to it. None the less, we believe that the support that the non-nuclear-weapon States give to these initiatives, through their adherence to them or through their participation in regional arrangements or systems, such as the Treaty of Tlatelolco, should not be considered as a gift to the nuclear-weapon States. The fact that States parties to the Treaty renounce the production or acquisition of nuclear weapons has implications for their own security, since they give up their right to deter an attack or the threat of an attack by nuclear-weapon-States.

That is why, until the ultimate goal of the total elimination of these weapons is achieved, the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty have the legitimate right to be given assurances that the weapons will not be used against them. In order to obtain recognition of this right, a matter of vital interest to their security, the non-nuclear-weapon States have been endeavouring since the very negotiation of the NPT, and through the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, to obtain security assurances that are internationally acceptable — in other words, commitments that are legally binding. Thus far, there have only been negative security assurances, in the form of unilateral statements that do not have the binding force of an international instrument, or positive security assurances through a resolution of the Council. One example was the adoption of resolution 255 (1968) of 19 June 1968, which did not specify what action should be taken in the case of nuclear aggression, and which did not specify whether the Security Council needed to obtain prior consent from the non-nuclear State which had been attacked. For this reason, these security assurances were of limited value.

My delegation understands that the draft resolution now before the Council attempts to make the positive security assurances more credible and more universally acceptable by broadening them, in that it defines the assistance to be provided to a non-nuclear State party to the NPT subjected to aggression involving nuclear weapons; establishes the intention to take appropriate measures to compensate it for damage caused by the aggression; and contemplates possible immediate collective action by the nuclear-weapon States members of the Council, in accordance with the provisions of the Charter.

My delegation recognizes that the present draft resolution and the unilateral statements recently made by the members of the Security Council that are nuclear-weapon States on new security assurances could contribute to strengthening the international nuclear non-proliferation regime and to dispelling the fears engendered by the ambiguous and undeclared nuclear policies of certain States against their regional

neighbours. In this respect, my delegation hopes that the adoption of this draft resolution will help resolve the differences in the Conference on Disarmament that have so far prevented the conclusion of effective international instruments on negative security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States, something that has been advocated since 1968 by the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries.

Lastly, my delegation feels that the most effective guarantee that can be provided against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is nuclear disarmament itself, under effective international control. In the meantime, the security assurances being offered to non-nuclear-weapon countries, be they positive or negative, can be understood only as temporary measures towards the attainment of that objective.

The President: I thank the representative of Honduras for the kind words he addressed to me.

Mr. Henze (Germany): Since this is the first time I have spoken at a formal meeting of the Security Council, I should like to start my remarks by congratulating you, Sir, on your assumption of the presidency of the Council. Your experience and your abilities are widely recognized, and you have already demonstrated that you intend to use them in the interests of our work.

At the same time, I should like to thank Ambassador Li for his work as President of the Council in March. He guided our deliberations with his well-known skill and intimate knowledge of the procedures of this body, to the benefit of our common efforts.

Germany welcomed the offer by the five nuclear-weapon States to extend negative as well as positive security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), and particularly their intention to submit a draft resolution to the Security Council to this end. Such an undertaking meets the legitimate security concerns of non-nuclear-weapon States and sends a positive political signal with a view to extending the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty indefinitely and unconditionally at the forthcoming Conference of the States parties to the NPT — an objective that Germany, itself a non-nuclear-weapon State, has persistently pursued for a long time.

So far, the commitments of the nuclear-weapon States regarding security assurances have been of a heterogeneous character: different with regard to the number of declaring States, different in scope, different as to the group of States to which they apply, different in timing and context. We therefore consider the draft resolution that has been submitted to be an important step towards a common position of all nuclear-weapon States, as well as a reinforcement of their already existing commitments.

In our view, progress consists mainly in the fact that now, for the first time, all nuclear-weapons States are sponsoring a formal commitment to non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT, and that both negative and positive security assurances are addressed in one and the same draft resolution of the Security Council. With regard to positive security assurances, we note that, also for the first time, options for action to be taken by the Security Council are specified in detail. This is important in the light of the fact that since the end of the cold war the emphasis of the debate has shifted from negative to positive security assurances.

Germany is of the opinion that even after a new draft resolution of the Security Council — the one on which we are about to vote — has been adopted, the question of security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States must remain on the international disarmament and arms control agenda. It therefore supports the reinstitution at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament, while this year's session is still going on, of the Ad Hoc Committee on security assurances. The aim of a multilateral agreement on security assurances must not be abandoned.

For all those reasons, Germany supports the draft resolution that has been submitted and will therefore vote in favour of it.

The President: I thank the representative of Germany for the kind words he addressed to me.

Mr. Legwaila (Botswana): I congratulate you, Sir, on your assumption of the presidency of the Security Council for the month of April. A well-deserved tribute goes also to Ambassador Li of China for the efficient manner in which he led the Council during the month of March.

We agree with everything said by the Chairman of the Non-aligned Movement in his statement. He spoke on our behalf. But we have deliberately decided to repeat what he said — not everything, of course — in order to drive the message home.

The delegation of Botswana appreciates the efforts made by the permanent members of the Security Council regarding nuclear security assurances. We consider the draft resolution before us to be a noteworthy contribution towards the adoption of further measures to be undertaken by the nuclear-weapon States to safeguard the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. We also consider the separate statements made individually by each nuclear-weapon State regarding negative security assurances to be a significant gesture of goodwill towards meeting the concerns of the non-nuclear-weapon States. Like others, we wish these statements were all categoric in committing these States to the non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States. We most appreciate the fact that at least one of the statements came close — but only close — to meeting all our concerns. The rest, I am afraid, are nothing more than statements of good intentions — solemn as they are. The road to protection against nuclear weapons is not paved with good intentions.

It is the understanding of my delegation that the draft resolution before us is not being presented on a quid pro quo basis relative to the issues before the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. It is our hope that this draft resolution is intended to help and/or influence, positively, the deliberations in the Conference. While fully cognizant of the importance of this draft resolution, my delegation remains convinced that the assurances it offers non-nuclear-weapon States should have been a clear and unequivocal statement of intent on the part of nuclear-weapon States on the non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States. In fact, it would have been even more reassuring if the present draft resolution had come in the form of a legally binding international instrument. The separate statements we referred to earlier on negative security assurances made by the nuclear-weapon States would thus form part of such a legal instrument, which could then be annexed to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

The non-nuclear-weapon States have contributed immensely to the maintenance of international peace and security by deciding to forgo the development, acquisition or possession of nuclear weapons. The world is today a relatively safer place to live in thanks to their vision and generosity. Their decision to forgo the right to have nuclear weapons in their defence capabilities should be matched by a more positive recognition by the nuclear-weapon States that they have a right to protection against the use of such weapons. This is the barest minimum required as a true confidence- building measure amongst non-nuclear-weapon States that forgoing possession of nuclear weapons was not a miscalculation which will leave them perpetually vulnerable to the threat of these weapons.

In fact, non-nuclear-weapon States should also be asking for protection against the use of nuclear weapons even in the case of a conflict between nuclear-weapon States, because the fallout would affect them all in the same way. It is therefore only fair that the non-nuclear-weapon States should expect to be met half way by their partners in the Non-Proliferation Treaty that enjoy the privileged monopoly of possessing nuclear weapons. They have given up the sovereign right to acquire these weapons for the sake of world peace and stability. Their concerns should therefore be accorded serious thought and understanding. Their right — and I emphasize "right" — to seek and receive protection must be recognized.

My delegation very strongly holds the view that in the final analysis the ultimate assurance against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is the complete elimination of those weapons. We are hopeful that Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons will remain a constant reminder to the nuclear-weapon States of their obligations under the Treaty.

The President: I thank the representative of Botswana for the kind words he addressed to me.

Mr. Li Zhaoxing (China) (*interpretation from Chinese*): At the outset, Sir, I would like to congratulate you on your assumption of this month's presidency of the Security Council. I am convinced, given your rich experience and wisdom, that you will guide the Council's work to success. I also wish to take this opportunity to thank all members for their assistance and cooperation during my presidency last month.

The Security Council will be adopting today a draft resolution on security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States. This is the result of the joint efforts of all countries. It will contribute to the maintenance of world peace, security and stability, and will facilitate the realization of the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. The Chinese delegation welcomes this development. However, we are of the view that the draft resolution soon to be adopted is only one step towards the conclusion of a legally binding

international instrument providing assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States and nuclear-weapon-free zones against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. We still have a lot to do for the conclusion of such an international instrument. China is ready to join the rest of the international community in a continued effort to that end.

I wish to take this opportunity to reiterate the position of the Chinese Government on security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States.

First, complete and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons to usher in a nuclear-weapon-free world is the fundamental guarantee for ridding all countries of the threat of nuclear war. China has always stood for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons and has proposed that a convention on the complete prohibition of such weapons be concluded in the same way as the Conventions banning chemical and biological weapons.

Secondly, it is the due right of non-nuclear-weapon States to acquire security assurances to free themselves from any nuclear attack or nuclear threat. Pending the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons, all nuclear-weapon States should undertake not to use or threaten to use such weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States, which is a practical and feasible measure to ensure the security of non-nuclear-weapon States. If all nuclear-weapon States could take a concerted position and take concerted action in this regard, it would enhance the security of the vast numbers of non-nuclear-weapon States and contribute to world peace and security as well as to the prevention of nuclear-weapon proliferation. The Chinese Government has long unilaterally undertaken not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States or nuclear-weapon-free zones at any time or under any circumstances. We call upon all the other nuclear-weapon States to undertake the same commitment and to make unremitting efforts for the conclusion of an international convention to this effect.

Thirdly, an unconditional commitment by all nuclear-weapon States not to be the first to use nuclear weapons is one of the effective measures to avoid nuclear war and reduce the nuclear threat. Since the very first day that China possessed nuclear weapons, the Chinese Government has unilaterally undertaken not to be the first to use such weapons at any time or under any circumstances. We call upon the countries concerned, acting in conformity with the trend of the times, to discard the theory of nuclear deterrence, to undertake not to be the first to use nuclear weapons and to start negotiations for the conclusion of an international convention to this effect.

Fourthly, China fully understands and supports the reasonable demand of the vast numbers of non-nuclear-weapon States for security assurances. On 5 April 1995 the Chinese Government made a solemn statement on security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States, which reaffirmed China's unconditional commitment not to be the first to use nuclear weapons and not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States or nuclear-weapon-free zones. A commitment was also made in the statement on positive security assurances that China, as a permanent member of the Security Council, undertakes to take action within the Council in order that the Council should take appropriate measures to provide, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, necessary assistance to any non-nuclear-weapon State that comes under attack with nuclear weapons, and to impose strict and effective sanctions on the attacking State. However, this commitment does not in any way compromise the position of the Chinese Government on no first use and no use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States or nuclear-weapon-free zones. Still less is it to be construed as endorsing the use of nuclear weapons.

The President: I thank the representative of China for the kind words he addressed to me.

Mr. Ubalijoro (Rwanda): Since this is the first time I have addressed the Council during your presidency, Sir, I would like to take this opportunity to congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency of the Security Council. I would also like to express our gratitude to your predecessor, Ambassador Li Zhaoxing, for the excellent manner in which he directed the work of the Council last month.

My delegation would also like to thank the sponsors of the draft resolution before the Council for having taken into account some of our concerns while drafting the text.

There is talk nowadays of apparent signs of relaxation of tensions, and more and more peaceful ways are being found to settle international problems. We feel that a positive strategy is an effort to persuade States not to threaten other nations, whereas a negative strategy aims at increasing the cost of making such threats. Some

countries may try to change the environment by enhancing their security and adjusting national conditions and goals to strengthen their position. But in the long run, this is useless if there are no security assurances on a world-wide level.

My delegation feels that it is also important to analyse the structure of today's international environment. Especially in the present context of adversarial interdependence, some strategies may be more promising than others. For example, approaches that proved useful during the cold war or the détente era may be less appropriate to the contemporary structure.

Any meaningful assessment of possible security strategies requires prior specification of the defining features of the international environment that is being addressed. It cannot be assumed that all strategies meet the challenge of various international settings equally well. Furthermore, in a fluctuating security environment, strategy analysis cannot be linked to discussion of the probabilities of facing familiar threats. Rather, it is important to identify the different types of threats and possible combinations thereof. Strategic surprise not only stems from inadequate risk assessment but also is often related to unimaginative threat analysis.

Considering all these factors, my delegation fully understands that the task was indeed not easy for the drafters of this draft resolution, because of its high complexity, involving a precise understanding of diverse threats and their causes, and of national vulnerabilities.

My delegation is strongly convinced that moral and strategic factors dictate the need to find new ways to achieve mutual security without exposing mankind to the terror of living under the threat of nuclear annihilation. Even though the road is still long, my delegation feels that it is up to all nations in the international structure to help shape the international security environment, which affects their future survival. It is in that same context that my delegation will vote in favour of the draft resolution.

The President: I thank the representative of Rwanda for the kind words he addressed to me.

Mr. Al-Khussaiby (Oman): Mr. President, I am delighted to begin by congratulating you on your assumption of the presidency of the Security Council for the month of April. I assure you of my delegation's cooperation at all times. Allow me also to take this opportunity to congratulate and thank your predecessor, Ambassador Li Zhaoxing of China, and his delegation, for the exemplary manner in which he steered the Council's work last month.

The current year is considered to be a distinctive one: this year we will witness the celebration of the fiftieth anniversary of the establishment of the United Nations. However, it is also the anniversary of the beginning of the atomic era, which led to the invention of nuclear weapons of mass destruction. The events of this era formed the background to and were of crucial significance in the important question of the provision of positive security assurances. The question is especially important now, as the deliberation of this question in the Council falls shortly before the holding of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).

The Sultanate of Oman has continuously supported the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, in the hope that mankind would be able to abolish completely all weapons of mass destruction. My country is therefore looking forward to the Conference, which will be held from 17 April to 12 May this year, in the hope that it will achieve our goal of the renewal of the Treaty, which continues to play a vital role as a legal instrument to counterbalance the nuclear threat.

My delegation has endeavoured to include the issue of the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful uses and its applications in the non-nuclear developing countries in a more organized, legitimate and protected manner to replace recourse to illegal means of developing and acquiring nuclear technology, which lead to risks on a global scale, to which incidents in many parts of the world bear witness. The Omani initiative is peaceful in nature, and falls within the scope of organized cooperation between countries which possess the technology and those Parties to the NPT which are still developing, and which need to have access to this technology in order to achieve progress in the social and economic spheres through its peaceful use.

The developing countries will expect the Council to afford them this privilege during the period of the Review and Extension Conference. In this context, the Security Council cannot stand in the way of a demand of this kind from the developing countries, as it can be considered one of the most important security assurances. We remain fully convinced that the present draft resolution would have been more integrated had the question of the transfer of technology for peaceful

purposes and its applications in developing countries been better accommodated.

My delegation's proposal summarizes and focuses on the responsibilities of the nuclear-weapon States permanent members of the Security Council to assist developing countries in the transfer of technology for peaceful purposes. The obligation of the permanent members to assist and cooperate with developing countries in the transfer of technology for peaceful uses will remain an issue which, we believe, will significantly contribute to the creation of a balance between the rights and obligations of the Parties under the umbrella of the NPT. Furthermore, the inclusion of this issue in the text of the draft resolution would encourage other countries with peaceful nuclear programmes to adhere to the Treaty — not to mention the positive impact such an effort would have on the developing countries, which would then be led to believe that the preferential regime of the Treaty as currently established in the field of the transfer of technology for peaceful purposes is not an immediate threat to their security.

In conclusion, while welcoming the draft resolution, we would like to emphasize once more the fact that the provision of security assurances should not be an end in itself in the world's endeavours to gain salvation from weapons of mass destruction, but will remain only a step in the right direction.

The President: I thank the representative of Oman for his kind words addressed to me.

The Council will now vote on the draft resolution contained in document S/1995/275.

A vote was taken by show of hands.

In favour:

Argentina, Botswana, China, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Honduras, Indonesia, Italy, Nigeria, Oman, Russian Federation, Rwanda, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

The President: There were 15 votes in favour. The draft resolution has been adopted unanimously as resolution 984 (1995).

I shall now call on those members of the Council who wish to make statements following the voting.

Mr. Gnehm (United States of America): Mr. President, I should like to begin by expressing to you our congratulations as you assume your duties as President of Security Council for this month. We look forward to a productive month under your able and gracious guidance. I should also like to thank Ambassador Li Zhaoxing for his effective and even-handed leadership of the Security Council during March.

Today we have taken an important step towards making the world safe from the use of nuclear weapons. The nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) — which are also the permanent members of the Security Council — have cooperated in offering coordinated assurances to the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty. This resolution incorporates those assurances, directly or by reference. In addition, this resolution elaborates a series of measures that the Council will consider taking in the catastrophic event of nuclear aggression, including possible measures to restore international peace and security. With the adoption of this resolution, these assurances are inscribed firmly in the United Nations framework.

This resolution recognizes the legitimate interest of the non-nuclear-weapon States in receiving assurances from the nuclear-weapon States. It promises that, in the event that the non-nuclear-weapon States are the victims of an act or a threat of nuclear aggression, the Security Council — and above all its nuclear-weapon States members — will be immediately involved. Although any State can bring such a matter to the Council's attention, the nuclear-weapon States promise that they will do so. And they will seek Council action to provide the necessary assistance to the State victim: this assistance can include humanitarian and technical aid, help in getting compensation from the aggressor, and, most importantly, appropriate measures to settle the dispute and restore international peace and security.

On 5 and 6 April, each of the permanent members issued national declarations which include so-called negative security assurances: explanations of the circumstances under which we will not use nuclear weapons. These national declarations are referred to in paragraph 1 of the resolution. They are realistic, serious and feasible considerations — the only basis on which credible security assurances can be based — and are highly responsive to the concerns expressed by non-nuclear-weapon States.

The coordinated sponsorship of this resolution by all the permanent members and the positive and negative assurances are significant advances over the Council's effort 25 years ago. Security Council resolution 255 (1968) was not co-sponsored or voted for by all nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT, nor did it incorporate both positive and negative security assurances.

Indeed, the stable environment created by the NPT has helped make possible the security assurances in the resolution we have just adopted. The resolution's very first paragraph encompasses the three aspects of the NPT: prevention of nuclear war, non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and cooperation in the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. These goals, and the efficient functioning of the NPT's verification and monitoring mechanisms, have been a fundamental element of global security for 25 years.

That is why the assurances in this resolution are offered to States in full compliance with the Treaty. And that is why my Government hopes that this resolution will be seen by others as a further argument in favour of the indefinite extension of the NPT, even though these security assurances are not linked to the extension question. As I said before, because there is a Treaty, we can offer these assurances. If the NPT is permanent; if it is fully complied with and if it is universal, not only do these assurances become more meaningful: they suggest a day when they may also prove to be unnecessary.

As the resolution calls for, the United States accepts its obligations under the NPT. We reaffirm our commitment to article VI of the NPT, which calls for good faith negotiations aiming towards nuclear disarmament. We are also actively involved in negotiations to achieve a comprehensive test ban and we look forward to the negotiations to achieve a treaty on the cut-off of fissile material. We joined France, the United Kingdom and the Russian Federation in reaffirming these goals in a joint declaration in Geneva on 6 April. And we are committed to ratifying the START II Treaty and going beyond it. The nuclear arms race is over.

Today, largely because of the success of the NPT, non-proliferation has become a norm in world politics. States wishing to demonstrate their peaceful intent readily join the NPT. States wishing to put their neighbours at ease join the NPT. States seeking international legitimacy join the NPT.

Today there over 170 States parties to the Treaty, and soon more will become members. As President Clinton said on 1 March 1995, the NPT is the principal reason why the spread of nuclear weapons has not been more rapid or more extensive. It is our firm hope that States share with us the goal of supporting this valuable Treaty and the entire non-proliferation regime. It is in this spirit that we adopt this resolution today.

The President: I thank the representative of the United States for his kind words addressed to me.

Sir David Hannay (United Kingdom): May I offer you my congratulations, Sir, on your assumption of the presidency of the Council. My thanks also go to the Ambassador of China for the excellent way in which he directed our work last month.

The Council is today addressing a question of the very greatest importance, that of security assurances to the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). My Government recognizes that States which have renounced nuclear weapons are fully entitled to look for specific assurances that nuclear weapons will not be used against them and that the Security Council will take action in the case of nuclear aggression against such States. The resolution which has just been adopted by the Council reflects that recognition in precise and unprecedented terms. The United Kingdom and the other nuclear-weapon States have responded to the continuing concern of those non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT that all the nuclear-weapon States should give these assurances and that the negative security assurances given by them should be in analogous terms.

This resolution is of historic importance and it makes a very significant step forward beyond the terms of the Council's resolution 255 (1968), which was adopted in 1968. For the first time, a Council resolution relates to both positive and negative assurances. For the first time, all five nuclear-weapon States have given negative assurances in such a clear-cut and comprehensive way. For the first time, the five nuclear Powers have acted together to provide a common positive security assurance, as reflected in the resolution. Furthermore, the resolution develops resolution 255 (1968) by setting out the kinds of Council measures which might be taken in response to a request from the victim of an act of nuclear aggression, including in respect of compensation under international law, and technical, medical, scientific or humanitarian assistance

We believe that in so doing this resolution will contribute substantially to international peace and security.

The fact that the five nuclear-weapon States have for the first time acted collectively in sponsoring this resolution is a reflection of the profound changes in the international political and security climate in recent years. This improved climate, to which the resolution will further contribute, has also enabled and encouraged the nuclear-weapon States, including the United Kingdom, to make very significant reductions in their nuclear forces.

The United Kingdom has never maintained nuclear forces at other than the minimum level it has judged necessary. Since the end of the cold war, my Government has reassessed that level and adjusted its nuclear forces accordingly. The United Kingdom has eliminated entirely its surface maritime nuclear capability. It has reduced by half the number of its free-fall bombs. The remainder will be withdrawn by the end of 1998 and will not be replaced by any air-delivered system. We will rely instead on Trident as our sole nuclear system. These reductions to the United Kingdom's sub-strategic forces, together with the decision that, when Trident is fully in service, each submarine will deploy with no more than 96 warheads, mean that our warhead stockpile will be 21 per cent lower than in the 1970s and the total explosive power of those warheads will be some 59 per cent lower than in the 1970s. These are massive reductions.

This is not the occasion to set out in detail my Government's position on the future of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. My Secretary of State will do so here in New York next week in his address to the Review and Extension Conference. Nor is it my intention to prejudge the outcome of that Conference. That Treaty is the cornerstone of international efforts to avoid the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. It has already made an invaluable contribution to international peace and security. Its very existence has been crucial in encouraging and enabling the nuclear-weapon States to act together to cosponsor the resolution now adopted by the Council. Without it, it would have been far more difficult, if not impossible, for the nuclear-weapon States to have acted as they have done. The United Kingdom is accordingly convinced that it is in the interests of all countries that the Treaty be extended indefinitely and without qualification. We urge all States parties to the Treaty to support such an extension at the forthcoming Review and Extension Conference in the long-term interests of international peace and security and to enable nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States to continue working together to achieve a safer and more prosperous world.

The President: I thank the representative of the United Kingdom for his kind words addressed to me.

Mr. Mérimée (France) (*interpretation from French*): The French delegation would like to convey its congratulations to you, Sir, on your assumption of the presidency and also its very sincere thanks to Ambassador Li Zhaoxing for the way in which he conducted the work of the Council last month.

The Council's adoption of resolution 984 (1995), a few days before the opening of the Review and Extension Conference of the States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), is an act of particular importance, whose scope is not lost on any delegation. The resolution reflects the common desire of the nuclear Powers, permanent members of the Council, to respond to the aspirations of the international community and promote the universality and indefinite extension of a Treaty which is now more than ever the very cornerstone of the non-proliferation regime.

The resolution which has just been adopted is intended to be a global, collective and concrete response to the legitimate aspirations of the non-nuclear-weapon States in the context of the post-cold-war period.

First and foremost it is a global response, for, unlike resolution 255 (1968), the text that the Council has just adopted involves both positive and negative security assurances.

It is also a collective response, since for the first time since the appearance of nuclear weapons the five Powers recognized as such by the NPT have been in a position not only to co-sponsor such a resolution, but also to a large extent to harmonize the contents of their national declarations. The five Powers afford all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT harmonized negative assurances, thus reinforcing their security.

Finally, it is a concrete response, because, for the first time a Security Council resolution specifies the measures which the Council may take, in the event of aggression, in the areas of settling disputes, humanitarian assistance and compensation to victims.

The resolution which has just been adopted by the Council would not exist without the national

commitments made by all the recognized nuclear Powers. The fundamental importance of the joint declarations of 6 April by the permanent representatives of the five permanent members at the Conference on Disarmament prompts me to reiterate what was said then.

First, with respect to negative assurances, France reaffirmed that it

> "will not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, except in the case of an invasion or any other attack on France, its territory, its armed forces or other troops, or against its allies or a State towards which it has a security commitment". *(S/1995/264, annex, p. 2)*

France thus makes clear, for the benefit of the States which are signatories of the NPT, the guarantees it gave in 1982.

The declaration made on 6 April in Geneva is also a very important step in so far as, for the first time, France pledges to give positive assurances to all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT, in order to indicate its determination to alert the Council should these countries be attacked or threatened by nuclear weapons.

In the course of the numerous consultations in the preparation of this draft, concern was expressed as to whether the joint commitments made by the nuclear Powers concerning the so-called positive assurances could ensure the matter's being brought before the Council. On this point, France's declaration should dispel any ambiguity or apprehension. It states:

> "France considers that any aggression which is accompanied by the use of nuclear weapons would threaten international peace and security. France recognizes that the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons are entitled to an assurance that, should they be attacked with nuclear weapons or threatened with such an attack, the international community and, first and foremost, the United Nations Security Council, would react immediately in accordance with the obligations set forth in the Charter.
>
> "Having regard to these considerations, France makes the following declaration:
>
> "France, as a Permanent Member of the Security Council, pledges that, in the event of attack with nuclear weapons or the threat of such attack against a non-nuclear-weapon State party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, France will immediately inform the Security Council and act within the Council to ensure that the latter takes immediate steps to provide, in accordance with the Charter, necessary assistance to any State which is the victim of such an act or threat of aggression.
>
> "France reaffirms in particular the inherent right, recognized in Article 51 of the Charter, of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack, including an attack with use of nuclear weapons, occurs against a Member of the United Nations until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security." *(ibid., p. 3)*

The fact that our Council has pronounced itself very clearly on this resolution, which calls for universal adherence to the NPT and emphasizes the need for States parties to the Treaty to fully respect all their obligations, bears witness to the desire of the members of the international community to work to strengthen the non-proliferation regime.

On the eve of the Conference on extending the NPT, whose indefinite extension, I would recall, France firmly advocates, this vote seems to my delegation to be a particularly encouraging sign. For their part, the permanent members of the Security Council, in presenting this resolution, have assumed the responsibilities incumbent upon them as nuclear-weapon States concerned about fulfilling their obligations under the NPT.

The President: I thank the representative of France for his kind words addressed to me.

Mr. Lavrov (Russian Federation) (*interpretation from Russian*): Mr. President, first of all, allow me to congratulate you on your accession to the presidency of the Security Council and express the expectation that the Security Council will work successfully under your leadership. The delegation of the Russian Federation will be prepared to offer you every possible support in this connection.

I would also like to express our profound thanks to the Ambassador of China, Mr. Li Zhaoxing, for the very skilful, precise and effective way in which he organized the work of the Security Council in March.

Today, for the first time since 1968, the Security Council is considering the question of security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States. During the almost 30 intervening years, considerable progress has been achieved in the field of disarmament. There has been a sea change in the international situation. The threat of nuclear warfare has been averted, and tangible results have been achieved in the field of nuclear disarmament. The START I Treaty has been signed and entered into force and the way has been opened for Russia and the United States to ratify START II. Specific steps in this field are also being taken by the other nuclear Powers, and talks on a comprehensive test-ban treaty have started in the Conference on Disarmament.

The question of security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States is most certainly a key element in the international security system. When he spoke at the forty-ninth session of the General Assembly, the President of the Russian Federation, Mr. Boris Nikolaevich Yeltsin, proposed that work be done to reach agreement on a renewed Security Council resolution on security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States, and this is the very goal that the resolution we have adopted reflects. The draft of the resolution that was put before the Council was prepared with the assistance of a wide range of States and, for the first time, all five nuclear-weapon States joined in sponsoring a draft resolution, in Council, on security assurances.

The resolution is an important step in response to the legitimate interest of the non-nuclear-weapon States, which have been trying to obtain agreed and binding security assurances in light of the fact that they themselves have renounced nuclear weapons under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). In our view, the resolution provides a global, collective and specific response to that interest. The adoption of the resolution is important for strengthening the NPT itself, whose purpose is to avert the threat of nuclear war and the proliferation of nuclear weapons and to promote international cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

I should like to emphasize that, for the first time, all five nuclear-weapon States have provided both positive and negative security assurances. In view of the legitimate aspirations of the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty to obtain assurances that nuclear weapons will not be used against them, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation made the following declaration on 5 April this year:

> "The Russian Federation will not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, except in the case of an invasion or any other attack on the Russian Federation, its territory, its armed forces or other troops, its allies or on a State towards which it has a security commitment, carried out or sustained by such a non-nuclear-weapon State in association or alliance with a nuclear-weapon State." (*S/1995/261, p. 3*)

Today's unanimous resolution goes significantly further than resolution 255 (1968) and spells out the actions and forms of assistance that will be undertaken by the Security Council and nuclear-weapon States in the event that an aggression using nuclear weapons, or the threat of such aggression, should occur. It is significant that, in the event of an aggression with nuclear weapons or the threat of such aggression against a non-nuclear-weapon State party to the NPT, the nuclear-weapon-States — permanent members of the Security Council — will immediately bring the matter to the attention of the Security Council and will seek to ensure that the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, takes steps to provide the necessary assistance to States victims of an act of aggression or subject to the threat of such aggression.

The resolution also makes provision for appropriate steps to be taken in response to a request from a victim of aggression for technical, medical, scientific or humanitarian assistance, and also for compensation by the aggressor for the losses, damage or injuries sustained by the State victim.

I am very pleased to note the constructive and responsible approach of all members of the Security Council during the discussion of the draft resolution. As far as possible, the sponsors tried to take into account all the proposals made by the non-nuclear-weapon States, particularly the non-aligned countries, during work on the draft resolution.

The adoption of today's resolution on security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States does not mean that this question has been played out. We intend for work along these lines to continue. I should also like to emphasize that the adoption of the resolution supplements the commitments already made by the Russian Federation concerning the signing of the relevant clarifications to the Protocols to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean — the

Treaty of Tlatelolco — and the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty — the Treaty of Rarotonga. The Russian Federation supports proposals for similar zones in Africa, the Middle East, South-East Asia and the Korean peninsula. We believe that the Security Council's adoption of today's resolution will help strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime, international security and world stability.

The President: I thank the representative of the Russian Federation for his kind words addressed to me.

I shall now make a statement in my capacity as representative of the Czech Republic.

The Czech Republic is pleased that today, just a couple of days before the opening of the Fifth Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the Security Council has adopted a resolution on security assurances jointly sponsored by all permanent members of the Council. Resolution 984 (1995) is a timely, long-awaited political step in the right direction. The nuclear-weapon States that sponsored the resolution have displayed a certain sensitivity and have recognized the justified security interests of non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT.

We are all aware of the fact that the issue of security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States has for many years been a complex problem. For the longest time, its treatment could not move beyond individual formulas of negative security assurances offered by nuclear-weapon States. During the cold-war era, it was next to impossible to achieve the objective of the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva — namely, a common security-assurance formula — and to embody it in an international, legally binding instrument. Thus, the Geneva Conference had no other option but to engage in an endless, repetitive and not-very-stimulating exercise on this subject.

Like other non-nuclear-weapon States, the Czech Republic is interested in assurances against the use or the threat of use of nuclear weapons, as well as in assistance if indeed we were ever threatened by them, not to speak of their actually being used against us. We therefore welcomed the renewed interest in the question of security assurances that followed the changes on the international scene at the end of the 1980s. Given these dynamic political changes and with the emergence of new States with nuclear-weapon capabilities, it was not easy to save the existing nuclear disarmament agreements or, in some cases, to ensure their entry into force and their reliable implementation. It was only logical that these problems were accorded priority attention.

However, these dramatic political changes notwithstanding, the quest of the non-nuclear-weapon States for security assurances lost none of its legitimacy and urgency. Those countries which had forsworn their nuclear option by adhering to the NPT and by faithfully implementing all its provisions had a particularly well justified demand.

The resolution the Security Council has just adopted is of particular value since it combines both positive and negative security assurances addressed to non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT. In its paragraph concerning the provision of assistance to those States if they are threatened with or become the victims of the use of nuclear weapons, the permanent members of the Security Council are further stressing the central role of the NPT in the field of international security and its vital importance for all States that adhere to it.

The resolution is a step forward compared with Security Council resolution 255 (1968). We particularly welcome that, in the event of aggression or threat of aggression with nuclear weapons, the matter will immediately be brought to the attention of the Council in order to provide the necessary assistance to the State in question. We also welcome the Council's mandate to investigate the situation and adopt appropriate measures to settle the core dispute and restore international peace and security.

Nevertheless, this resolution is not the last word on the question of security assurances. We expect that a further international, legally binding instrument in this regard will be agreed upon. The prospects for attaining it would improve if further nuclear proliferation were permanently curbed and if the process of nuclear disarmament maintained its momentum. Such developments will be more likely if the NPT is extended indefinitely and unconditionally. We can all contribute to such an outcome of the upcoming NPT Review and Extension Conference, thereby contributing, above all, to our very own security.

I now resume my functions as President of the Council.

There are no further speakers. The Security Council has thus concluded its consideration of the item on its agenda.

The meeting rose at 6.30 p.m.

United Nations S/PV.3515

Security Council

Fiftieth Year

Provisional

3515th Meeting

Wednesday, 12 April 1995, 7.35 p.m.

New York

President:	Mr. Kovanda	(Czech Republic)
Members:	Argentina	Mrs. Cañas
	Botswana	Mr. Legwaila
	China	Mr. Li Zhaoxing
	France	Mr. Mérimée
	Germany	Mr. Rudolph
	Honduras	Mr. Rendon Barnica
	Indonesia	Mr. Wibisono
	Italy	Mr. Fulci
	Nigeria	Mr. Egunsola
	Oman	Mr. Al-Battashi
	Russian Federation	Mr. Sidorov
	Rwanda	Mr. Ubalijoro
	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	Ms. Wilmshurst
	United States of America	Mr. Hume

Agenda

The situation in Tajikistan and along the Tajik-Afghan border

95-85272 (E)

This record contains the original text of speeches delivered in English and interpretations of speeches delivered in the other languages. The final text will be printed in the *Official Records of the Security Council*. Corrections should be submitted to original speeches only. They should be incorporated in a copy of the record and be sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned, *within one week of the date of publication*, to the Chief of the Verbatim Reporting Section, room C-178.

The meeting was called to order at 7.35 p.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

The situation in Tajikistan and along the Tajik-Afghan border

The President: I should like to inform the Council that I have received a letter from the representative of Tajikistan in which he requests to be invited to participate in the discussion of the item on the Council's agenda. In conformity with the usual practice, I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite that representative to participate in the discussion without the right to vote, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure.

There being no objection, it is so decided.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Kayumov (Tajikistan) took a place at the Council table.

The President: The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. The Council is meeting in accordance with the understanding reached in its prior consultations.

I should like to draw the attention of the members of the Council to the following documents: S/1995/225, letter dated 27 March 1995 from the Permanent Representative of Tajikistan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General; and S/1995/283, letter dated 10 April 1995 from the Permanent Representative of Kazakhstan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General.

Following consultations among members of the Security Council, I have been authorized to make the following statement on behalf of the Council:

"The Security Council expresses its deep concern at the escalation of military activities on the Tajik-Afghan border which resulted in grave loss of life. In this context, the Council reminds the parties of their obligations to ensure the safety of the Secretary-General's Special Envoy and all other United Nations personnel.

"The Council strongly believes that armed activities by the Tajik opposition in violation of the cease-fire Agreement of 17 September 1994 (S/1994/1102, Annex I) jeopardize the inter-Tajik dialogue and the process of national reconciliation as a whole. Noting also recent violations of the 17 September 1994 Agreement by Government forces, the Council calls on the Tajik opposition and the Government of Tajikistan to comply strictly with the obligations they have assumed under that Agreement and calls on the Tajik opposition in particular to extend it for a substantial period beyond 26 April 1995.

"The Council fully supports the appeal of the Secretary-General to the Tajik parties and other countries concerned to exercise restraint, to do their utmost to continue the political dialogue and to hold the next round of talks as soon as possible. It welcomes the agreement by the Government of Tajikistan and the Tajik opposition to the proposal of the Secretary-General's Special Envoy to hold an urgent high-level meeting of their representatives in Moscow. It calls upon the countries of the region to discourage any activities that could complicate or hinder the peace process in Tajikistan.

"Reaffirming its resolution 968 (1994) of 16 December 1994, the Council once again urges the parties to reconfirm through concrete steps their commitment to resolve the conflict only through political means. The Council reiterates its call on the parties to hold the fourth round of the inter-Tajik talks without delay on the basis as agreed during the previous rounds of consultations."

This statement will be issued as a document of the Security Council under the symbol S/PRST/1995/16.

The Security Council has thus concluded the present stage of its consideration of the item on its agenda.

The meeting rose at 7.40 p.m.

United Nations S/PV.3516

Security Council

Fiftieth Year

Provisional

3516th Meeting

Wednesday, 12 April 1995, 7.40 p.m.
New York

President:	Mr. Kovanda	(Czech Republic)
Members:	Argentina	Mrs. Cañas
	Botswana	Mr. Malebeswa
	China	Mr. Li Zhaoxing
	France	Mr. Mérimée
	Germany	Mr. Rudolph
	Honduras	Mr. Rendon Barnica
	Indonesia	Mr. Wibisono
	Italy	Mr. Fulci
	Nigeria	Mr. Egunsola
	Oman	Mr. Al-Battashi
	Russian Federation	Mr. Sidorov
	Rwanda	Mr. Ubalijoro
	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	Ms. Wilmshurst
	United States of America	Mr. Hume

Agenda

The situation concerning Western Sahara

Report of the Secretary-General on the situation concerning Western Sahara (S/1995/240)

95-85278 (E)

This record contains the original text of speeches delivered in English and interpretations of speeches delivered in the other languages. The final text will be printed in the *Official Records of the Security Council*. Corrections should be submitted to original speeches only. They should be incorporated in a copy of the record and be sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned, *within one week of the date of publication*, to the Chief of the Verbatim Reporting Section, room C-178.

The meeting was called to order at 7.40 p.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

The situation concerning Western Sahara

Report of the Secretary-General on the situation concerning Western Sahara (S/1995/240)

The President: The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. The Security Council is meeting in accordance with the understanding reached in its prior consultations.

Members of the Council have before them the report of the Secretary-General on the situation concerning Western Sahara (S/1995/240).

Following consultations among members of the Security Council, I have been authorized to make the following statement on behalf of the Council:

"The Security Council notes the report of the Secretary-General dated 30 March 1995 (S/1995/240). It welcomes progress achieved so far in the identification and registration process, in particular the acceleration in the rate of identification, and emphasizes the need to continue that acceleration. It endorses the Secretary-General's goal of achieving a rate of at least 25,000 per month. However, the Council regrets that progress was not sufficient to enable the Secretary-General to recommend 1 June 1995 as the date for the commencement of the transitional period.

"The Security Council also notes with concern the delays resulting from the failure to ensure the continuous presence at the identification centres of the necessary sub-fraction representatives. It welcomes the agreement on a method for choosing alternative sub-fraction representatives when necessary and it expresses the hope that this will contribute to further acceleration of the process with a view to holding the referendum in January 1996. The Council supports the Secretary-General's call upon both parties to cooperate fully with the Identification Commission in the performance of its work, in particular by abandoning their insistence on strict reciprocity in the number of centres and on the linkage of a centre on one side with a specific centre on the other.

"The Security Council expresses its concern about the slow progress on the other aspects which are relevant to the fulfilment of the Settlement Plan and must be implemented before the referendum can take place. It calls upon both parties to cooperate fully with the Secretary-General, with his Deputy Special Representative, with the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO), and to coordinate such cooperation to ensure prompt and full implementation of all aspects of the Settlement Plan.

"The Security Council hopes to see continuous and rapid progress by the time of the Secretary-General's next report, in May 1995, which would enable it to consider favourably the possible extension of MINURSO's mandate."

This statement will be issued as a document of the Security Council under the symbol S/PRST/1995/17.

The Security Council has thus concluded the present stage of its consideration of the item on its agenda.

The meeting rose at 7.45 p.m.

United Nations S/PV.3517

Security Council

Fiftieth Year

Provisional

3517th Meeting

Thursday, 13 April 1995, 10.45 a.m.

New York

President:	Mr. Kovanda	(Czech Republic)
Members:	Argentina	Mr. Cardenas
	Botswana	Mr. Legwaila
	China	Mr. Li Zhaoxing
	France	Mr. Mérimée
	Germany	Mr. Rudolph
	Honduras	Mr. Martinez Blanco
	Indonesia	Mr. Wibisono
	Italy	Mr. Fulci
	Nigeria	Mr. Gambari
	Oman	Mr. Al-Khussaiby
	Russian Federation	Mr. Sidorov
	Rwanda	Mr. Ubalijoro
	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	Sir David Hannay
	United States of America	Mrs. Albright

Agenda

The situation in Liberia

Tenth progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (S/1995/279)

95-85290 (E)

This record contains the original text of speeches delivered in English and interpretations of speeches delivered in the other languages. The final text will be printed in the *Official Records of the Security Council*. Corrections should be submitted to original speeches only. They should be incorporated in a copy of the record and be sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned, *within one week of the date of publication*, to the Chief of the Verbatim Reporting Section, room C-178.

The meeting was called to order at 11.05 a.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

The situation in Liberia

Tenth progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (S/1995/279)

The President: I should like to inform the Council that I have received a letter from the representative of Liberia in which he requests to be invited to participate in the discussion of the item on the Council's agenda. In conformity with the usual practice, I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite that representative to participate in the discussion without the right to vote, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure.

There being no objection, it is so decided.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Bull (Liberia) took a place at the Council table.

The President: The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. The Council is meeting in accordance with the understanding reached in its prior consultations.

Members of the Council have before them the tenth progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia, document S/1995/279.

Members of the Council also have before them document S/1995/291, which contains the text of a draft resolution prepared in the course of the Council's prior consultations.

It is my understanding that the Council is ready to proceed to the vote on the draft resolution before it. Unless I hear any objection, I shall put the draft resolution to the vote.

There being no objection, it is so decided.

I shall first call on those members of the Council who wish to make statements before the voting.

Mr. Fulci (Italy): Italy will vote in favour of the draft resolution on Liberia, since it constitutes a merely technical renewal of the United Nations Observer Mission there. During the present delay in the peace process, legitimate doubts are being raised about the wisdom of maintaining this mission unless the parties demonstrate real goodwill and a real intention to accelerate the reconciliation process.

We agree with the substance of the draft resolution, in particular with regard to the need to hold the summit of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) as soon as possible. We are also in favour of the measures concerning the establishment of a sanctions committee to be entrusted with verifying the application of the arms embargo against Liberia.

We understand that the continued, and continuing, violation of the weapons embargo is one of the major obstacles hindering the efforts of the international community towards the re-establishment of peace in Liberia. Hopefully, this measure will also signal to the countries in the area that the Security Council is serious about the question and, more generally, that they need to really commit themselves to creating the proper conditions for implementing the Akosombo and Accra Agreements.

Mr. Wibisono (Indonesia): At the outset, my delegation would like to express its sincere appreciation to the Secretary-General for his most useful report (S/1995/279) of 10 April 1995, the tenth in the series of progress reports on the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL). We also commend and express appreciation to the Secretary-General, his Special Representative and the leaders of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) for their untiring efforts to bring about peace in Liberia.

From the report, the Indonesian delegation notes that developments towards a resolution of the situation have not been encouraging and that actions unfolding in the country at present are not of the sort to create a climate conducive to the attainment of peace, stability and national reconciliation. The report states that the peace process in Liberia remains at an impasse and, further, that the breakdown of the cease-fire has led to a further deterioration in the overall situation.

This situation has resulted in large part from the failure of the parties to reach agreement amongst themselves on the instalment of a Council of State. We

deeply regret the failure of the factions and of the political parties to reach such an agreement, despite the untiring efforts of the Chairman of ECOWAS and other ECOWAS leaders. What is missing is the political will to implement the Accra Agreement in good faith. It is our sincere hope that the Liberian parties will now strictly adhere to the Accra Agreement, demonstrate their readiness to implement it fully, and make evident their political determination and commitment to achieving peace and stability in Liberia. Furthermore, it is our hope that the follow-up consultations on these matters will result in agreements on the installation of the Council of State.

Another issue of concern to the Indonesian delegation is the question of a sustained extension of humanitarian relief activities to the areas controlled by the factions, which has been impeded by the absence of credible security guarantees from the factions in Liberia. We believe that sustained security guarantees will ensure that sufficient quantities of life-saving assistance reach the civilian population throughout the country. It is in this context that we would like to express our hope that the ECOWAS summit can take place as soon as possible in order to coordinate and harmonize policies on Liberia and promote the implementation of the Accra Agreement. In this regard, we cannot fail to pay tribute to the Government of Nigeria for agreeing to host the ECOWAS summit meeting.

The draft resolution on Liberia before us today, which, *inter alia*, extends the mandate of UNOMIL until 30 June 1995 and establishes a Committee of the Security Council to monitor the effective implementation of the arms embargo imposed under resolution 788 (1992), enjoys my delegation's support, and we will vote in favour of its adoption.

The extension of the mandate ought to be seen as an opportunity for the parties to the conflict to respect the cease-fire and implement all the relevant agreements, and as providing sufficient time to prepare and convene the ECOWAS summit. It is our hope that, within this period, the Liberian parties will be afforded a significant opportunity to demonstrate their willingness to resolve their own problems and to respect the role of international, regional, and subregional organizations.

Mr. Uhomoibhi (Nigeria): My delegation would like to thank the Secretary-General for his latest report on the situation in Liberia (S/1995/279), which constitutes the basis of the draft resolution now before the Council. To a large extent, the report gives an accurate account of the current state of play in Liberia, which, unfortunately, is not encouraging. It underscores the political, military and humanitarian tragedy that continues to plague Liberia.

My delegation has expressed at every opportunity its disappointment over the fact that the Liberian factions and political leaders have not been able to agree on the composition and chairmanship of the new Council of State, as provided for in the Agreement they themselves signed in Accra, Ghana, on 21 December 1994, despite the considerable efforts of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to broker an agreement between the Liberian parties.

In Nigeria's continuing efforts to help resolve the deadlock in the Liberian peace process, my Government has agreed to host a summit of West African leaders in Abuja in May. It is hoped that this summit will result in a more effective harmonization of the policies of the States in the subregion and produce a concertation of efforts to assist the Liberian parties in achieving peace and national reconciliation in their country.

However, our efforts can only complement those of the parties themselves. If we are able to create a climate conducive for negotiations, it is for the parties to seize the moment and make the necessary compromises for peace. My delegation is in full agreement with the Secretary-General when he observes in his report that:

> "The continuing rivalry and intransigence of the faction and political leaders have taken a heavy toll on the Liberian people". (*S/1995/279, para. 28*)

It is only proper that those responsible for the continuing impasse in the Liberian peace process reflect seriously on the personal responsibility they bear for the deaths of hundreds of thousands of their people, the destruction of their country's economy and infrastructure and the destabilizing effects on their neighbours, the most pertinent case being Sierra Leone.

The present draft resolution is right in extending the mandate of the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) until 30 June 1995, as recommended by the Secretary-General. It is also appropriate to call on all Liberian parties once again to implement the Akosombo and Accra Agreements by re-establishing an effective cease-fire and installing the Council of State.

Violations of the arms embargo imposed under resolution 788 (1992) have in the past not helped the collective efforts to promote peace in Liberia. Therefore,

my delegation supports any well-thought-out measures aimed at tightening the current regime limiting the flow of arms into the country. In this connection, we endorse paragraph 3bis of the draft resolution, which does exactly that, and establishes a Committee of the Security Council to monitor compliance with the arms embargo regime, and we hope this will have a salutary effect on the situation.

For these reasons, my delegation will vote in favour of the draft resolution.

Mr. Martinez Blanco (Honduras) (*interpretation from Spanish*): My delegation is grateful for the report on Liberia submitted by the Secretary-General in document S/1995/279 pursuant to paragraph 2 of Security Council resolution 972 (1995). Having read the report, my delegation can only deplore the serious situation prevailing in the country as a result of the intransigence of the factions now fighting for power and their failure to meet the commitments undertaken in the Accra and Akosombo Agreements.

The Secretary-General's report allows us to understand the gravity of the situation, which can be summed up as follows. The parties have failed to reach an agreement to install a Council of State, a fundamental step towards the implementation of the Accra Agreement. Hostilities between the parties to the conflict have intensified, leading in turn to an increase in the number of refugees and displaced persons. There have been reports of massacres, which are currently under investigation. Tanzania and Uganda have decided to withdraw their contingents from the peace force in Liberia, the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). The humanitarian situation has deteriorated dramatically, to the extent that the supply of food to the camps for refugees and displaced persons is in serious danger. This and other negative factors must be overcome if peace is to prevail in Liberia.

The Secretary-General, in paragraph 22 of his report, states that the peace process remains at an impasse. Military activities have intensified and the parties have failed to implement one of the basic steps of the Accra Agreement. Nevertheless, one positive element - which my delegation considers to be very important - is the summit that is soon to be hosted by Nigeria for States members of the Economic Community of West African States. For its part, my delegation appreciates Nigeria's efforts to promote peace in Liberia.

The draft resolution before us today marks another effort on the part of the Council to secure a just solution and lasting peace in Liberia. This will be possible only if the factions in conflict decide to cooperate to achieve it. The draft resolution also establishes a committee to monitor the arms embargo imposed under resolution 788 (1992), and my delegation hopes that this will contribute decisively to the peace process in Liberia.

Lastly, we believe that if the factions in Liberia do not wake up to this opportunity and seize it, the Council should seriously reconsider its role in that country, since resources and efforts are being exhausted with no results to justify the United Nations presence in Liberia.

My delegation supports the draft resolution in all respects.

Mr. Li Zhaoxing (China) (*interpretation from Chinese*): The Chinese delegation has always closely followed the development of the situation in Liberia. We have expressed our deep concern at the stagnation in the peace process, the breakdown of the cease-fire, the large quantity of weapons flowing to the country and the frustration of humanitarian relief activities there.

The key to progress in the Liberian peace process lies in the good-faith implementation of the Akosombo and Accra Agreements by all parties to the conflict. They must immediately implement an effective cease-fire and establish a Council of State as soon as possible so as to lay a solid foundation for achieving national reconciliation.

We endorse and support the convening of a regional summit meeting aimed at finding an appropriate settlement to the question of Liberia. In this regard, we wish to express our gratitude to the Government of Nigeria and to President Rawlings of Ghana for their efforts.

The draft resolution before us reflects the spirit of the Liberian people and conforms to their fundamental interests. It is also a reflection of the ardent hopes of the international community. The Chinese delegation will therefore vote in favour.

The President: I shall now put draft resolution S/1995/291 to the vote.

A vote was taken by show of hands.

In favour:

Argentina, Botswana, China, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Honduras, Indonesia, Italy, Nigeria, Oman, Russian Federation, Rwanda, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

The President: There were 15 votes in favour. The draft resolution has been adopted unanimously as resolution 985 (1995).

I shall now call on those members of the Council who wish to make statements following the voting.

Mrs. Albright (United States of America): The United States is deeply concerned about the absence of progress towards peace in Liberia. The cease-fire begun on December 28 has largely broken down. There are new reports of massacres and atrocities against civilians and new movements of displaced persons towards Buchanan and across the Ghanaian and Ivoirian borders.

Primary responsibility for the continued bloodshed lies with the armed factions that have proved unwilling thus far to implement the Akosombo and Accra Agreements. We strongly urge that the cease-fire be restored promptly, and that the factions act quickly to resolve their differences over the Council of State and to implement the accords.

The United States continues to support fully the efforts of the Chairman of the Economic Community of West African States, President Rawlings of Ghana, to bring about a summit meeting of the concerned States in the region, together with the faction leaders. This meeting is now scheduled for 17 May in Abuja, Nigeria. We strongly urge all invited Heads of State to attend the summit in the interest of harmonizing their policies on Liberia, and particularly to halt the flow of arms into Liberia, thereby facilitating an end to the war.

The United States believes that the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) has a key role to play in monitoring implementation of the peace process and protecting civilians from the fighting. Unfortunately, it has been unable thus far to carry out its mandate because of continuing hostilities. The United States supports this limited extension of the UNOMIL mandate in the hope that the regional summit meeting on 17 May will give real impetus to peace. We must say, however, that technical roll-overs are not a solution and that the patience of the international community is not endless.

Mr. Rudolph (Germany): Germany voted in favour of the resolution, which extends the mandate of UNOMIL until 30 June. The situation on the ground and the progress in the peace process do not necessarily justify extending UNOMIL's mandate. In fact, the situation has deteriorated: there is still no agreement on the composition of the Council of State, and the cease-fire has broken down.

Nevertheless, we believe that the Council must give the scheduled summit meeting of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), to be held in Abuja under the auspices of the Government of Nigeria, the chance to achieve the much-needed positive breakthrough for war-stricken Liberia. In this context, we would like to reiterate our support for the efforts of ECOWAS and its Military Monitoring Group in assisting the peace process in Liberia.

The ECOWAS summit will be of extreme importance, and we urge all parties concerned to attend it and to work together, in a spirit of goodwill and compromise, to find a way out of the tragic impasse that has characterized the situation in Liberia for so long.

The factions in Liberia must realize that they bear the responsibility for reaching a lasting settlement to the crisis in their country. We therefore urge them to respect the cease-fire and to implement the other provisions of the Accra Agreement. In the absence of real progress, it will be increasingly difficult for the international community to continue to assist Liberia.

The Council will therefore have to examine very carefully the future of the United Nations presence in Liberia when the current mandate expires at the end of June.

Mr. Mérimée (France) (*interpretation from French*): Our Council has just unanimously adopted resolution 985 extending the mandate of the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) to 30 June 1995. Through approving the resolution, France wishes to express its desire to see the implementation of the peace process in Liberia which should have been assured with the signing of the Akosombo, Cotonou and Accra Agreements by all the Liberian parties. By extending UNOMIL's presence in Liberia for a limited

period, France also intends to send a clear message to the parties.

At the urging of the international community and with the assistance of the countries of ECOWAS, whose Chairman has been tireless in this regard, the Liberian factions have long been called upon to work towards national reconciliation, which alone can guarantee lasting peace in the country. However, recent events have shown that the factions have not been resolutely committed to that course of action: the cease-fire is being more honoured in the breach than in the observance, human rights violations seem common and no real progress has been accomplished in installing the institutions provided for by the Agreements I mentioned.

In this context, the meeting organized on the initiative of the Chairman of ECOWAS, which is due to take place next month in Abuja, seems in many respects to represent a last chance. My delegation fervently hopes that the Liberians will put the national interest first and finally commit themselves, with good faith and a sense of continuity, to the peace process.

Thus, the Council's decision to extend UNOMIL's mandate today both sends an invitation and sounds a warning: it tells the parties that it is not too late to show genuine resolve to restore lasting peace to Liberia, but it also makes clear that it will soon be impossible for the international community to continue to assist Liberia if Liberians themselves refuse to come to an understanding.

Mr. Sidorov (Russian Federation) *(interpretation from Russian)*: The Russian Federation is seriously concerned by the complex situation in Liberia and by the prospect that the country will slip into the abyss of chaos and civil war, so threatening the civilian population with new disasters without number and the region with further destabilization. We note with regret that, almost four months after the signing of the Accra Agreement, the Liberian parties have basically implemented not one of its fundamental provisions and have failed to resolve the most urgent problem, that of establishing a Council of State. As a result of this most irresponsible approach to the fate of their country and its people on the part of the leaders of the armed groups, the peace process in Liberia remains deadlocked: the cease-fire has been broken, and an increase in hostilities has been reported, accompanied by human rights violations on a massive scale.

The Russian delegation voted in favour of the draft resolution just adopted because, firstly, it gives the Liberian parties a clear signal that the international community is prepared to continue to render assistance in settling the conflict while also containing a clear warning that the outcome the next time the Council considers the future role of the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia will hinge mainly on how far the Liberians themselves succeed in making progress towards re-establishing the peace process before the Mission's mandate expires on 30 June.

We believe that this is one of the last — if not the last — real chances for a peaceful settlement to the crisis in Liberia, and it must not be missed. We hope that the forthcoming ECOWAS summit meeting will play an important and constructive role in resolving the protracted conflict in Liberia, and in re-establishing the peace process. We believe that the decision in the resolution to establish a Security Council Committee to monitor compliance with the embargo imposed under Security Council resolution 788 (1992) will really help normalize the situation not only in Liberia but in the region as a whole. In this connection, we urgently call on all States, especially Liberia's neighbours, to help improve the effectiveness of the embargo on weapons supplies to Liberia, and to cooperate fully with the Committee.

Mr. Legwaila (Botswana): The resolution the Security Council has just adopted is of fundamental importance to the peace process in Liberia and to the Liberian people, who have lost control of their country to the rule of the gun. The extension of UNOMIL's mandate to 30 June 1995 is possibly Liberia's last chance. It is our sincere hope that the factions and political leaders there will understand the message very clearly.

My delegation wholeheartedly welcomes the efforts of Heads of State of the Economic Community of West African States in the search for peace in Liberia. We hope that the summit meeting planned for 10 May 1995 will be successful in bringing peace to that ravaged country. We shudder to imagine what will happen to Liberia if the various factions once again fail to cooperate.

The President: I call on the representative of Liberia.

Mr. Bull (Liberia): Mr. President, I congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency of the Security Council for the month of April. Your vast experience

and diplomatic skills assure us that the Council's deliberations will proceed smoothly and successfully. I also wish to commend Ambassador Li Zhaoxing of the People's Republic of China for the able manner in which he conducted the work of the Council during March.

My delegation expresses its profound gratitude to the Secretary-General for the interest which he continues to manifest in the Liberian conflict. We remain hopeful that the noble objective of finding a peaceful resolution of the conflict will soon be realized. The Secretary-General's reports of 24 February 1995 (S/1995/158) and 10 April 1995 (S/1995/279) accurately assess the prevailing situation in Liberia and do offer alternative courses of action that should assist the Council in determining the measures it should take to end the fratricidal conflict in my country.

Since the eruption of the civil war more than five years ago, it has been our solemn duty to represent, before this body, the sentiments, hopes and aspirations of our compatriots. On those occasions, we sought to convey their anguish, frustration and outrage at the losses of innocent lives, which now exceed 300,000, and at the fact that over a million of our citizens have been forced to flee to neighbouring countries as refugees.

During this period of national distress, the Liberian people have appealed for and received assistance from the international community, for which we are indeed most grateful. In this regard, they have been and continue to be appreciative of the peace-keeping initiative of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) on the one hand and the humanitarian relief assistance of the United Nations and governmental and non-governmental organizations on the other. Moreover, the United Nations has lent its moral authority to several peace initiatives undertaken by ECOWAS, thus giving concrete meaning to Chapter VIII of the Charter, which encourages cooperation with regional bodies in the pacific settlement of disputes.

The efforts of the United Nations and ECOWAS are underpinned by the fact that a large majority of Liberians have made known their preference for democratic institutions and the rule of law, in opposition to the coercive use of military force to achieve political power. Sadly, this legitimate aspiration has been lost on the factions in Liberia, which seem bent on acquiring power by force of arms. To date, they have reneged on every agreement signed, and have instead continued to subject the people of Liberia to acts of terrorism and violence.

This sad state of affairs is a major impediment to the demobilization and disarmament of combatants. We are now left with the question of what is responsible for the impasse, and what kind of pressure can be brought to bear that will induce the factions to forgo their intransigent and belligerent stance and seek political accommodation. Time and again, concessions were made taking into consideration the specific concerns of particular factions. Unfortunately, this approach has served only to embolden them to make new demands.

In this connection, it is clear that, until all forms of support to these factions are curtailed, they will not honour the agreements to which they are signatories. We therefore welcome and support the proposed ECOWAS summit — which will, *inter alia*, address this issue — and we are certainly most grateful to the Security Council for the resolution, which contains elements that will help to ensure that the arms embargo is respected.

It is the prevailing view that the forthcoming summit of ECOWAS will offer the last, best hope for the Liberian parties to reach political accommodation and fully implement the terms of the previous agreements, including a cease-fire and installation of the Council of State. Furthermore, if the parties fail to avail themselves of this opportunity, the goodwill and support of the international community will be eroded.

While we Liberians realize that this Organization, indeed Member States, cannot continue to utilize scarce resources to assist parties which are unwilling to resolve their differences peacefully, it should be borne in mind that the majority of Liberians desire to live in peace: it is the armed factions which continue to hold the people hostage. In such a case, should a defenceless people be abandoned because of the unscrupulous acts of a few? We strongly believe that, in this post-cold-war era, the Organization has a moral obligation, and should consider bold and imaginative measures to address these and other relevant problems resulting from internal conflicts in Member States.

We the Liberian people have suffered long enough and yearn for normal life in our country. As before, we can only appeal to the international community not to leave us before a resolution of the conflict. The United Nations has shown much courage and persistence in other conflicts, and we wish it do so and believe that it can exert a similar effort in Liberia.

The President: I thank the representative of Liberia for his kind words addressed to me.

There are no further speakers. The Security Council has thus concluded the present stage of its consideration of the item on the agenda.

The Security Council will remain seized of the matter.

The meeting rose at 11.45 a.m.

United Nations S/PV.3518

Security Council

Fiftieth Year

Provisional

3518th Meeting

Thursday, 13 April 1995, 6.10 p.m.

New York

President:	Mr. Kovanda	(Czech Republic)
Members:	Argentina	Mr. Cardenas
	Botswana	Mr. Legwaila
	China	Mr. Li Zhaoxing
	France	Mr. Ladsous
	Germany	Mr. Graf zu Rantzau
	Honduras	Mr. Martinez Blanco
	Indonesia	Mr. Wibisono
	Italy	Mr. Fulci
	Nigeria	Mr. Uhomoibhi
	Oman	Mr. Al-Harthy
	Russian Federation	Mr. Lavrov
	Rwanda	Mr. Ubalijoro
	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	Sir David Hannay
	United States of America	Mrs. Albright

Agenda

The situation in Angola

Second progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III) (S/1995/274)

95-85303 (E)

This record contains the original text of speeches delivered in English and interpretations of speeches delivered in the other languages. The final text will be printed in the *Official Records of the Security Council*. Corrections should be submitted to original speeches only. They should be incorporated in a copy of the record and be sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned, *within one week of the date of publication*, to the Chief of the Verbatim Reporting Section, room C-178.

The meeting was called to order at 6.30 p.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

The situation in Angola

Second progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III) (S/1995/274)

The President: The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. The Security Council is meeting in accordance with the understanding reached in its prior consultations.

Members of the Council have before them the second progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III), document S/1995/274.

Members of the Council have also received photocopies of a letter dated 13 April 1995 from the Permanent Representative of Angola to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, which will be issued as a document of the Security Council under the symbol S/1995/296.

Following consultations among members of the Security Council, I have been authorized to make the following statement on behalf of the Council:

"The Security Council has considered the Secretary-General's progress report of 7 April 1995 (S/1995/274) on the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III).

"The Security Council welcomes the confirmation by the Secretary-General that the cease-fire is generally holding and that the level of cease-fire violations has remained relatively low. It also welcomes the continued deployment of UNAVEM III military and police observers to team sites and regional headquarters outside Luanda, and the progress reported by him in a number of important areas, including liaison with UNITA, the completion of the first phase of disengagement, discussions of the modalities for the incorporation of UNITA into the national army. It commends the parties for their efforts in this regard.

"The Security Council notes that a number of developments give cause for concern. These include reports of continuing military actions and preparations, in particular the attack on the airstrip at Andulo by the Angolan air force, the failure to complete the second phase of disengagement by 10 April 1995, some restrictions on UNAVEM III's access to Government military facilities, and recent attacks on the personnel of UNAVEM III and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). It welcomes the improved access by UNAVEM III to UNITA-controlled areas but notes that some local UNITA commanders continue to impose restrictions on the movement of UNAVEM III personnel and calls upon UNITA to ensure unrestricted access.

"The Security Council calls on the parties to cooperate fully with the United Nations, in particular through the Joint Commission, and to ensure the safety of the personnel of UNAVEM III and the NGOs. It notes with satisfaction that the members of the Joint Commission, including representatives of the Government of Angola, met Dr. Savimbi in Bailundo on 7 April and that at that meeting he publicly confirmed his commitment to the Lusaka Protocol. It reiterates its call for a meeting between President dos Santos and Dr. Savimbi as a matter of urgency because such a meeting may help to improve the climate of trust and give new impetus to the peace process in Angola.

"The Security Council welcomes the Secretary-General's decision to proceed with preparations for the deployment of UNAVEM III's infantry units (S/1995/230). It notes that he has reminded the Angolan parties that they must implement without delay the requirements of the Lusaka Protocol, provide UNAVEM III with the indispensable logistic support, and undertake essential tasks such as mine clearance, the repair of major transport routes, and the designation of quartering areas, to make it possible for United Nations infantry battalions to deploy to Angola in May 1995. The Council fully supports the Secretary-General in this regard and emphasizes the need for full implementation of the Lusaka Protocol. It welcomes his intention to deploy the infantry battalions in stages. It stresses the importance it attaches to the Government of Angola providing the logistic support envisaged for UNAVEM III. In this context it welcomes the Government of Angola's

agreement to allow the United Nations full operational access to Catumbela airfield and calls upon the Government of Angola to ensure that this arrangement is extended for as long as required by UNAVEM III. It also welcomes the Government of Angola's intention to conclude, by 15 April 1995, a Status of Forces Agreement with the United Nations.

"The Security Council reaffirms the obligation of all States to implement fully the provisions of paragraph 19 of resolution 864 (1993) and states that the continuing flow of arms into Angola contrary to the provisions of the 'Acordos de Paz' and resolution 976 (1995) contributes to the country's instability and undermines efforts at confidence-building.

"The Security Council is encouraged that the Secretary-General has been able to report overall progress in the humanitarian situation in the month since his last report to the Council. It calls upon the parties to continue to facilitate access to all areas of the country for the delivery of humanitarian assistance. It also calls once again upon the parties to respect the safety and security of all humanitarian personnel in Angola. It endorses the call on the parties by the three observer States to the Angolan peace process (S/1995/239) to cooperate fully in releasing all war-related detainees through the International Committee of the Red Cross, as well as all captured foreign citizens, or to provide information about their fate.

"While the Security Council takes note of the progress made in the implementation of the comprehensive mine action programme, it also notes the statement in the Secretary-General's report that the mine situation in Angola remains critical. The Council therefore urges both parties to support and facilitate mine clearance and to comply fully with the relevant provisions of the Lusaka Protocol. In this context, it welcomes the statement by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, following the 13th meeting of the Joint Commission, that the Government of Angola and UNITA have pledged to put 800 and 400 personnel, respectively, at the disposal of UNAVEM III for mine clearance activities.

"The Security Council will continue to monitor the situation in Angola closely. It looks forward to the next monthly report of the Secretary-General and requests him, in the meantime, to ensure that it is kept informed of developments in Angola and on prospects for the prompt deployment of the infantry battalions of UNAVEM III."

This statement will be issued as a document of the Security Council under the symbol S/PRST/1995/18.

The Security Council has thus concluded the present stage of its consideration of the item on the agenda. The Security Council will remain seized of the matter.

The meeting rose at 6.40 p.m.

United Nations S/PV.3519

Security Council

Fiftieth Year

Provisional

3519th Meeting

Friday, 14 April 1995, 10.30 a.m.
New York

President:	Mr. Kovanda	(Czech Republic)
Members:	Argentina	Mr. Cárdenas
	Botswana	Mr. Legwaila
	China	Mr. Li Zhaoxing
	France	Mr. Mérimée
	Germany	Mr. Rudolph
	Honduras	Mr. Martínez Blanco
	Indonesia	Mr. Wisnumurti
	Italy	Mr. Fulci
	Nigeria	Mr. Gambari
	Oman	Mr. Al-Khussaiby
	Russian Federation	Mr. Lavrov
	Rwanda	Mr. Ubalijoro
	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	Sir David Hannay
	United States of America	Mrs. Albright

Agenda

The situation between Iraq and Kuwait

95-85309 (E)

This record contains the original text of speeches delivered in English and interpretations of speeches delivered in the other languages. The final text will be printed in the *Official Records of the Security Council*. Corrections should be submitted to original speeches only. They should be incorporated in a copy of the record and be sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned, *within one week of the date of publication*, to the Chief of the Verbatim Reporting Section, room C-178.

The meeting was called to order at 10.50 a.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

The situation between Iraq and Kuwait

The President: I should like to inform the Council that I have received a letter from the representative of Japan, in which he requests to be invited to participate in the discussion of the item on the Council's agenda. In conformity with the usual practice, I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite that representative to participate in the discussion without the right to vote, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure.

There being no objection, it is so decided.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Owada (Japan) took the place reserved for him at the side of the Council Chamber.

The President: The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. The Security Council is meeting in accordance with the understanding reached in its prior consultations.

Members of the Council have before them document S/1995/292, which contains the text of a draft resolution submitted by Argentina, Oman, Rwanda, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America.

The first speaker is the representative of Japan. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

Mr. Owada (Japan): Mr. President, permit me at the outset to offer my congratulations to you on your assumption of the presidency for April. Japan stands ready to extend its full support as you go on leading the work of the Council. I also wish to take this opportunity to pay tribute to your predecessor, the representative of the People's Republic of China, for the excellent manner in which he guided the Council's business during the month of March.

Japan is deeply concerned about the plight of the people of Iraq, who are experiencing severe medical and nutritional problems as a result of the intransigence of the Government of Iraq, which has necessitated the application of sanctions by the United Nations.

It is out of this humanitarian concern that Japan supports the draft resolution which the Council is about to adopt. In the view of my delegation, the draft resolution adopts an appropriate and balanced approach to alleviating the hardships that confront the Iraqi people. Japan wishes to express its appreciation for the efforts of the States that have worked out this draft resolution, and hopes that the Security Council will adopt it by consensus, which will serve the purpose of sending a strong and unambiguous message of the international community to the Iraqi authorities.

Japan urges Iraq to comply faithfully with the terms of the present draft resolution and to cooperate with the United Nations in its prompt implementation.

It should be clearly kept in mind, at the same time, that the well-being of the people of Iraq can be ensured only when the Government of Iraq faithfully implements all relevant Security Council resolutions and makes sincere efforts to rejoin the international community.

The President: I thank the representative of Japan for the kind words he addressed to me.

It is my understanding that the Council is ready to proceed to vote on the draft resolution before it. Unless I hear any objection, I shall put the draft resolution to the vote.

There being no objection, it is so decided.

I shall first call on those members of the Council who wish to make statements before the voting.

Mr. Fulci (Italy): Italy will vote in favour of the draft resolution that is before the Council this morning. We shall vote in favour on the basis of one conviction — that while sanctions are, and remain, one of the most effective tools provided by the Charter of the United Nations to enforce compliance with international law, they should not lead to the extreme consequence of inflicting untold misery and starvation on an entire civilian population.

Indeed, it would be paradoxical if by our actions, we, the peoples of the United Nations, we who take great pride in mounting massive operations to bring humanitarian relief wherever and whenever it is needed,

were ourselves instead to contribute to provoking such suffering. Frankly, an Iraqi child who looks at us from our television screens, with his big eyes made even larger by famine and disease, is no different from a child in Somalia or any other country whom we rush to aid.

Furthermore, the experience of the past shows that sanctions, if applied indiscriminately, tend to rally people around the Government, rather than to mobilize them against it. This, of course, does not mean that sanctions should not be adopted or should not be applied. But to be effective, they should always be applied with caution and parsimony, and, above all, be precisely targeted in order to avoid serious negative side-effects. According to the draft resolution, Iraq will now be allowed to sell about 1 billion dollars' worth of its oil every 90 days. Seventy per cent of this amount will go to meet the urgent food and medical needs of the Iraqi people. The remaining 30 per cent will be used to partially compensate the victims of the Iraqi aggression.

In this way, we believe, at least three important objectives will be achieved. First, the Iraqi authorities will be provided with the necessary financial means, under strict international control, to alleviate the suffering of the Iraqi people. Secondly, a cash flow will be created in the fund, to be used for the compensation of the many victims — Kuwaitis, Egyptians, Pakistanis, Indians, Sri Lankans, Palestinians and many others — who were deprived of their livelihood and subjected to great hardship. In other words, the Committee on Compensation in Geneva, chaired by Italy, will therefore be able to start to function properly. Thirdly, the many commercial losses to the neighbouring countries will begin to be redressed, starting with the restoration of the Iraq-Turkey pipeline.

After Iraq's formal recognition of the sovereignty and international borders of Kuwait, today's draft resolution is yet another step toward opening the way toward stabilizing the situation in that region, which has already suffered too much too long. It is our sincere hope that Iraq will complete its fulfilment of all the pertinent resolutions so that a situation of normalcy may be restored in the area.

Finally, I wish to take this opportunity to warmly thank the Argentine delegation for its relentless search for a compromise and to thank all others — and they are many — who joined in a common effort to produce a balanced text which does not infringe — I would like to underline this — on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iraq. And our thanks, of course, go also to you, Mr. President, for the determination, the skill and the stamina that you once again demonstrated in leading us to achieve today's important result.

Mr. Li Zhaoxing (China) *(interpretation from Chinese)*: China's position on the question of Iraq has been consistent. Iraq should continue to cooperate with the United Nations in implementing the relevant Security Council resolutions in a comprehensive and earnest manner. Meanwhile, the Council should proceed to discuss, at an early date, the lifting of the oil embargo against Iraq, on the basis of humanitarian considerations and in the light of Iraq's implementation of the resolutions, so as to truly and effectively ease the humanitarian situation in Iraq and alleviate the suffering inflicted on the Iraqi people by sanctions.

We are of the view that when we address the issues left over from the Gulf crisis, the sovereignty, territorial integrity and the political independence of all countries in the region, including Iraq, should be fully respected by the international community. We have noted that this element has been reaffirmed in a few places in the draft resolution before us. We understand that the main purpose of the mechanism proposed in the draft is the easing of the humanitarian situation in Iraq and that this is merely a temporary measure. Once the conditions are ripe, the Security Council should start to consider easing or removing the sanctions against Iraq. Based on this understanding, the Chinese delegation will vote in favour of this draft resolution.

But it must be pointed out that questions regarding the channel of shipment for Iraqi oil exports and the distribution of humanitarian funds to the three northern Governorates of Iraq, as mentioned in the draft resolution, are matters within the purview of Iraq's sovereignty to which a proper solution should be found, in full consultation with Iraq, to ensure the implementation of the mechanism embodied in the draft resolution. While certain modifications and qualifications have been made in this regard, the Chinese delegation still has some difficulties with the elements to which I have referred, and therefore wishes to express its reservations on them.

Mr. Ubalijoro (Rwanda): My delegation decided to co-sponsor this draft resolution for one specific reason: to alleviate the suffering of the Iraqi people.

Indeed, the machinery provided for in this document is in full accordance with that principle. It is painful for my delegation to sit down and cross its arms while great

numbers of Iraqis seem to be condemned to eternal suffering because of the lack of sensitivity and cooperation of a few.

Moreover, I would like to reiterate that this is a temporary measure to provide for the needs of the Iraqi people until Iraq's fulfilment of all its obligations contained in all the relevant Security Council documents. It is of paramount importance that Iraq comply fully with its remaining obligations in order for the Council to take further positive steps that are in the best interest of the Government of Iraq, and especially its people.

It is in this context that we would like to send an important message to the Government of Iraq.

Needless to say, the international community is not against the sovereignty and the territorial integrity of Iraq. Inspired by the great principles contained in the United Nations Charter, we call upon Iraq to adhere to all the moral obligations that all sovereign and peace-loving countries undertake in order to live in a climate of mutual respect, harmony and peace. That is also why my delegation will vote for the present draft resolution.

Mr. Martinez Blanco (Honduras) (*interpretation from Spanish*): It has been stated on various occasions in this forum that the purpose of the sanctions provided for in Article 41 of the United Nations Charter is to change the conduct of parties that endangers international peace and security, and not to punish or take other reprisals. It was also made clear, during the consideration of the supplementary document to the "Agenda for Peace", that when the Security Council has recourse to the tool of sanctions, it should attempt to guarantee the provision of humanitarian assistance to the vulnerable groups of society affected by the imposition of a sanctions regime.

My delegation is of the view that a sanctions regime, when effectively applied, is an important tool for restoring international peace and security and is preferable to the use of force for the achievement of the desired effect. But we also feel that when sanctions are imposed one should consider specific measures to mitigate their impact on an innocent civilian population; the longer the sanctions take to achieve their intended effect, the more serious that impact becomes. If there must always be a humanitarian price to pay when sanctions are imposed, one should discuss measures to minimize the harm done to vulnerable sectors of the affected society, such as women, children, the disabled and the elderly.

The decision to impose economic sanctions is taken within the framework of the international legal order. Therefore, account should be taken of humanitarian law, which, as we know, includes norms relating to humanitarian assistance applied to different categories of protected persons.

Economic sanctions are more sharply felt by the civilian population than by those in power. The current situation in Iraq is a clear example of this: the economic sanctions regime imposed on that country because of its invasion of Kuwait has had an adverse impact on the Iraqi population. Seven per cent of Iraq's population — about 1,300,000 people — is at risk, being hardest hit by the consequences of the sanctions regime. Of these, 750,000 are in northern Iraq, in the territory of Kurdistan, while 550,000 are in the central and southern region of the country. All these people require immediate humanitarian assistance.

The draft resolution the Council is preparing to adopt will make it possible to alleviate temporarily the effects of the economic embargo on the Iraqi people and provide for their nutritional and health needs until the Government of Iraq complies fully with the relevant resolutions of the Security Council and until the Council decides what action to take in connection with the prohibitions under resolution 661 (1990) of 6 August 1990. In order to implement the draft resolution, we must have the cooperation of the Government of Iraq in the task of equitably distributing humanitarian assistance. We believe that such assistance to all sectors of the Iraqi population must not be hindered, obstructed or denied in any way, shape or form. We therefore urge the Iraqi Government to comply scrupulously with this draft resolution.

My delegation believes that the provisions of this draft resolution are positive, and we are in full agreement with the principles and premises on which it is based, as well as with the temporary system it establishes. We therefore support every aspect of it.

Mr. Wisnumurti (Indonesia): At the outset, my delegation would like to express its appreciation to the Argentine delegation and the other sponsors for their endeavours in initiating the draft resolution before us, aimed at addressing the deteriorating humanitarian situation in Iraq, which has created concern among the international community.

From the beginning, Indonesia has always believed that producing resolutions on a humanitarian basis is imperative in order to be able to address effectively the human sufferings and misery largely affecting, women, children and the elderly, which have taken on dramatic proportions. We also believe that it is therefore indispensable that Iraq's concerns also be taken into account so that this humanitarian tragedy may be addressed adequately and effectively.

Like others, Indonesia is deeply concerned over the worsening humanitarian situation in Iraq, as clearly reflected in the latest reports of the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), as well as in the recent report made by an official of the Emergency and Humanitarian Aid section of the Netherlands Ministry for Foreign Affairs who had visited central and southern Iraq. The situation in those areas can be described only as a humanitarian tragedy, with young children, in particular, suffering from the effects. Therefore, the needs are enormous, and aid is urgently required in order to ameliorate the situation and keep the number of victims of this tragedy as low as possible.

We welcome the cooperation demonstrated by the sponsors of this draft resolution in accommodating several amendments addressing the concerns not only of Member States, but also of the Government of Iraq. My delegation regrets, however, that this draft resolution falls short of our expectations. We respect the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity, which are guaranteed under the Charter of the United Nations and which we all espouse. The Indonesian delegation would therefore like to emphasize that these fundamental principles of international law should be adhered to and respected by all Member States. Although we know that reference to these principles has indeed been incorporated into some of the paragraphs of the draft resolution, we note that its contents are not consistent with these principles.

In this regard, my delegation would like to draw attention to paragraph 6, which still insists that

> "the larger share of the petroleum and petroleum products"

should be shipped via the Kirkuk-Yumurtalik pipeline. It is our view that the volume of petroleum shipped through this pipeline, the property of Iraq and Turkey, should be considered a matter of paramount concern. We must respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iraq, and Iraq should therefore be able to decide on the use of its pipelines for transportation and production purposes. Furthermore, we believe that the application of Chapter VII of the Charter should be specifically addressed to peace and security in the region, and should not be applied so as to interfere in the internal affairs of Iraq.

My delegation would also like to express its reservations regarding paragraph 8 (b), describing Iraq's obligation to complement the distribution of humanitarian relief and to provide an amount exceeding 10 per cent of its oil production revenue. Within the context of the principles of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of States, it would be more appropriate not to mention a specific amount to be allocated for the three northern Governorates within Iraq. This, in our view, would constitute an infringement on the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of sovereign States, as it would provide encouragement to separatist movements in the northern part of Iraq.

In order for the draft resolution to achieve the desired result and become an effective tool to rectify the situation, it is imperative not only to properly address the concerns of the issue at hand but also to maintain strict adherence to the basic principles governing relations between sovereign States. Indonesia is of the view that it is a meaningless exercise to adopt resolutions that are not implementable. However good the intentions are, if the fundamental principles are not respected, such measures may not adequately address the matter.

My delegation firmly believes that the humanitarian situation in Iraq should be dealt with in a comprehensive manner, that humanitarian considerations should prevail and that the focus of our efforts should be directed towards ensuring that the requirements for the population are met. It is in this spirit, and with the reservations I have expressed, that my delegation will vote in favour of the draft resolution.

Mr. Legwaila (Botswana): The humanitarian situation in Iraq is a matter of serious concern to my delegation. The sanctions imposed against Iraq by the United Nations have inevitably had adverse effects on the nutritional and health situation of the people of that country. The primary purpose of the resolution we are about to adopt is to help alleviate the deterioration in this situation and alleviate the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people. It is for this reason that my delegation will join others in voting in favour.

Considerable efforts have been made during the past few days to blunt what some consider to be the rough edges of the draft resolution by taking into account the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iraq to accommodate Iraq's national sensitivities. It is our sincere hope that the fifth preambular paragraph, subparagraph 8 (a) and paragraphs 10 and 18 have addressed some of the concerns expressed by the Government of Iraq. My delegation would not, of course, be surprised if Iraq does not like the resolution or if it does not agree with everything contained in it, but we hope they will accept the spirit reflected in it and implement it for the benefit of the Iraqi people. Of course, we would be terribly disappointed if the resolution is consigned to the graveyard like resolutions 706 (1991) and 712 (1991), because that would not make Council look good.

The third preambular paragraph clearly states that what the Security Council is doing is providing

> "a temporary measure ... for the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people"

while their country is still subject to mandatory sanctions. There can be no doubt that this "temporary measure" cannot satisfy the needs of the people of Iraq: the needs of the people of Iraq can be satisfied only when Iraq has satisfied the requirements of the relevant Security Council resolutions. In other words, the ball rests squarely in Iraq's court.

We have noted with satisfaction the full cooperation that the Government of Iraq has extended to the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) in most of the areas in which the Commission has been working. We hope that the remaining issues will be resolved in the not-too-distant future so that Iraq can awake from the nightmare of sanctions.

Mr. Gambari (Nigeria): I thank you, Mr. President, for your patience and your indulgence.

This draft resolution is not really about oil production, about oil pipelines and oil sales: it is about the alleviation of the sufferings of real people, the unintended victims of the sanctions against Iraq. It is the view of my Government that sanctions are not meant to be punitive of whole populations, but to modify the behaviour of the leadership of a country or of a party whose actions threaten international peace and security.

In drafting the resolution, my delegation wanted the sponsors to be sensitive to some important factors, first of which is the need to respect explicitly the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iraq. Having insisted, rightly, that Iraq must recognize the sovereignty and territorial integrity of its neighbours, Council should not promote policies or take actions that could be construed as undermining the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iraq.

Secondly, care must be taken, in our view, that the resolution before us does not in any way prejudice or detract from the provisions of earlier Security Council resolutions, especially when we note that the timing of the resolution before us coincides with the submission and discussion of the six-monthly report of the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM).

We therefore appreciate the fact that some aspects of these concerns have been addressed. In this regard, the third preambular paragraph of the draft resolution is very important to my delegation. We believe, as stated in the text, that this is a "temporary" exercise; one that is long overdue, but which will remain valid until the fulfilment by Iraq of the relevant Security Council resolutions. Such fulfilment would then enable the Council to take further action with regard to the prohibitions referred to in resolution 661 (1990) in accordance with the provisions of resolution 687 (1991), starting with its paragraph 22 — this is in light of our assessment that we are almost at the end of another important chapter in the ongoing efforts to resolve the Iraq/Kuwait crisis, namely, the chapter of disarmament.

My delegation believes that this resolution, unlike resolutions 706 (1991) and 712 (1991), is implementable, and hopes that it will receive the effective cooperation of the Government of Iraq, which cooperation is critical to its success. In order to secure that cooperation, all of us worked very hard to accommodate the concerns of Iraq. Of course, my delegation would have wished to obtain further concessions from the sponsors regarding paragraph 6 of the draft resolution, to the effect that no reference would be made to the proportion of the oil to be shipped through any particular pipeline or terminal: this should, in our view, have been left to market forces.

However, my delegation is fully aware that this is not a normal situation: Iraq is in a unique position; it is under sanctions and therefore cannot be given a veto over our decisions. The Council has a responsibility to all the parties that have been affected by the conflict; in this

context, the controls, the checks and the monitoring mechanisms contained in the draft resolution are necessary to ensure transparency and compliance with extant resolutions. In this respect, we will be looking forward to the reports of the Secretary-General provided for in paragraphs 11 and 12 to enable us to take a further look at the operation, with a view on the one hand to fine-tuning it if necessary or, on the other, to terminating it should the authorities in Iraq fail to discharge their obligations in a transparent manner.

While my delegation would like to reaffirm its view that the present draft resolution is a humanitarian one aimed at bringing relief to real people with real needs, it believes that it is not unrelated to the larger issues concerning the situation between Iraq and Kuwait. Hence, I should like to restate the principled position of my Government on the central issues relevant to the objective of restoring peace and stability in the region following the outbreak of the crisis in 1990: in this context, we believe that recognition of the basic principles of the Charter regarding the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of all the States in the region is non-negotiable; moreover, the use or threat of use of force to settle disputes between States must be rejected unequivocally. My Government has therefore fully supported the resolutions of the Security Council aimed at achieving these objectives. In this regard, we have consistently called upon Iraq to recognize the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Kuwait and the international border between them as demarcated by the United Nations Iraq/Kuwait Boundary Demarcation Commission. The recognition of Kuwait by Iraq was therefore an important milestone.

We have also continued to insist that Iraq must address seriously, and in a transparent manner, the issue of Kuwaiti detainees, missing persons and seized property.

With respect to regional security, we have supported and continue to support Security Council resolutions on the destruction of all weapons of mass destruction in Iraq and the establishment of a credible and effective long-term monitoring system. The progress that has been made so far in this field, as reflected in the latest reports by UNSCOM and the International Atomic Energy Agency, leads us to believe that a substantial part of the disarmament work has indeed been completed.

Meanwhile, we cannot but issue a reminder that Iraq still has a duty to continue to cooperate with UNSCOM in the discharge of its work by providing it with full and verifiable information on all outstanding issues related to weapons of mass destruction. This is vital for the prospects of easing sanctions envisaged under paragraph 22 of resolution 687 (1991).

In this circumstance, and in light of our objective assessment of the situation and the provisions of the relevant Security Council resolutions, we reiterate that the present draft resolution is a stop-gap measure necessary to alleviate the immense sufferings of the Iraqi population. It is, therefore, for this overriding reason that we will support the adoption of the draft resolution, and we call on Iraq to cooperate fully with the Secretary-General in its implementation in order to ensure that the goal we set out to achieve by this exercise is realized.

Mr. Al-Khussaiby (Oman): The Security Council meets today to consider a humanitarian problem that, for a long time, has been in the hearts and minds of the international community. In his report to the Security Council in 1991 (S/23006, Annex I), Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan, then Executive Delegate of the Secretary-General for the United Nations inter-agency humanitarian mission, painted a gloomy picture of the serious nutritional and health situation of the Iraqi people. Given the day-to-day deterioration in economic conditions, the situation has undoubtedly become worse since the submission of that report: the reports of the humanitarian relief agencies operating in Iraq attest to this fact.

In the light of the historical ties between Iraq and the Omani people, the Sultanate of Oman has been following, and continues to follow, at the highest level and with deep concern the continued deterioration of the humanitarian conditions of the brotherly people of Iraq. The Sultanate of Oman, through its various interventions in the Security Council and during meetings of relevant organizations and agencies, has emphasized the need to address as soon as possible the question of alleviating the suffering of the brotherly people of Iraq.

The draft resolution before us today takes into account the concerns and preoccupations of many Council members. We are convinced that the text before us addresses many of the international community's concerns *vis-à-vis* the humanitarian situation of the Iraqi people. In this vein, the Sultanate of Oman has joined others in co-sponsoring the draft resolution, which, in our opinion, aims principally, at alleviating the suffering of the brotherly people of Iraq at this point in time and until the Security Council is convinced that Iraq has fulfilled

all its obligations, after which the Council will consider favourably all resolutions pertaining to the sanctions imposed on Iraq.

We attach extreme importance to Iraq's sovereignty and territorial integrity, as is reaffirmed in the fifth preambular paragraph of this draft resolution and, what is more, reaffirmed very explicitly and without any shadow of a doubt in operative paragraph 18. We should also like to emphasize that our understanding is based on the fact that the draft resolution does not compromise Iraq's sovereignty and territorial integrity and, as I have already mentioned, is aimed mainly at addressing the humanitarian situation of the brotherly people of Iraq.

We have studied the report which was submitted by Ambassador Ekeus to the Security Council on 10 April and which points out that Iraq has gone a long way in its cooperation with the Special Commission on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. It also strongly emphasizes the particular importance of the need to encourage Iraq to be more forthcoming with the Special Commission in order to enable it to account for all aspects relating to the programmes of prohibited Iraqi weapons in a more comprehensive manner.

We look forward to seeing Iraq respond to and comply fully with the remaining relevant Security Council resolutions. Meanwhile, we believe that the draft resolution before us provides the necessary financial resources for the exceptionally urgent humanitarian needs and has no linkage whatsoever with any other questions, including the implementation of paragraph 22 of resolution 687 (1991), on the total lifting of the sanctions imposed on Iraq.

While we respect the views of the Iraqi Government *vis-à-vis* the draft resolution, we urge that Government to consider it positively, for it provides in the meantime the most appropriate mechanism for alleviating the suffering of the Iraqi people and, furthermore, it will pave the way to building confidence between the Security Council and the Government of Iraq.

We hope that Iraq will soon be in a position to fulfil its obligations in accordance with the relevant Security Council resolutions, so that there will be no need for this mechanism and so that Iraq may resume its regional and international role in the peaceful and positive manner that would enable the brotherly people of Iraq to overcome the years of hardship and to make up for their losses in the domain of economic and social development.

The Council's adoption of this draft resolution reflects the concern of the international community *vis-à-vis* the general situation in Iraq. Therefore, we look forward to seeing it expeditiously implemented by all concerned.

Finally, I should like to take this opportunity to convey my Government's sincere thanks to the other sponsors of the draft resolution and also to the other Council members for their cooperation and the relentless efforts they have exerted to come up with the draft resolution as it now stands. From such cooperation we have proved today the earnest commitment of the members of the Council and the international community to the effort to alleviate the suffering and pain of the brotherly people of Iraq.

The President: I now put to the vote the draft resolution in document S/1995/292.

A vote was taken by show of hands.

In favour:

Argentina, Botswana, China, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Honduras, Indonesia, Italy, Nigeria, Oman, Russian Federation, Rwanda, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

The President: There were 15 votes in favour. The draft resolution has been adopted unanimously as resolution 986 (1995).

I shall now call on those members of the Council who wish to make statements following the voting.

Mr. Cárdenas (Argentina) (*interpretation from Spanish*): The Security Council has just adopted — unanimously — resolution 986 (1995), relating to the situation between Iraq and Kuwait. This resolution, which constitutes an exception to the sanctions regime to which Iraq is subjected, has a humanitarian objective: it is designed to alleviate the humanitarian situation of all the Iraqi people.

It is worthwhile recalling in this context that the Republic of Iraq has been subjected for almost five years now to a set of sanctions imposed by the international community as a consequence of its invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 and its subsequent defiance of the entire international community. This sanctions regime is still in

force because Iraq has not totally complied with its obligations under the relevant Security Council resolutions.

The Argentine Republic has for some months now been expressing in the Security Council its concern over the humanitarian situation of the people of Iraq and, consequently, the need to seek to correct the situation.

Therefore, my delegation proposed at the appropriate time the elaboration of a temporary, simple and flexible regime to replace the regime established under resolutions 706 (1991) and 712 (1991), which certainly had the same purpose but which, for various reasons, have never been implemented by the Government of Iraq.

The present resolution, prepared first by the other co-sponsoring countries and then with the support of the entire Council, does nothing, however, that is detrimental to Iraq's eventual full compliance with all its obligations, which would lead to the lifting of the sanctions. Its objective is to offer Iraq a flexible tool that would enable it to improve the precarious humanitarian situation of its people. The regime we are establishing here can in no way be interpreted as harmful to Iraq's sovereignty and territorial integrity. It allows Iraq to export $1 billion every three months, of which 30 per cent is earmarked for the Compensation Fund and the remainder for an account upon which Iraq will be able to draw, through a plan that must be worked out, for imports of a humanitarian character — foodstuffs, medicine and so forth — for its people.

This regime requires for its implementation close cooperation between the Government of Iraq and the Secretary-General. None the less, efforts have been made to simplify it as far as possible without compromising the objective being pursued by the international community through the sanctions regime.

This decision by the Security Council follows a growing trend in recent months to try to lessen the sufferings of the civilian populations of countries under sanctions. The Secretary-General, in his report "Supplement to an Agenda for Peace" (S/1995/1), describes sanctions' unintended effects.

Previously, in the cases of the sanctions regimes established against Haiti and the former Yugoslavia, efforts were made, and are still being made in the second of these cases, to lessen the humanitarian impact of the sanctions. The accumulated experience is thus being taken into account and this important instrument provided by the United Nations Charter within the framework of collective security is being strengthened.

What we are beginning today is both a new course and a clear opportunity for Iraq to continue rebuilding its credibility, for whose destruction the Iraqi regime has been the sole responsible party. Strictly speaking, it should be recognized that this course began when Iraq, at the urging of this Council and as a consequence of the Council's actions, recently recognized, expressly and formally, the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Kuwait and the border separating Iraq from that other independent nation.

When one emerges from a past without a future, the difficulties are clear but need not be insurmountable. Now is the time for moderation, but also for absolute realism and, as is frequently the case, a dose of patience. First and foremost it is time for action, since the objective of living in peace presupposes a responsible attitude, which is not nourished by rantings.

In a word, confidence is based on conduct and can therefore be built only on consistency, respect, tolerance and, of course, time. The corollary is that it can be destroyed by threats, intolerance, aggressiveness or overweening pride. In other words, confidence is a picture that is built up step by step with stability, on the basis of everyday conduct.

For Iraq, the priority of the hour should therefore be to continue working — consistently — to rebuild its credibility, to become predictable once again. Frankly, we hope that this will happen, because we sincerely hope and desire that Iraq, by triumphing over adversity and the trauma of the recent past, will be able to rejoin the international community.

This is a world that, thank God, wants to live in peace. To do so, it must forgo threats and build its future on the tireless search for consensus. In the meantime, the Council has, by making available to Iraq mechanisms designed to meet the basic humanitarian needs of its people, assumed in full awareness and in deed the responsibilities incumbent on it.

The responsibility for implementing those mechanisms now rests with the Iraqi authorities, by acting in cooperation with the Secretary-General and with the United Nations officials whom this Council has designated. The exceptional regime the Council has approved today is of course addressed to all Iraqis,

without exceptions or exclusions, and including, obviously, the minorities. Otherwise, it would be neither fair nor just.

It is therefore the Council's intention to monitor the situation closely to ensure that there are no undue delays on the practical level. In addition, however, the Secretariat is expressly entrusted with supplementing as necessary the actions of the Iraqi authorities in such a way as to ensure efficiency in the implementation of the humanitarian objective motivating the Council.

My delegation, like all delegations concerned at the situation of the Iraqi people, has had the honour to be the initiator of this resolution. In our work, we have had invaluable contributions from all members of the Council without exception, but we should like to make special mention of the contributions we received from the delegations of the United States, the United Kingdom, Oman and Rwanda, with whom we have worked together since the outset, and with whom we share absolutely identical views.

In the final stage of the talks which culminated in the text we have adopted today, we should like to express our special recognition for the effective and open nature of the efforts and understanding of the delegation of France, which transcended the few differences between us. This, in a particularly complex issue, is another result of the tireless work of this body, which is entrusted with the maintenance of international peace and security, and of which the Republic of Argentina once more forms a part.

Mrs. Albright (United States of America): Argentina, the United States, the United Kingdom and Oman began work on this resolution at the specific request of a number of Arab, non-aligned and European States. We shared a common concern about the unnecessary humanitarian suffering of the Iraqi people caused by the Iraqi Government's policies, particularly its refusal to implement the resolutions of the Security Council. We agreed to make a good-faith effort to draft a plan that Iraq would have no reason to reject.

We decided that we must be guided by the following principles. Firstly, the purpose of the resolution is to address humanitarian needs, not to meet political or other extraneous objectives. Secondly, this resolution is not an easing or lifting of sanctions, but an exception to the sanctions regime for a specified purpose. Thirdly, we wanted a greatly simplified resolution, building on both the positive and negative lessons from resolutions 706 (1991) and 712 (1991) and other experiences. Finally, against the desire for simplification, we had to balance the need to take full account of the fact that Iraq had not proven trustworthy in implementing previous resolutions, and had consistently sought to turn innocent-sounding phrases into excuses for non-compliance.

We approached the task of drafting the new by returning to the old, and examined carefully the complete record of resolutions 706 (1991) and 712 (1991). We looked carefully at all the reasons Iraq gave at that time to justify its refusal to implement that plan. We also reviewed the record of negotiations between Iraq and Turkey in 1994, when Council members considered a plan, at first supported by Iraq, to export oil through the Turkish pipeline and use the proceeds for humanitarian purposes. Throughout our drafting, we made every effort to understand every concern expressed by Iraq, and we addressed those concerns in a serious and open-minded way.

While we addressed every issue Iraq had raised before, we never underestimated Iraq's ability to generate dozens of new objections and excuses. We realized from the beginning that Iraq would never say in advance of the vote that it accepted this plan, just as it has never accepted any Council resolution before or at the time of its passage. We note that, eventually, Iraq has found it in its interest to accept, and on occasion even implement, several Council resolutions. We hope that Iraq's current position, taken for the sake of posturing and negotiations, will not be the same as its final position, taken on the basis of a calm measurement of the benefits this resolution offers to the Iraqi people.

Let me address just some of the arguments that some delegations have advanced on behalf of Iraq. First, I reaffirm here, as we reaffirm in the resolution, my Government's unchanging support for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iraq. But I must note that the greatest threat to the territorial integrity of Iraq is Saddam Hussein. His is the only Government in history to have used weapons of mass destruction against its own citizens. His is the Government that has imposed an economic and electricity blockade against one section of his country. Doubts about Iraq's territorial integrity, and the need to make special arrangements to provide for humanitarian needs in northern Iraq, arise only because of the actions of the Iraqi Government.

The Council has other business before it with regard to Iraq, as we wait with impatience for a change in Iraq's attitude and its compliance with all the Council's

resolutions. Today's resolution, however, does not prejudge in any way subsequent actions the Council may take in this regard. The United States believes that Iraq's compliance with all the Security Council's resolutions is the only way in which it will prove to the international community that its intentions are peaceful. Then, and only then, can this Council move to modify the sanctions regime. This resolution today is technical, not political, and we have resisted efforts by Iraq and others to insert political provisions into the resolution.

Our work on this new resolution is based on our humanitarian concern that the people of Iraq are suffering as a result of the policies of their Government. We believe sanctions are a valuable tool for the Security Council to use when dealing with rogue States that refuse to live peaceably with their neighbours. But we have always shared the concern expressed by so many here that sanctions not strike an unintended target. We believe we have found exactly the right compromise here — not a lifting of the sanctions on the Iraqi regime, but a humanitarian exception to the sanctions for the benefit of the Iraqi people.

Even before the passage of this resolution, and even before the passage of resolutions 706 (1991) and 712 (1991), this Council has always demonstrated that it has no quarrel with the Iraqi people. The Council has tried to assure that the people of Iraq had access to basic humanitarian goods, and has never prohibited the shipment of food and medicines. The Council and Member States have supported the United Nations Inter-Agency Humanitarian Programme, which operates throughout Iraq.

We want the Government of Iraq to accept and implement this resolution. The co-sponsors made extraordinary efforts, even before entering a phase of flexible and productive cooperation with other members of the Council, to craft a text that would address Iraq's concerns. If it still refuses to implement it, it will only be because the Government of Iraq does not know how to take "Yes" for an answer.

The Government of Iraq already has at its disposal the means to lift the sanctions: compliance with the Council's resolutions. It declines to exercise this option. If it refuses to implement this resolution, it will be clear for all to see, and especially to the Iraqi people, that the blame for the suffering of the people of Iraq rests not with the Security Council, but with the Government in Baghdad.

Let me stress that that is not the outcome we desire. We call on Iraq to take its time, study this resolution with an open mind, and decide to accept it and implement it. The Council has once again given Baghdad the opportunity to act in the best interests of its citizens. For their sake, we urge the Government of Iraq to take advantage of this chance.

In closing, let me make it clear that this resolution would not be necessary, and the Iraqi people would not be suffering, if Iraq's Government were not driven by ruthless ambition. Let us not forget that this is a Government that has invaded its neighbour, supported terrorism, built weapons of mass destruction and continues to threaten the stability of the Persian Gulf. It is only when the regime changes its underlying objectives that the resolutions will no longer be necessary and the Iraqi people will no longer be suffering.

Sir David Hannay (United Kingdom): The aim of the co-sponsors of this resolution is purely humanitarian; no more and no less. We have devised a system which could substantially alleviate the suffering of the Iraqi people, with whom we have never had any quarrel. My Government has been concerned about the humanitarian situation in Iraq since 1991, when the Council adopted resolutions 706 (1991) and 712 (1991), which offered Iraq the possibility of exporting oil in exchange for humanitarian supplies. We deeply regret the refusal of the Government of Iraq to operate that scheme. It bears a heavy responsibility for the suffering of its people.

Our determination to do something about this major humanitarian problem led us to see whether there were ways in which we could improve the earlier scheme. In drafting this resolution we took careful account of the concerns expressed by the Government of Iraq during the abortive negotiations they held with the United Nations Secretariat on implementing resolutions 706 (1991) and 712 (1991). We have also listened carefully to views expressed by other Council members. The text we have just adopted represents a serious attempt to meet those concerns. The scheme it establishes is more generous and more flexible than the earlier arrangements provided for in resolutions 706 (1991) and 712 (1991).

Iraq will remain subject to a regime of sanctions imposed under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter until it complies fully with all the Security Council's relevant resolutions. That is the reason for the detailed provisions of this resolution. That is why we have provided for independent inspection agents to ensure that Iraq does not export more oil than it is entitled to under the provisions of this resolution and does not under-price

it. That is why we have insisted that all the proceeds of the oil sales should be deposited in an escrow account. That is why we have asked the Secretary-General to ensure that there is equitable distribution of the humanitarian assistance to all the Iraqi people.

We have been compelled in this resolution to allocate between $130 million and $150 million to be spent in the three northern Governorates of Iraq by the United Nations. This is not because the Security Council does not respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iraq. We do respect Iraq's sovereignty and its territorial integrity, even if Iraq itself has not always been so respectful of its obligations in this respect towards its neighbours; and we have made our respect for those principles clear in this resolution. But it is Iraq itself that imposes an economic blockade against its three northern Governorates. The provision for the North is simply intended to ensure that the inhabitants of the three northern Governorates receive an equitable share of the humanitarian goods to be purchased with the proceeds of the oil sales. It is not politically motivated. It is simply intended to ensure that all Iraqis, and not just some of them, benefit from the sale of oil provided for in this resolution.

We have also made it clear that this resolution is a temporary measure. It is not intended to substitute for the action that will be taken on sanctions when Iraq complies with all its obligations under the relevant Security Council resolutions. The recent reports of the Special Commission and the International Atomic Energy Agency make it clear that such compliance by Iraq with the provisions of the Council's resolutions relating to weapons of mass destruction is not just round the corner. The continuing problems over the missing Kuwaiti and other nationals, over the return of Kuwaiti property and over Iraq's repressive record on human rights demonstrate very clearly that Iraq is still far from fulfilling the conditions that could justify lifting sanctions: all the more reason, therefore, for the Council not to ignore the suffering of the Iraqi people.

It is our earnest hope that Iraq will decide to cooperate in the implementation of this resolution. It is a reasonable and workable scheme. It should enable Iraq to import substantial amounts of food, medicines and other humanitarian goods to meet the needs of its people. But in case there are shortcomings we have provided for a review of all aspects of the scheme just three months after it starts. If the Secretary-General reports that there are problems — for example, that the amount of money available for humanitarian relief is insufficient, or that the Iraqi oil industry is incapable of exporting enough oil to generate the revenues provided for in this resolution — we will be ready to look again at the details of the scheme and to consider making the appropriate adjustments. We now look to Iraq to cooperate in this scheme's implementation. If it fails to do so, it will have demonstrated once again its lack of concern for the welfare of its own people.

Mr. Mérimée (France) (*interpretation from French*): Resolution 986 (1995), which we have just adopted, is an important text. It took a long time to draft because several partially contradictory approaches had to be reconciled. The Council wisely gave itself the time to overcome these difficulties. My delegation was able to join in approving this text for the three following reasons: it responds to a serious humanitarian situation; it respects Iraq's sovereignty and territorial integrity; and it does not prejudice decisions the Council will take towards reducing or lifting the sanctions once the necessary conditions have been met.

France believes that sanctions are not a punishment but, rather, are designed to induce a State to behave in a certain way. The effects of sanctions on the peoples must therefore be attenuated as much as possible. This consideration led my delegation as early as 1991 to initiate texts that would become resolutions 706 (1991) and 712 (1991). The negotiations for their implementation never came to fruition. The lessons from this experience had to be drawn to ensure that the new provisions could serve effectively to bring relief to the Iraqi people.

We are all aware that the humanitarian situation in Iraq has worsened over the past few years. Nevertheless, we do not possess an exhaustive analysis enabling us to determine precisely the extent of the needs. There is no doubt, however, that they are great. The testimony of non-governmental organizations and the reports of the United Nations institutions that are now working in that country have amply shown this.

Without going into the details of the resolution, I note with particular interest that the Council has chosen to revise the general conditions for its implementation three months after the start of its entry into force. It will do so on the basis of a report from the Secretary-General, which should inform it whether the sums which Iraq is authorized to use are large enough to cover the needs of the people and whether the mechanisms that have been provided for suffice to enable Iraq to make use

of these sums. The Council will thereby be assured that the text meets the objectives it has set for itself.

Unflagging attention has been paid to the matter of respect for Iraq's sovereignty and territorial integrity. The current unrest in the north of the country lends this question particular importance. Everyone knows that peace and security in the region would be seriously and permanently affected if Iraq's territorial integrity were threatened. It was therefore essential that no provision of this resolution seem to encourage in any way the country's dismemberment.

Resolution 986 (1995) affirms the Council's dedication to Iraq's sovereignty and territorial integrity. Its penultimate paragraph, moreover, specifies that none of its provisions should be construed as infringing this sovereignty and territorial integrity. In addition, the Council has taken care to ensure that the constraints surrounding the derogations of the trade embargo should be implemented with respect for the prerogatives and legitimate interests of the Iraqi State.

Finally, my delegation stresses that the provisions of this resolution do not affect the implementation, when the time comes, of paragraph 22 of resolution 687 (1991), or of the other texts relating to the reduction or lifting of the sanctions.

On this subject, I would like to point out that the derogations introduced in resolution 986 (1995) are regarded as a temporary measure, intended to disappear when the conditions have been met that would authorize the Council to take new decisions regarding the prohibitions to which Iraq is now subjected. It is important, moreover, that several paragraphs specify that the regime established is valid solely within the framework of the arrangements of this resolution.

My delegation invites the Secretary-General to begin the necessary consultations and negotiations as soon as possible, and first of all with the Iraqi Government, so that this resolution may begin to produce its effects without delay, and so that the Iraqi peoples may begin to feel its benefits in the coming weeks.

We share the very sound opinion that the decisions taken by the Council for humanitarian reasons will serve no purpose without the cooperation of the Government of Iraq. I welcome the constructive attitude of the Iraqi delegation, which has shown wisdom and realism in its dialogue with the initiators of this text. I also thank the co-sponsors, and above all Argentina, for having heeded the appeals addressed to them and for having been receptive to the comments that were made. I express the hope that the Government of Iraq will continue to take this attitude, so that the suffering of its people can begin to decrease, until the Council is in a position to consider a radical modification of the sanctions regime.

Mr. Rudolph (Germany): The Security Council was forced to impose a sanctions regime over Iraq. The latest report of the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) and the discussion we had yesterday with its Executive Chairman, Ambassador Ekeus, have made it abundantly clear that it is unfortunately not yet possible to lift this regime. My delegation has stated more than once that only after the full compliance of the Government of Iraq with all its obligations, including those contained in resolution 687 (1991), will the Council be able to consider lifting the sanctions in accordance with operative paragraph 22 of that resolution.

In view of the fact that the sanctions regime has to remain in effect, the resolution just adopted by the Council is a very important document. It opens new opportunities for the benefit of the Iraqi population. Its scope is much wider than that of the previous Council resolutions 706 (1991) and 712 (1991), which, because of Iraq's refusal, never became effective.

We are aware of the plight of the innocent civilian population of Iraq. The implementation of the resolution just adopted can ensure the supply and availability of medicines, health supplies, foodstuffs and materials for essential civilian needs. We therefore appeal to the Government of Iraq to actively cooperate in implementing this resolution and to make the supplies thus attained available throughout the country to the entire population. For its benefit, the speedy implementation of the resolution is necessary. This should be all the more possible for the Government of Iraq since the resolution is in conformity with Iraq's legitimate interests, especially its interest in maintaining its territorial integrity.

It must be understood that the provisions of this resolution constitute only temporary measures, as stated in its third preambular paragraph. The resolution aims at improving the living conditions of the entire population of Iraq. The action taken by the Council by adopting this resolution cannot, however, replace in any way what is necessary on the part of the Government of Iraq, namely, strict and complete compliance with the relevant Security

Council resolutions, including resolution 687 (1991) of 8 April 1991. While we hope that through our action today we are making a contribution towards alleviating the hardship faced by the innocent people of Iraq, we urge the Iraqi leadership to do its part so that the Council will be able to finally lift the sanctions.

Mr. Lavrov (Russian Federation) (*interpretation from Russian*): Russia is extremely concerned over the acute humanitarian situation in Iraq, which has reached the critical mark because of the effects of sanctions, and we believe that those sanctions must be eased in response to the constructive steps already taken by Iraq, so motivating Baghdad to comply fully with the resolutions of the Security Council. We believe that it is necessary for urgent and effective measures to be taken to ease sanctions and alleviate the situation of the Iraqi population. With this in mind, our delegation played an active part in the elaboration of the resolution that has just been unanimously adopted by attempting to ensure that it really achieves its humanitarian objective. For it to do so, the resolution must not be a mere instrument of propaganda; rather, it must be implementable, which it can be only with the cooperation of the Iraqi Government.

This was also the premise underlying our work with the sponsors of the resolution, the other members of the Security Council, and also Iraq. Together with a large group of delegations, we proposed specific amendments to the sponsors, and we note with satisfaction that, as a result of consultations, we managed to have included provisions ensuring that its noble objectives will be attained, and this made it possible for us to vote in favour of the resolution. It is of no small importance that the resolution affirms the obligation of all States to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iraq and makes provision for the Government of Iraq to participate in agreeing specific ways of implementing this act of humanitarian relief. The text clearly states that the measures proposed for Iraq are temporary and do not substitute for any future agreement to lift the oil embargo against Iraq under the terms of paragraph 22 of resolution 687 (1991), once Baghdad has fulfilled the disarmament requirements imposed on it by the Security Council. We expect that if Iraq continues its constructive cooperation with the United Nations Special Commission, it will in the near future enable us to solve this problem. We also note the constructive position taken by the delegation of Iraq during the negotiations on the text of the resolution adopted today. We hope that this is yet another sign of Baghdad's policy as regards cooperation with the Security Council on all relevant issues.

We feel that through the work carried out we were able to improve the text of the resolution substantially. Unfortunately, it did not prove possible to solve all the problems. This had to do primarily with the fact that the principles of Iraq's sovereignty that are reaffirmed in the resolution are not always backed up by specific procedures for giving practical effect to those principles, in particular in respect of Iraq's northern provinces, where the humanitarian situation is deteriorating and the fault is not only Baghdad's.

A number of the resolution's provisions, paragraph 6 in particular, touch on issues in the bilateral relations between Iraq and Turkey, which issues should be resolved within that framework.

We hope that these remaining problems will be satisfactorily settled during the forthcoming contacts between the Secretary-General and the Government of Iraq, which are provided for in the resolution. In order to begin the implementation of the resolution as soon as possible, we urge the Secretary-General to negotiate generally acceptable procedures so that the resolution can really be effective and not remain so much paper, which, unfortunately, has happened with previous Security Council resolutions on this matter. At the same time, we call on Iraq to cooperate constructively with the Secretary-General in order to ensure that this useful initiative is given practical effect.

The President: I shall now make a statement in my capacity as representative of the Czech Republic.

Resolution 986 (1995) is of tremendous importance for several reasons — first and foremost because it is a humanitarian resolution aimed at providing for the essential humanitarian needs of the Iraqi population. As a consequence of actions taken by its leaders, Iraq has been subject to a variety of United Nations sanctions. It was never the intention of the Security Council that the poorest, most vulnerable strata of the Iraqi public should suffer unduly under these sanctions. Many have felt that if they do suffer, it is a result of their leaders' rather callous attitude towards the distribution of wealth in the country. With this resolution, however, the Security Council is demonstrating very clearly that it has not forgotten the hard-pressed ordinary people of Iraq and that it is ready to go one last mile in order to provide mechanisms that could alleviate their troubles.

We especially appreciate in this context the new wording of paragraph 8, in which the ordering of the

distribution of payments clearly shows the priority accorded the humanitarian aspect and which also satisfactorily formulates the manner in which the aid will be distributed all over Iraq, including the northern part of the country.

Nevertheless, the Security Council can still only alleviate, not resolve the humanitarian situation in Iraq. Resolving it in all its aspects still depends on the activities of Iraq's leadership itself, on how completely and how expeditiously it responds to all the requirements of previous Security Council resolutions that are still outstanding.

In this respect, the second important aspect of this resolution comes into play: it sends a clear signal to the Government of Iraq that the Security Council's position is not unjust or politically prejudiced. In this resolution, Iraq should see some reassurance that the same approach will be taken by the Council on other issues relating to that country. Most especially, by adopting resolution 986 (1995) we are not prejudging further developments that in the future might, and hopefully will, lead to the modification of the sanctions regime.

We note with particular satisfaction that the resolution does not preclude the implementation of paragraph 22 of resolution 687 (1991) and that it reaffirms the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iraq, something my delegation has frequently emphasized in this Chamber.

In addition to its importance for Iraq, however, this resolution has a far broader significance. Doubts are sometimes cast on the entire philosophy of sanctions, precisely because many observers feel that their burden falls unjustly and preponderantly on weaker strata of the targeted country's population. This resolution, if its provisions turn out in practice to have the effect we expect, may show a way of refining the generally blunt instrument of sanctions for other situations around the world.

When, as President of the Security Council, I met earlier this week with His Excellency Mr. Tariq Aziz, Deputy Prime Minister of the Republic of Iraq, I told him that I would hope and pray that the draft we were working on would be adopted unanimously and that the Iraqi authorities would then actually make use of it. Resolution 986 (1995) has just now been adopted unanimously, and we will be anxiously awaiting developments in the next few weeks that would indicate the position of the Iraqi authorities for, in fact, the spigot to the oil that is to be piped is, in the last analysis, in Iraqi hands, and it is now purely an Iraqi decision whether this resolution remains a dead letter or whether it is filled with real meaning.

In conclusion, let me express my delegation's admiration and thanks to all those who worked on the final text: seldom has the Council seen such earnest, sincere and intensive cooperation between parties with different points of view result in a unanimously adopted resolution, and I wish to pay a special tribute to Ambassador Cárdenas of Argentina, whose delegation initiated the work on it. It is his particular combination of expertise in diplomacy, the law, banking and the oil industry, combined with his personal tenacity and sincerity which, we feel, had a lot to do with today's success.

I now resume my function as President of the Council.

There are no further speakers. The Security Council has thus concluded the present stage of its consideration of the item on the agenda. The Security Council will remain seized of the matter.

The meeting rose at 12.20 p.m.

United Nations S/PV.3520

Security Council

Fifty-first Year

Provisional

3520th Meeting
Friday, 14 April 1995, 2.20 p.m.
New York

President:	Mr. Kovanda	(Czech Republic)
Members:	Argentina	Mr. Cárdenas
	Botswana	Mr. Outlule
	China	Mr. He Yafei
	France	Mr. Mérimée
	Germany	Mr. Rudolph
	Honduras	Mr. Martínez Blanco
	Indonesia	Mr. Thayeb
	Italy	Mr. Terzi di Sant'Agata
	Nigeria	Mr. Egunsola
	Oman	Mr. Al-Hassan
	Russian Federation	Mr. Sidorov
	Rwanda	Mr. Ubalijoro
	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	Mr. Plumbly
	United States of America	Mr. Hume

Agenda

The situation in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina

95-85315 (E)

This record contains the original text of speeches delivered in English and interpretations of speeches delivered in the other languages. The final text will be printed in the *Official Records of the Security Council*. Corrections should be submitted to original speeches only. They should be incorporated in a copy of the record and be sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned *within one week of the date of publication* to the Chief of the Verbatim Reporting Section, room C-178.

The meeting was called to order at 2.20 p.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

The situation in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina

The President: The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on the agenda. The Security Council is meeting in accordance with the understanding reached in its prior consultations.

Following consultations among members of the Council, I have been authorized to make the following statement on behalf of the Council:

"The Security Council is gravely concerned at the recent attacks on UNPROFOR personnel in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and, in this regard, has learnt with particular indignation that once again a soldier of UNPROFOR, this time a soldier of the French contingent, was deliberately targeted and shot to death by an unidentified sniper in Sarajevo today. The Council notes with similar concern that several other soldiers of the United Nations have been killed recently in similar circumstances.

"The Council condemns in the strongest terms such acts directed at peace-keepers who are serving the cause of peace in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Deliberate targeting of UNPROFOR personnel reflects the overall deterioration of the situation in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Council wishes to state once again that this is totally unacceptable. It reiterates that the cooperation of all parties and others concerned is indispensable for the missions of the Force to be carried out and demands that they respect fully the status of United Nations personnel.

"The Security Council invites the Secretary-General to investigate the circumstances of these acts and to report to the Security Council, taking into consideration the views of troop-contributing countries, on any measures which might be necessary to prevent further similar attacks, which should not remain unpunished."

This statement will be issued as a document of the Security Council under the symbol S/PRST/1995/19.

The Security Council has thus concluded the present stage of its consideration of the item on its agenda.

The Security Council will remain seized of the matter.

The meeting rose at 2.25 p.m.

United Nations S/PV.3521

Security Council

Fiftieth Year

Provisional

3521st Meeting

Wednesday, 19 April 1995, 10.30 a.m.

New York

President:	Mr. Kovanda	(Czech Republic)
Members:	Argentina	Mr. Cárdenas
	Botswana	Mr. Legwaila
	China	Mr. Wang Xuexian
	France	Mr. Mérimée
	Germany	Mr. Graf Zu Rantzau
	Honduras	Mr. Martínez Blanco
	Indonesia	Mr. Wisnumurti
	Italy	Mr. Fulci
	Nigeria	Mr. Gambari
	Oman	Mr. Al-Khussaiby
	Russian Federation	Mr. Lavrov
	Rwanda	Mr. Bakuramutsa
	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	Mr. Gomersall
	United States of America	Mrs. Albright

Agenda

The situation in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina

95-85321 (E)

This record contains the original text of speeches delivered in English and interpretations of speeches delivered in the other languages. The final text will be printed in the *Official Records of the Security Council*. Corrections should be submitted to original speeches only. They should be incorporated in a copy of the record and be sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned *within one week of the date of publication*, to the Chief of the Verbatim Reporting Section, room C-178.

The meeting was called to order at 10.55 a.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

The situation in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina

The President (*interpretation from French*): I should like to inform the Council that I have received a letter from the representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina in which he requests to be invited to participate in the discussion of the item on the Council's agenda. In conformity with the usual practice, I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite that representative to participate in the discussion without the right to vote, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure.

There being no objection, it is so decided.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Misić (Bosnia and Herzegovina) took a place at the Council table.

The President (*interpretation from French*): The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. The Council is meeting in accordance with the understanding reached in its prior consultations.

Members of the Council have before them document S/1995/311, which contains the text of a draft resolution submitted by France.

The first speaker is the representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina, on whom I now call.

Mr. Misić (Bosnia and Herzegovina): Allow me, Mr. President, to extend to you my sincere congratulations on the able manner in which you have been conducting the work of the Security Council this month. I should also like to congratulate your predecessor, His Excellency Mr. Li Zhaoxing, Permanent Representative of the People's Republic of China, on his able stewardship of the Council last month.

At the outset of this statement, I should like to express our deepest sympathy to the delegation and Government of France and to the families of the two valiant and honourable members of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) whose valuable lives were cut short at such an early age by the merciless and cold-blooded actions of professional killers, whoever they may be.

My Government strongly rejects all the methods that the murderers of innocent members of UNPROFOR and of Bosnian civilians — men, women, children and the elderly — have been using for more than three years.

In this situation — which could potentially uncover the nature of the war in Bosnia and clearly draw a line between the aggressor and the victim — my Government is exposed to an unacceptable formula that recently has been widely employed in delicate situations. It gives its assurance that there is no basis to believe that any Bosnian soldier was involved in the recent tragic events.

Bosnia and Herzegovina believes that this tragic incident must not be used for ethically unacceptable and inappropriate political manipulations that espouse the myth that all the sides in Bosnia and Herzegovina should be seen in the same criminal light and as having the same responsibility for the evil that has engulfed my country for more than three years.

Instead, this tragic occasion should be utilized as a turning point. Continuing to appease the aggressor side for the purpose of obtaining its cooperation and achieving even meagre success in a paralysed peace process can only pull us away from peace — a fact that has been confirmed many times throughout these years.

The truth, no matter what it could be and what its price might be, must be given priority over half-truths or complete lies. The truth must finally be faced.

Too high a price has already been paid, because for too long high-ranking officials, both within and outside the United Nations, denied the existence of concentration camps; because mass rapes and "ethnic cleansing" were not recognized and denounced in time; because the appeasers went so far as to use libel in spreading the morally corrupt fallacy that the army of Bosnia and Herzegovina could possibly have staged the massacres in the bread line or in the marketplace in Sarajevo. Each time, after such suspicions had been expressed loudly and clearly, the issue was resolved, as a rule, by a magic formula stating that it was not possible to determine who had fired the deadly grenades or shots. This sounds really absurd and it is very discouraging; but, beyond all that, it is totally damaging to the credibility of UNPROFOR and especially to its effectiveness, as well as to the prospects of the peace process.

The death of two innocent soldiers who were trying to prevent deadly sniper fire by erecting sniper barricades testifies to the continuing terrorization of Sarajevo; and to the fact that resolutions on safe areas continue to be routinely violated and that there are those who continue to violate the cease-fire and the cessation of hostilities. The soldiers' deaths will not be in vain if they contribute to a change in the situation. This draft resolution is a first step in that direction. We support the intention to establish new measures, on an urgent basis, that would prevent further attacks against UNPROFOR troops and contribute to the improvement of their security.

The Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina will sincerely cooperate in these efforts and will offer its assistance and support. We would also like to believe that they will logically lead to a review of the current state of the UNPROFOR mandate, which appears reduced and deformed in comparison to its definition and to the provisions envisaged in the resolutions of the Security Council. That is why we believe that this body will, in the time frame and the manner envisaged by Security Council resolution 982 (1995), give its full attention to this question, which is essential to the future of the peace mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as to the peace process as a whole. Departures from and self-serving interpretations of Security Council resolutions on the ground have not been followed up by adequate and timely reactions from this Chamber. There is not much time left to correct this situation and to make the necessary shift.

The President of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, His Excellency Mr. Alija Izetbegovic, has recently stated the position of our Government. We understand the calls for an extension of the cease-fire, but we cannot take on such an obligation without guarantees that it will not become a time frame from which only the aggressor can benefit.

We agree that it is high time the peace process moved forward. For our part, we have made the contributions that were expected of us. We accepted, almost 10 months ago, the Contact Group plan that Karadzic continues to reject up to the present moment. The fact of our acceptance seems to be neglected, more often than not, and the fact of Karadzic's refusal seems to be veiled by some countries. In this game, the decision of the Contact Group to give support to the party that does accept the plan and punish the one that rejects it seems finally to have been totally forgotten. Does this all possibly mean a gradual introduction of a new variant of a peace settlement? If that is what is envisaged, the message of my Government should be clear: there will be no more concessions from our side. In making concessions and sacrifices for the sake of peace, we have reached the edge of the abyss; any further step would mean a definite fall into that abyss for the victim and a cynical reward for the aggressor. Any step or intention in this direction would be terminal and would only encourage the aggression to continue. We strongly believe that no one has a right to do this.

With the death of the brave soldiers of the French peace contingent, attacks on the Bihac region continue, as does the terrorizing of the safe area of Tuzla and its surroundings. The strangulation of Sarajevo has tightened, denying to officials of Bosnia and Herzegovina and even to the United States Ambassador to Bosnia and Herzegovina the right to travel on United Nations planes. The murder and wounding of civilians continue as well.

In another wave of "ethnic cleansing", more than 150 Muslims from Bijeljina and 400 Muslims and Croats from the Banja Luka region have recently been expelled. Karadzic's followers persist in this practice, which all of us had believed had vanished with the defeat of fascism in Europe.

Unfortunately, fascism was long ago revived, and it has now advanced in the territory of the former Yugoslavia, in particular the part under the control of Karadzic's Serbs.

As we prepare for the fiftieth anniversary of the great victory of mankind over fascism, it is not excessive to suggest that the best way to commemorate that victory and pay tribute to the millions of victims of fascism would be to defeat these new practitioners of the revived fascism and disable them for ever.

The President (*interpretation from French*): I thank the representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina for the kind words he addressed to me.

It is my understanding that the Council is ready to proceed to the vote on the draft resolution before it. If I hear no objection, I shall put the draft resolution to the vote.

There being no objection, it is so decided.

I shall first call on those members of the Council who wish to make statements before the voting.

Mr. Wibisono (Indonesia): At the outset, my delegation would like to express its deep condolences for the recent terrible loss of the two French soldiers in Bosnia and Herzegovina. My delegation would also like to express its appreciation to the French delegation for its endeavours in initiating the draft resolution now before us expressing the Council's concern regarding the recent developments in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The Indonesian delegation is deeply concerned by the continuing fighting in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in violation of the agreements of 23 and 31 December 1994 on a cease-fire and the complete cessation of hostilities, reflecting an overall deterioration in the situation in that country. The cessation of hostilities is indispensable if political dialogue is to have any prospect of success. Indonesia not only urges the parties to adhere to the current agreements, but would also like to encourage them to work towards their possible extension.

In particular, my delegation would like to express its grave concern about the recent attacks on personnel of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), and urges all parties to refrain from any similar action. Only a few days ago, the President of the Security Council issued a statement denouncing such acts, specifically, the deliberate targeting and shooting to death of a French soldier by an unidentified sniper in Sarajevo, continuing the recent killing of United Nations soldiers in similar circumstances. In fact, soon after the adoption of the Presidential statement, we learned of a repetition of this cowardly act which took the life of another French soldier.

With the resolution before us today, the Council re-emphasizes its strong condemnation of the intentional targeting of UNPROFOR. The international community cannot accept any attacks of this nature on members of United Nations peace-keeping forces, and the status of United Nations personnel must be respected in all circumstances by all parties.

In this context, we underline the call on the Secretary-General to submit a proposal on measures to prevent future attacks. My delegation attaches great urgency to addressing this matter without delay, and we should like to re-emphasize the responsibility of the parties concerned to provide for the security and safety of all United Nations personnel.

Also, we emphasize the importance of the principle of the unacceptability of any attempt to resolve the conflict by military means, which principle is reflected in the draft resolution, and the draft resolution's emphasis on reaching a peaceful settlement. In this regard, we urge all parties not only to comply fully with the cease-fire and cessation-of-hostilities agreements, but also to show the political will necessary for the attainment of these objectives on the basis of acceptance of the Contact Group peace plan, which has been accepted by the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

My delegation still believes that a political settlement through negotiations is indeed imperative in order to re-establish comprehensive and permanent peace and security in that country and in the region as a whole.

Mr. Legwaila (Botswana): Let me at the outset express the sincere condolences of my delegation to the Government of France and, through Ambassador Mérimée, to the families of the two French soldiers killed in the alley-ways of Sarajevo this past week. The Security Council issued a Presidential statement last Friday condemning the killing of Sergeant Rals Gunther, and the response of the warmongers in Bosnia was to murder Corporal Eric Hardouin. The perpetrators of these cold-blooded murders should not be left under any illusion that they can intimidate the United Nations out of Bosnia.

It is demonstrably clear to us that there is a deliberate plan by elements of one or both of the parties in the Bosnia conflict to target the United Nations forces for attack, and this trend should be nipped in the bud before it gets out of control. It is unacceptable that the Blue Helmets of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), who left the comfort of their homes to go and help the people of Bosnia live in peace with one another, should themselves be victims of unprovoked attacks. It is imperative that the Council should institute specific measures to avoid a recurrence of similar incidents in the future.

We therefore agree with the import of operative paragraph 2 of the draft resolution, which requests the Secretary-General to submit proposals on measures to be undertaken to prevent attacks on UNPROFOR and its personnel.

The general deterioration in the situation in Bosnia makes us wonder how long the international community will have to wait for the dawn of common sense in that war-ravaged country. The extraordinary ferocity of the war, the physical devastation, the deliberate massacre of civilians and the wanton indifference to human suffering

have continued unabated for three years now. All attempts at mediation have thus far foundered. Surely the parties to that conflict should by now have come to terms with the futility of a war that is proving unwinnable; they should by now have come to the realization that they can never resolve their differences through the barrel of the gun. And yet, tragically, the senseless carnage continues, with no end in sight.

The President *(interpretation from French):* I shall now put draft resolution S/1995/311 to the vote.

A vote was taken by show of hands.

In favour:

Argentina, Botswana, China, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Honduras, Indonesia, Italy, Nigeria, Oman, Russian Federation, Rwanda, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

The President *(interpretation from French):* There were 15 votes in favour. The draft resolution has been adopted unanimously as resolution 987 (1995).

I shall now call on those members of the Council who wish to make statements following the voting.

Mr. Mérimée (France) *(interpretation from French):* First of all, I should like to thank the delegations that have been so kind as to express their condolences — which I shall not fail to convey — to my Government and to the families.

The Council last week adopted a statement condemning, in the strongest possible terms, the deliberate attacks on the personnel of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), who are serving the cause of peace in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Since then there has been another act of violence, yet again causing the death of one of UNPROFOR's soldiers.

These cowardly murders and totally unacceptable. They reflect a general deterioration in the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and are likely, sooner or later, to put UNPROFOR's missions there into the balance even though the Force has contributed to easing tensions and providing humanitarian assistance for the civilian populations.

This being the case, it was a matter of urgency for the Council to react by condemning these unacceptable acts against the peace-keeping forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina and for it to give a sign of its determination to have the status of United Nations personnel there respected to the letter. It was also essential to remind the Bosnian parties of the vital need to extend the cease-fire and cessation-of-hostilities agreements beyond 30 April next and to restart, immediately, the negotiations towards an overall settlement by accepting the Contact Group peace plan as a starting point.

France, which is the United Nations premier troop contributor, in Bosnia and Herzegovina in particular, expects a positive response from the parties, without delay, to Council's demands, and that UNPROFOR will thus be in a position once again to carry out its mandate.

Mr. Gomersall (United Kingdom): My Government condemns without reservation all attacks on the personnel of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) and shares in the grief of France at the loss of two of their valiant peace-keepers. The death of these two French soldiers last week amounts to deliberate murder. The parties concerned have a responsibility to ensure that these kinds of attacks stop, and the perpetrators of these attacks should be brought to justice.

These attacks underline the dangers which UNPROFOR and others working on the ground, such as the aid agencies and the European Community monitoring mission, face on a daily basis. UNPROFOR works to save lives in Bosnia, both by securing the delivery of humanitarian aid and by trying to contain the fighting.

My Government has consistently argued that UNPROFOR should remain as long as it is able to carry out its mandate at an acceptable level of risk. If UNPROFOR were to withdraw, the consequent escalation of the fighting would result in a humanitarian tragedy and seriously increase the risk of a wider and more terrible conflict.

Britain has been working to prevent this, and hopes that neither side in the conflict wants it either. There has to be a point at which troop contributors, including Britain, can no longer reasonably be asked to accept the sacrifices that their continued presence involves. We have not yet reached that point, but we do need to address urgently how the safety of UNPROFOR troops can be improved and how we can improve their ability to carry out their tasks. We shall consider seriously any proposals

to these ends. They will need to take into account UNPROFOR's peace-keeping, not its peace-enforcement role. We look forward to receiving the Secretary-General's report on these issues.

As in all peace-keeping operations, the only real guarantee of UNPROFOR's safety lies with the parties themselves. They must be brought to realize that war is no solution. Neither side can win a military conflict. In the end, they will have to return to the negotiating table. Meanwhile, it will again be the ordinary people of Bosnia who will suffer needlessly.

It is vital that both sides agree to extend the cessation-of-hostilities agreement and cooperate with UNPROFOR in implementing it fully. The alternative is renewed bloodshed, in which UNPROFOR's continued presence will be called into question. In that case, leaders on both sides would bear a very heavy burden of responsibility.

My Government, however, recognizes the Bosnian Government's concerns about freezing the existing confrontation lines. We agree that a cease-fire can only be, and must be, the first step towards a negotiated settlement. The Contact Group plan remains the starting point for further negotiations. We deplore the Bosnian Serbs' stubborn refusal to accept this and urge them to reconsider. We call upon the Council to continue its support for the Contact Group's efforts to take the political process forward.

Mr. Inderfurth (United States of America): My Government joins with the Council and with the Government and people of France in expressing sorrow and anger at the recent murder of two French soldiers serving as peace-keepers in Bosnia. They died, as so many have died in that tragic land, at the hands of cowardly snipers. This resolution will not bring those brave soldiers back. But it should serve to renew our resolve that the parties to the conflict in Bosnia must respect the status of United Nations personnel. It should prompt us to explore urgently the means by which UNPROFOR personnel might better defend themselves. And it should give new life to our support for an extension to the Bosnian cease-fire and cessation of hostilities that are due to expire at the end of this month.

Finally, this resolution reminds us of the valour of the thousands of men and women, of many nationalities, who are now serving the cause of international security as United Nations peace-keepers around the globe. Their tasks are difficult, perilous and, too often, thankless. They deserve the world's admiration and this Council's full support.

Mr. Lavrov (Russian Federation) *(interpretation from Russian):* The Russian delegation supported the unanimous resolution aimed at ensuring the safety of the personnel of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Together with other Council members, we once again convey our condolences to France, whose citizens on this occasion have fallen victim to terrorist acts, for which there can be no justification.

Russia, which has sent its own national contingent and a significant number of military and civilian police observers to Bosnia and Herzegovina, knows very well how high is the risk to the lives and the safety of the international personnel as they carry out their peace-keeping functions in that region. The number of deaths in UNPROFOR is already close to 200, not to mention the hundreds of wounded and other victims. Unfortunately, these losses are the result not only of accidents, but also of deliberate acts by all the Bosnian parties against UNPROFOR personnel as they were carrying out their duties. Many Blue Helmets have suffered as a result of artillery, mortar and sniper fire. We expect the resolution to serve as a serious signal and warning to all who would indulge in aggressive and provocative acts against the United Nations Protection Force.

The safety of international personnel is directly affected by the overall situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Unfortunately, the situation there continues to worsen. In a whole range of areas, there is no halt to military actions, in clear violation of the agreements of 21 and 31 December last year between the Bosnian parties on a cease-fire and on a complete cessation of hostilities. The situation is being aggravated by attempted offensives from the Government forces and by disproportionate responses from the Bosnian Serbs, including acts against the civilian population which is absolutely inadmissible. This is all leading inexorably towards an escalation in the conflict, to yet more victims and further suffering.

Another indicator of the worsening situation can be seen in the fact that recently a military helicopter reported by the Secretariat as belonging either to the Bosnia and Herzegovina Government army or to the Bosnian Croats was used to attack a Bosnian Serb position in the area of Donji Vakuf. That is the most flagrant violation of the no-fly zone since the relevant

Security Council resolution was adopted, and is indicative of the danger that air power and not just heavy ground-based weaponry will be brought into play in the Bosnian conflict.

The shelling by the Bosnian Serbs of Dubrovnik airport is also a cause for great concern, as is the earlier attack by units of the Croatian regular army and Bosnian Croat formations from the Livno area in Bosnia and Herzegovina. I need hardly mention the constant and massive violations of the arms embargo against Bosnia, which are being conducted practically in the open.

In this connection, we think it extremely important that the resolution clearly shows that the Council is convinced of the unacceptability of using military means to achieve a settlement in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Security Council has clearly stated that violating the no-fly zone is inadmissible, that the agreements of 23 and 31 December 1994 must be strictly observed and also extended, and that the peace talks must be resumed as a matter of urgency. We are convinced that it is possible if the Contact Group plan is taken as the starting point, to achieve agreements to suit everyone on a just constitutional arrangement for Bosnia and Herzegovina that will ensure equal rights for all the peoples living there.

I should very much like to hope that the Bosnian parties will react appropriately to the Council's resolution and that they will not allow new outbreaks of large-scale war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which would have unforeseeable consequences.

Mr. Cárdenas (Argentina) *(interpretation from Spanish)*: A few days ago the Security Council, with some sense of hope, adopted three resolutions that established new mandates for the United Nations presence in the former Yugoslavia. Today, on the other hand, the Council has just adopted resolution 987 (1995) because of the alarming, continuing and serious deterioration of the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in particular, and in Croatia.

The cowardly assassination of two French soldiers of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) must serve as a warning and must make us think about the future role of the United Nations in the conflict area.

We have stated before, and we will continue tirelessly to state, that if the parties do not wish to help themselves the United Nations cannot do so in their place. If this is indeed the case we must very soon consider carefully the options available to us in the future.

The Argentine Republic views the death of a United Nations soldier, whatever his nationality, in the same way and with the same sense of sorrow as it would the death of one of its own soldiers. In addition, we feel deep indignation at the cruel cowardliness with which the lives of the French soldiers were snuffed out.

The parties to the conflict must understand that such acts are inadmissible and that those responsible deserve the international community's strongest rejection and condemnation and must shoulder their responsibility in keeping with the norms of international law. We hope that this will indeed be the case.

At this time my delegation would like to express its complete solidarity with and sympathy for the French delegation as well as the members of the families and the friends of the soldiers who gave their lives while fulfilling a noble duty — so diametrically different from the assassins, who lack the most elementary morals.

Mr. Fulci (Italy): The recent cowardly murder of two French UNPROFOR soldiers in Sarajevo is for us, also, a source of profound sorrow and strong indignation. These feelings were expressed personally by the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mrs. Agnelli, in her statement here in New York yesterday at the NPT Review and Extension Conference. And even as we speak a wire has just arrived from Gorazde with the news that a mine blast there has wounded three British soldiers, one of them seriously. Three more victims. We cannot but feel even greater anxiety and indignation.

Italy therefore supported with full conviction the draft resolution proposed by France.

Today's resolution underlines three closely connected questions: the security of UNPROFOR personnel, which is indispensable for the continuation of the operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina; the need for an extension of the agreement for a cease-fire and a cessation of hostilities — whose expiration date, we would do well to remember, is dangerously near; and, finally, the need for a restoration of the negotiation process for a comprehensive and peaceful settlement of the Bosnian crisis.

My Government has followed with extreme concern the increasing violation of the cease-fire in recent weeks.

We believe that these incidents raise dramatically the serious threat of a general return to fighting, which would of course lead to new suffering for the sorely tried Bosnian people: hence the importance, in our view, for the international community to issue a new, vigorous signal to all the Bosnian parties to convince them that there is no military solution to the present conflict and to induce all of them to respect the lives, dignity, and freedom of movement of the international forces that have thus far played, and that continue to play — at the cost of great personal sacrifice — a fundamental role in trying to bring peace and humanitarian assistance to an afflicted people.

Mr. Graf Zu Rantzau (Germany): On behalf of my Government I have today, together with all the other members of the Security Council, voted in favour of the draft resolution which the Council has adopted today.

This resolution, as we all know, was called for by the assassination of two French soldiers in the service of peace. The feelings of my delegation and of my Government are divided between profound compassion for the families of those killed and for the French Government and indescribable outrage at this act, a most heinous, most barbaric, most cowardly, most unsoldier-like and most politically senseless act: the assassination of an unsuspecting person from a safe distance and under cover.

The act is all the more despicable if it is directed against young men whose sole purpose, in the service of their country, of the United Nations and of peace, is to bring about peace, to keep peace and to save lives. An act such as this proves the utter cynicism of, and the total disregard for decency and civilized human behaviour by, those who are responsible for the act. The question must be raised whether there is really any will to come to a peaceful arrangement in this conflict-torn area.

My Government's respect goes to those Governments that, in spite of the dangers that have been demonstrated on more than one occasion, still maintain the presence of their United Nations peace-keeping troops in the area.

The President *(interpretation from French):* The Security Council has thus concluded the present stage of its consideration of the item on its agenda.

The Security Council will remain seized of the matter.

The meeting rose at 11.40 a.m.